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Molecules, Cells and Minds: Aspects of Bioscientific Explanation 
 
Abstract  
 
In this thesis I examine a number of topics that bear on explanation and 
understanding in molecular and cell biology, in order to shed new light on 
explanatory practice in those areas and to find novel angles from which to approach 
relevant philosophical debates. The topics I look at include mechanism, emergence, 
cellular complexity, and the informational role of the genome. I develop a 
perspective that stresses the intimacy of the relations between ontology and 
epistemology. Whether a phenomenon looks mechanistic, or complex, or indeed 
emergent, is largely an epistemic matter, yet has an objective basis in features of the 
world.  
 
After reviewing several concepts of mechanism I consider the influential recent 
account of Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC). That account makes interesting 
proposals concerning the relationship between mechanistic explanation and 
intelligibility, which are consistent with the results of the investigation I undertake 
into the science surrounding protein folding. In relation to a number of other issues 
pertaining to biological systems I conclude that the MDC account is insufficiently 
nuanced, however, leading me to outline an alternative approach to mechanism. This 
emphasizes the importance of structure—function relations and addresses issues 
raised by reflection on the nature of cellular complexity. These include the distinction 
between structure and process and the different possible bases on which system 
organization may be maintained. 
 
The account I give of emergence construes the phenomenon in terms of 
psychological deficit: phenomena are emergent when we lack the capacity to trace 
through and model their causal structures using our cognitive schemas. I conclude by 
developing these ideas into a preliminary and partial account of explanation and 
understanding. This aspires to cover the significant fraction of work in molecular and 
cell biology that correlates biological structures, processes and functions by 
visualizing phenomena and making them imaginable. 
 
 
(298 words)
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“There are today only a few philosophers of science who would defend any major 
logical empiricist doctrines in anything like their original form. Yet the legacy lives on 
in assumptions held even by those most opposed to the logical empiricist account of 
science. One is the widespread presumption that scientific theories are essentially 
linguistic entities – maybe not formal axiomatic systems, but nevertheless something 
like sets of statements. A second is the presumption that the job of the philosophy of 
science is at least to ‘explicate,’ even if no longer to justify, the rules of rational belief 
and action that are supposed somehow to ‘govern’ scientific activity. Of course, 
some philosophers have challenged even these presumptions. A cognitive approach 
to the study of science, as I understand it, rejects both.” 
- Ronald Giere 1 
 
 
 
“[W]e are ignorant how far the mechanical mode of explanation possible for us may 
penetrate.”  
– Immanuel Kant 2 
 
 
“In general, we’re least aware of what our minds do best.”  
– Marvin Minsky 3 
 
                                                 
1 Giere (1988), p.28. 
2 Kant (1790/2007), p.243 
3 Minsky (1987), p.29. 
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1. The logical empiricist legacy 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this thesis I investigate the nature of scientific explanation and understanding. 
My principal aim, however, is not to develop a grand theory of explanation to rival or 
supplant those devised and debated by philosophers of science over the past half century 
or so. Rather I propose to investigate a number of related topics that are salient to 
explanation and understanding in molecular and cell biology. In this way I hope to be able 
shed new light on aspects of explanatory practice in these areas of biology, and reciprocally 
find novel ways of looking at philosophical accounts of explanation and understanding.  
 
Patterns of explanation in molecular and cell biology depend strongly on our 
knowledge of, and the assumptions we make about, the character of molecular and cellular 
systems. Hence much of the thesis consists of reflection on ontological issues. An 
important aspect of my position, however, is that to develop a philosophically satisfactory 
picture we sometimes need to take our own psychological capacities and dispositions into 
account. I therefore stress the intimacy of the relations between ontology and 
epistemology, and the importance of epistemic considerations generally for getting to grips 
with a number of central philosophical concepts. One such is causation, a traditional view 
about which could be expressed sloganistically by saying that things really exist if they have 
causal powers and so have causal effects. Thus causation and ontology are regarded as 
tightly intertwined, and things dignified with causal powers are considered to be 
unproblematically real.4 I see causation as a metaphysically loaded concept, however, and 
correspondingly regard the ontological distinctions we make as often being more 
psychologically contingent than is perhaps generally acknowledged. A view to which I am 
sympathetic is that we interpret and understand phenomena in the world by paralleling 
them cognitively using schemas and entailment structures of various kinds (Sloman 2005).5 
                                                 
4 Hacking (1983), for example, talks about the reality of entities capable of playing instrumental causal roles in 
experimental interventions in phenomena. 
5
 And increasingly via the epistemic prosthesis of computer simulation, as I describe in Chapter 3 in relation 
to protein folding. 
 10
Sometimes these are supported by very little besides raw belief.6 A lack of fit between our 
schemas and events in the world impels us to develop better schemas, from which the 
progressive character of science results.  
 
This overall orientation shapes, as well as reflects, the views I develop in the 
following chapters about a range of topics relating to biological explanation and 
understanding. The principle novel elements of my treatment are:  
 
1) a perspective on mechanism in biology that cleanly separates ontological from 
epistemological factors and which emphasizes the importance of structure—
function relations (Chapters 2, 4 and 5);  
2) a review of protein folding science and discussion of some of the epistemological 
issues surrounding molecular dynamics simulation methods (Chapter 3);  
3) a discussion of biocomplexity that highlights the ‘high bandwidth’ nature of cellular 
causality and the epistemological significance of non-equilibrium behaviour 
(Chapters 4 and 5);  
4) a jointly ontological and epistemological account of emergence framed in terms of 
cognitive constraint and schema deficit (Chapter 6);  
5) an attempt to understand genetics- and genomics-related information talk in terms 
of the distinctive character of DNA and the processes in which it participates, allied 
to our function-attributing tendencies (Chapter 7).  
 
I should mention too what I do not cover. The major omission is evolution, about which I 
say almost nothing beyond some brief passages in Chapter 7 relating to information storage 
in the genome. This is because my primary interest, which I share with Boogerd et al. 
(2007, pp.325-326), is in how micro-scale biological systems such as cells work in a 
proximate sense, rather than how it is that such systems have come to exist at all. Thus 
much of the thesis – Chapters 2 to 5 inclusive – consists of an investigation of mechanistic 
concepts and their relevance to molecular and cell biological explanation and 
understanding.  
 
To set the scene I first outline in the remainder of this chapter the philosophical 
context from which contemporary interest in those concepts has arisen. I begin by 
discussing the concept of reduction, which historically has played a key structuring role in 
                                                 
6 For example, in England even as late as the seventeenth century the causal powers of witches were 
sometimes held to account for the occurrence of particular events (Thomas 1971). 
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philosophy of science and philosophy of biology. The rise of the latter can be viewed in 
part as a response to the failure of the logical empiricist programme to articulate an account 
of explanation capable of illuminating biological thought and practice. This was because 
logical empiricism focused on formal theories and their relationships, whereas in many 
areas of biology formal theories – qua mathematically specifiable quantitative relationships 
of wide applicability – are thin on the ground. In formalist views of science that emphasize 
theories and theoretical relationships, reduction of one theory to another represents one 
sense of explanation. The idea is that a theory A explains another theory B if the formal 
elements of theory B can be systematically related to those of theory A, and if in some set 
of circumstances the formal picture (in terms of the values of variables etc.) provided by 
theory A looks the same as that of theory B. If the range of circumstances covered by 
theory A is greater than that of theory B then theory A is considered more fundamental 
than theory B. Moreover the fact that theory B takes the form it does is explained by the 
way in which the formal picture offered by theory A adopts the form it does in the specific 
circumstances covered by theory B. Other senses of reduction are less directly connected 
with the concept of explanation, but nonetheless enter into discussions of explanation in a 
variety of ways. 
 
From reduction I move on to more overt conceptions of explanation itself, starting 
with the view that explanations amount logically to arguments. Hempel’s deductive-
nomological (D-N) model of explanation is the best-known and most influential expression 
of this idea. I also look briefly at unification-based models of explanation such as those 
articulated by Friedman and Kitcher as a response to defects of the D-N model. What 
these different models of explanation share – besides seeing explanation in terms of 
relations amongst linguistic terms – is the deliberate avoidance of causation as a concept 
around which to build an account. It is this eschewal of causation – on the grounds that the 
concept is deemed too metaphysically laden to serve as a philosophically satisfactory basis 
for explicating explanation – that gives rise to difficulties. I then quickly survey a variety of 
accounts of causation and causal explanation, including the ‘causal-mechanical’ account 
associated with Salmon and Dowe. My treatment of all these different perspectives is 
highly compressed, there being insufficient space to do justice to the complexity of the 
relevant debates when my major focus is elsewhere. (In any case they have been covered in 
considerable depth by many other authors.) However, it serves as pertinent philosophical 
background against which to view the issues that concern me, and provides at least a partial 
account of how it is that concepts of mechanism (about which I shall have much to say) 
have been the focus of so much recent philosophical activity. 
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The received view and aftermath  
  
The formalist programme promoted by the logical positivists in the first half of the 
twentieth century led to a view of science and the aims of philosophy of science that 
continues to be reflected in the shape of many philosophical debates, even if often only in 
the negative sense of providing a set of positions to which contemporary alternatives can 
be seen as a reaction. The ‘received view’ to which logical positivism gave rise (Suppe 1974, 
2000), under the banner of logical empiricism, might be characterized as asserting that the 
central concern of philosophy of science is to formalize the relations between observed 
phenomena and scientific theories qua mathematical objects. Theories gain legitimacy to 
the extent that they can be shown to connect in formal terms (via ‘correspondence rules’) 
with ‘observation sentences’, or linguistic codifications of perceived phenomena. There are 
several points to note here. First, a strong distinction is drawn between a realm of 
observation and a realm of theory. Secondly, there is the sense in which observations are 
epistemically prior to theory – hence the received view might be said to be anti-realist 
about the objects of theory. And thirdly there is the importance attached to language and 
mathematical logic, allied to the implicit view that there is an intimate relationship between 
the two.7  
 
Underlying the logical empiricist programme was the belief that formal structures 
representing the relationships between scientific observations and theoretical statements 
and generalizations could collectively provide an objective view of how science works 
without making reference to metaphysically problematic notions such as causation. The 
aim of articulating formal relations between observations and scientific theories was more 
congenial to the mathematical codifications of knowledge possible (indeed prevalent) in 
physics than to than the looser, less mathematically systematized conceptual structures 
found in other (‘softer’) disciplines. This bias towards formal theoretical structures, 
supposedly amenable to interpretation in terms of the positivist model of science, 
encouraged the idea of a disciplinary hierarchy. Physics was the foundation, and it was 
towards the condition of physics that all other disciplines should aspire. There was thus a 
normative dimension to the positivist view (Suppe 2000, S104). 
 
                                                 
7 The difficulties that researchers in artificial intelligence have encountered in their attempts to develop 
computer systems capable of natural language processing and understanding might, however, argue for 
caution about regarding language purely as a logically driven symbolic system. 
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In order to extend the positivist model to incorporate all of science it was necessary 
then to show how the constitutive ideas of other disciplines are related to the laws of 
physics that the positivist model might appear to deal with satisfactorily. The classic 
formulation here is that of Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). They conceived of nature as 
being constituted by a hierarchy of objects which, in turn, defined a hierarchy of distinct 
sciences. At each level above the root level the objects are structures composed of objects 
from the next lower level. Thus elementary particles combine to form atoms, and atoms 
combine to form molecules; so the hierarchy ascends through living cells, multicellular 
organisms, and social groups. The sciences are individuated on the basis of the ontological 
level with which they deal, and reduction, on this model, consists in relating laws pertaining 
to the objects at one level with those of the next lower level via ‘bridge principles’ that 
identify the objects at any level with the set of lower level objects of which they are 
composed. The ‘layer cake’ reduction of the Oppenheim-Putnam model is thus a 
composite involving the conflation of two distinct ideas, one to do with inter-theoretic 
relations and another to do with mereology or the relations between wholes and their parts.  
 
This view – a working hypothesis – that the world is ontologically stratified and 
unified by formal relations between its layers is problematic, not least for its requirement 
for the existence of theories of a kind capable of entering into deductive relations. In 
contexts beyond physics, and certainly in biology, mathematically lawful codifications of 
knowledge are in short supply. And in what sense exactly could the Oppenheim-Putnam 
scheme and its machinery of intertheoretic reductions be said to show how science ‘works’? 
It is not obvious how the positivist project of ‘rational reconstruction’ relates to events and 
processes that actually play out in scientists’ minds or that get enacted within scientific or 
wider society.8 
 
Reduction 
 
Reduction is at the heart of the Oppenheim-Putnam worldview, but what was 
meant by the term? How is the reduction relation to be characterized? For logical 
empiricist philosophers of science the question amounted to asking how reduction could 
be formally articulated given a syntactically structured conception of science. Thus the 
                                                 
8 For Carnap this did not represent a valid concern (Carnap 1955). An account of why this should have been 
so could perhaps be framed in terms of how (1) the logical positivist programme was a principled attempt to 
purge philosophy of metaphysical excess, with logical abstraction and verificationism its main tools for 
accomplishing this, and how (2) the brain and its relations to the mind were still for the most part empirically 
inaccessible terra incognita. 
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important sense of the concept was seen as being to do with relations between formal 
scientific theories, and other possibilities were relatively neglected. The account of Nagel 
(1961) is the canonical expression of the logical empiricist view. His starting point is to 
note that reduction is about connections between different domains: 
 
Reduction, in the sense in which the word is here employed, is the explanation of a 
theory or a set of experimental laws established in one area of enquiry, by a theory 
usually though not invariably formulated for some other domain. 
(Nagel 1961/1979, p.338) 
 
Excluded as unproblematic (‘part of the normal development of science’) are cases of what 
Nagel refers to as ‘homogeneous’ reduction. These, as he puts it, establish deductive 
relations between two sets of statements that employ a common vocabulary. In other 
words, the laws of the reduced theory employ terms that occur in vocabulary of the 
reducing theory. The interesting cases of reduction identified by the definition given above 
are different in that the domain in which the reducing theory was developed, or in Nagel’s 
terms the ‘primary science’, ‘seems to wipe out familiar distinctions as spurious, and 
appears to maintain  that what are prima facie indisputably different traits of things are 
really identical’ (p.340). Thus an aspect of reduction so construed is unification: a certain 
mode of description is shown to cover a set of cases thought previously to require distinct 
modes of description. But such reductions go further, for the identity Nagel cites is 
combined with an asymmetry of epistemic value: the reducing theory is held to be more 
fundamental than the reduced theory.  
 
Schaffner (1967) describes Nagel’s model of reduction as direct, in that the model 
asserts that theories are related by establishing correspondences between their terms, using 
so-called bridge principles where necessary. This contrasts with indirect accounts, such as 
that of Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956), in which there need be no formally expressible 
relationship between the terms of the two theories involved in a reduction. Rather, one 
theory T1 is said to reduce another theory T2 if all the observations that can be explained 
under T2 can be explained under T1, and if T1 makes additional predictions that are 
confirmed and which are inexplicable under T2. This indirect connection via observational 
overlap makes for greater flexibility, and associates the notion of fundamentality with 
explanatory range.9 However, indirect reduction of this sort seems to be more about the 
                                                 
9 The classic example is the subsumption of Newtonian physics by relativistic accounts. The latter continue to 
make accurate empirical predictions under conditions in which Newtonian theories break down, although 
within particular bounds similar predictions are made by both sets of theories. 
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criteria by which one scientific theory replaces another, diachronically, than about the kinds 
of case of particular interest here which involving competing claims about the terms by 
which phenomena in some domain are best to be accounted for (Sarkar 1998, p. 27).  
 
A number of philosophers have developed taxonomies of reduction concepts that 
recognise broad families of variants. Van Gulick (2007) sees the major division as being 
between ontological and representational kinds of reduction, whilst others express more or 
less the same distinction by contrasting the former with epistemological reduction. There 
are substantial overlaps between these two categories, however, as Sarkar (1998) has noted: 
the kinds of object we suppose make up the world and the possibilities of and limits on the 
knowledge we can obtain by presuming their existence are not independent. Intertheoretic 
reduction is a case in point. Both ontological and epistemic components are involved, since 
theoretical terms are typically associated with objects we believe to be substantially realized 
in the world, and the structure of theories and the ways they work reflect and constrain our 
knowledge-making capacities.10  In the Oppenheim-Putnam view intertheoretic  reduction 
is conjoined with a particular ontological picture. This yields the mereological sense of 
reduction, which is about the ways in which wholes relate to parts. This sense of reduction 
is potentially problematic when applied to biological phenomena, since cells and organisms 
are not compositionally static even if they manifest relatively stable structure at a variety of 
scales. Such structure is typically maintained through processes that involve the constant 
turnover of matter, sometimes on surprisingly short timescales, and biological systems are 
in this respect very different from classical macroscopic mechanisms and machines (Dupré 
2008) – as I discuss at length in Chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
 
The idea that the properties of a whole are determined by the properties of its parts 
brings in issues to do with the direction of causation. The microdeterminist thesis is that 
causation runs exclusively from the micro to the macro, and indeed this can appear to be a 
natural view to take when one thinks about how the force field associated with a charged 
particle radiates outwards, say. But forces can converge too, and sometimes what happens 
at some delimited region is determined by the way in which multiple influences from 
different regions sum and interact. Hence there seem to be grounds for saying that 
                                                 
10 No doubt a high degree of mutual reinforcement across the ontological/epistemic divide often occurs, the 
descriptive adequacy or predictive power of a theory providing grounds for believing in the reality of objects 
appealed to by its terms. Striking examples arise in high-energy physics of objects being directly associated 
with terms found to be necessary elements of empiricially satisfactory (non-disconfirmed) theoretical 
frameworks: particles have been sought and found on exactly this basis. (Indeed, the Large Hadron Collider 
owes its existence to the desire to confirm the existence of the postulated Higgs’ boson.) 
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causation may also operate downwards – or perhaps we should say inwards – from the 
macro to the micro (see Chapter 6). 
 
The mereological sense of reduction pertaining to material composition and part-
whole relationships is related to another variant. This is the concept of methodological 
reduction, which approximates on one reading to the idea of material analysis.11 This sense 
is highly pertinent to present concerns, since a notable characteristic of molecular and cell 
biological work has been the way in which the systems of interest have been investigated 
through a strategy of decomposition. Indeed the early development of molecular biology 
went hand-in-hand with the development of analytical techniques to support such a 
strategy, such as centrifugation, electrophoresis and chromatography (Kay 1993; Morange 
2000). An important part of the debate about molecular biology and reduction is to do with 
the limits that methodological reduction qua material decomposition, and the apparent 
involvement of certain mereological, ontological and causal assumptions, might set on our 
explanatory powers. We can think of analysis as providing raw materials with which to 
synthesize explanations, and this work has a large cognitive component. An important 
question then is whether the raw materials so obtained provide a sufficient basis for 
answering all of the questions that interest biologists. 
 
Reduction and explanation 
 
Even a somewhat cursory survey such as the preceding brings to light the diversity 
of issues and dimensions implicated in different senses of reduction, including those of 
scale, stability, containment and causation implicit in mereological senses and the theme of 
epistemic fundamentality that is perhaps ubiquitous. One very rough-and-ready 
interpretation of reduction is that it relates to the terms by which something may best be 
explained. To be excessively reductionist, in this crude sense, is to have an unduly narrow – 
simplistic – view of what it is that needs to be taken into account in order to explain 
something adequately. In the limiting case there is what Dupré describes as unifactorial 
explanation, in which a range of phenomena is accounted for in terms of a single factor 
(Dupré 1993, p.87). He gives the example of Marxist theories that hold that all social 
phenomena are to be explained in terms of economics. Here it is clear that there is a 
connection with what is perhaps the most basic sense of ‘to reduce’, which is to diminish in 
number or scale. In the context of explanation what is being diminished is the number of 
                                                 
11 A more straightforward sense of methodological reductionism is just the excessive reliance on one 
particular experimental (or theoretical) methodology. 
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explanatory factors. A conflation with this quite basic sense probably enters unbidden into 
many of the instances in which we speak of reduction – even in moderately sophisticated 
scientific or philosophical contexts. 
 
Reduction in the positivist theoretical sense of Kemeny and Oppenheim or 
Oppenheim and Putnam can be connected with a particular view of explanation. 
Associated with this view is the idea that observation statements can be linked formally to 
theoretical statements, and that observation-proximate theoretical statements will be found 
to be subsumed under a smaller number of generalizations, which will in turn be subsumed 
under a still smaller number of yet more abstract generalizations, and so on. In other words 
it envisages a logic of science that can be explicated via the notion of reduction qua 
theoretical subsumption, establishing a theoretical unity as well as a hierarchy of 
abstraction. (The latter notion suggests something akin to – but not I think quite the same 
as – Feigl’s well-known 1970 diagram showing how formal postulates are linked to the ‘soil’ 
of observation via concepts of various kinds (see Godfrey-Smith 2003, p.35).) Had the 
logical empiricist programme succeeded, the observations we make of natural phenomena 
might have been shown in this manner to be logically consistent with a small number of 
highly abstract principles, and this logical consistency could perhaps have been said to 
account for, or explain, the observed phenomena. However, this view of explanation, even 
if something like it can be postulated to have been implicit in the logical empiricist 
programme, was not explicitly articulated.12 The reason, presumably, was that it would have 
run counter to positivist empiricism and anti-realism about theories (Godfrey-Smith 2003, 
pp.34-36). 
 
Explanation 
 
Reduction as theoretical subsumption played a major part in the logical empiricist 
picture of science, but it was not seen as providing a complete account of explanation. Far 
more influential in that respect was the deductive-nomological (D-N) or ‘covering law’ 
model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965), described by Salmon 
as ‘the fountainhead from which almost everything done subsequently on philosophical 
problems of scientific explanation flows’ (Salmon 1998, p.68). The key features of the 
account, according to which explanations are construed as logical arguments, are 
                                                 
12 Godfrey-Smith describes unification – presumably along lines similar to those outlined above in terms of a 
hierarchy of formal relations – as an ‘unofficial’ account of explanation within logical empiricism (2003, 
p.196). 
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highlighted by the name: the relation between the premises (or explanans) and the 
conclusion E (explanandum) is deductive, and the premises or explanans contain at least 
one law-like (‘nomological’) generalization (Li) in addition to a set of statements of 
antecedent conditions (Cj): 
  
L1{, L2, ... Li}     
C1{, C2, ... Cj}   
------------------ 
E       
 
Woodward (2003b) gives the example of explaining the future position of Mars (the 
explanandum). The laws in this case would include Newton’s laws of motion and his 
gravitational inverse square law, whilst the mass of the sun, the mass of Mars, and the 
position and velocity of each, would be provided as antecedent conditions. (If we were 
numerically computing the position of Mars we might want to add the other planets of the 
solar system to the model to improve the accuracy of the prediction.) 
 
The explanatory weight in the D-N model rests on the properties of laws as distinct 
from accidental generalizations, and on the deductive assurance that the truth of the 
explanans entails the truth of the explanandum.13 Hempel gives as an example of non-
nomological (i.e. accidental) generalization ‘All members of the Greensbury School Board 
for 1964 are bald’ (Hempel 1965, p.339). If this generalization were combined with the 
statement ‘Harry Smith is a member of the Greensbury School Board for 1964’, we would 
not thereby derive an explanation for the fact that Harry Smith is bald (if he is).14  
 
Does the D-N model describe necessary conditions for explanation? Certain 
singular causal explanations show that it does not. For example, Scriven’s example that it 
was the impact of my knee on the desk that caused the tipping over of the inkwell appears 
to be explanatory in the absence of any law or generalization (Woodward 2003b). Hempel’s 
response was that this kind of narrative statement incorporates implicit law-like statements, 
and hence it ought to be regarded as ‘explanation-sketch’ (Hempel 1965, p.423). An 
alternative possibility, however, is that statements like this show that explanation can often 
be related to our ability to imagine phenomena (an idea to which I return in due course). 
 
                                                 
13 The D-N model was later extended to cover cases where deduction is possible on the basis of laws that are 
statistical in character rather than fully deterministic (deductive-statistical explanation), and cases in which 
individual events are subsumed under statistical laws (inductive-statistical explanation). 
14 For Hempel laws are to be seen in the Humean sense as exceptionless, counterfactual-supporting 
generalizations that capture regularities in phenomena (Woodward 2003b). 
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As well as counterexamples to the idea that the D-N model constitutes an account 
of the necessary conditions for explanation, inasmuch as laws seem inessential, cases can be 
devised that call into question whether it describes sufficient conditions for explanation. 
Famously there is Bromberger’s example of the shadow cast by a flag-pole (Bromberger 
1966). The mathematical function that correlates the position of the shadow with that of 
the sun relative to the flag-pole is symmetric: either variable can be used to derive the value 
of the other since they are systematically correlated. Yet intuitively we feel that it is 
derivation in only one direction that has explanatory value: the position of the shadow of 
the flag-pole does not seem to explain the position of the sun. What appears to be missing 
here that could overcome the symmetry problem is consideration of causal factors.  
 
Friedman (1974) and then Kitcher (1981, 1989) developed alternative accounts of 
explanation in response to some of the problems of the D-N model.15 Their accounts 
retain the idea that explanations depend on or are constituted by relations amongst sets of 
linguistic statements, but are distinguished by their appeal to global rather than local 
properties of such statement sets. The key idea is that explanatory power is located not in 
putative special properties of laws and deductive relations but rather in the capacity of 
certain patterns of argument to unify our beliefs. Kitcher (1981) showed that Friedman’s 
account has defects that are not readily overcome. His own account is somewhat complex 
but depends on the idea that the set of scientific beliefs accepted at a particular time, K, is 
maximally unified by a set of argument patterns termed the explanatory store over K, E(K). 
Explanation becomes a relative matter that involves achieving a balance between the 
economy of a set of resources and their power, suggesting a possible connection with the 
epistemic asymmetry of reduction relations noted earlier. Objections to the Kitcher model 
have been raised on a number of grounds. Woodward argues, with Psillos, that it too 
suffers from problems in its capacity to handle the causal asymmetry of explanation 
(Woodward 2003b; Psillos 2002, pp.276-278). Gijsbers (2007) argues that the account is 
fatally flawed by the fact that it entails that every proposition can be explained by itself. 
 
Causation 
 
Both the D-N model and the unification accounts of explanation just mentioned 
eschew consideration of causal issues, and this creates significant difficulties. Part of the 
                                                 
15 Salmon (1998) notes an additional problem with the D-N model: its inability to provide an account of 
explanations of general laws – despite the importance of theoretical subsumption by reduction for the logical 
empiricist programme (p.69).  
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trend away from logical empiricism and its metaphysical abstinence has been a greater 
willingness to frame explanation accounts in causal terms (Salmon 1989, pp.107-116). 
However, this comes with its own set of problems. Hume noted the absence of criteria by 
which we might distinguish unambiguously between genuinely causal and non-causal 
events. All we have to go on are the regularities of priority, contiguity and constant 
conjunction of events, and this seems an inadequate basis for causal understanding (Hume 
1739/1978). Mackie made perhaps the definitive attempt to develop a workable regularity-
based account, in which he introduced the notion of the INUS condition (Mackie 1974). 
The idea is that a cause can be regarded as being an insufficient but necessary part of an 
unnecessary but sufficient condition for an event. Despite the sophistication of this analysis 
there remain problems, such as its failure to capture fully the difference between genuine 
causes and joint effects of a common cause (Psillos 2002, p.90). 
 
A recurrent and intuitively appealing idea is that efforts to explicate the notion of 
causation might succeed if they were framed to incorporate counterfactual conditionals, a 
possibility associated in particular with David Lewis.16 The root notion here is that we say 
that X caused Y when there are grounds for supposing that if X had not occurred then Y 
would not have occurred. But again difficulties are encountered in particular cases, for 
example concerning causal over-determination and pre-emption (see Psillos 2002, pp.96-
100 and Reiss 2007, pp.24-33), and the project looks ultimately unpromising. 
 
Salmon attempted to provide a workable account of physical causation and causal-
mechanical explanation. His idea was to distinguish between causal and non-causal events 
and processes in terms of the capacity to transmit information or a ‘mark’ (Salmon 1989, 
pp.107-111). A genuine causal process can do this because if it is modified at one time the 
modification persists without further intervention. For example, a light beam can transmit 
information because a modification made to the beam, e.g. by the insertion of a coloured 
filter, results in a persistent change. As Salmon puts it, causal processes ‘provide the causal 
connections among events that happen at different times and places in the universe’ 
(Salmon 1989, p.109). A causal connection or interaction is the intersection of several 
causal processes in which the ‘processes are modified in the intersection in ways that persist 
beyond the point of intersection, even in the absence of further intersections’ (Salmon 
1998, p.71). Salmon’s account also has a counterfactual aspect, in that a causal process need 
not actually transmit a mark; it is just that it has the potential to transmit a mark. Dowe 
later modified the account by reframing it in terms of the exchange of conserved physical 
                                                 
16 The counterfactual aspect of causation was noted early on by Hume. 
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quantities (e.g. momentum), and argued that interactions are causal in virtue of the 
transmission of conserved quantities (with no counterfactual element) (Salmon 1998, 
chapter 16).  
 
Even this account, however, proves inadequate as a basis for making sense of 
causal explanation in general. This is because causal explanations, even when they relate to 
the objects and phenomena of scientific study outside psychology, frequently appeal to 
factors besides the causal-mechanical interactions that actually occur. In the next chapter, 
for example, I note a criticism that has been made of a popular contemporary account of 
mechanism: it fails to encompass cases in which we explain phenomena causally on the 
basis of an absence of interaction. Sometimes things occur because they are allowed to 
happen, i.e. because nothing intervenes to prevent them occurring. And as debates about 
causation have made plain, objective phenomena such as spatiotemporal event correlations 
are often ambiguous or misleading about the underlying causal properties and powers of 
objects (e.g. Mackie 1974; Cartwright 1983 – especially Essay 1: ‘Causal Laws and Effective 
Strategies’). Hence, pessimistically, we might well conclude that attempts to capture the 
objective nature of the causal relation in terms just of the patterns that occur, actually or 
counterfactually, between events in the world are destined to fail.  
 
Despite all these difficulties we often are able to make causal judgements and 
ascriptions that serve well as a basis for explaining and predicting phenomena. How are our 
successes to be accounted for? An approach that figures less prominently in the 
philosophical causation literature than accounts of the kind just described is to see 
causation not solely in terms of objective properties of events and processes in the world 
but rather as something that in addition necessarily involves a significant psychological 
component. This somewhat Kantian approach would no doubt have been rejected by the 
logical empiricists as being metaphysically excessive, yet in the following chapters I aim to 
show its benefits. Specifically I shall make use of the idea (already mentioned) that we 
interpret phenomena using cognitive models and schemas of various kinds. This approach 
connects, I suggest, in an interesting way with the concept of mechanism that in recent 
years has come into vogue amongst philosophers of science. 
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Explanation and understanding 
 
The tradition in philosophy of science, part of the legacy of positivism, has been to 
emphasize explanation over understanding. Moreover the tendency has been to 
concentrate on explanations as explanatory objects rather than on explanation as an act, i.e. 
as it pertains to the verb ‘to explain’ (with an exception being the illocutionary approach of 
Achinstein (1983)). There have been important exceptions to this privileging of 
explanation, however (e.g. Friedman 1974), and recently the topic of understanding has 
attracted renewed interest (de Regt and Leonelli 2009).  
 
Part of the reason for the privileging of explanation has been the positivist aversion 
to psychology and sociology, and the associated belief that the ideas of those disciplines are 
inessential to explication of the logic of science. The concern has been to focus on what is 
objective rather than subjective, as borne out by Hempel when he contends that ‘such 
expressions as ‘realm of understanding’ and ‘comprehensible’ do not belong to the 
vocabulary of logic, for they refer to psychological or pragmatic aspects of explanation’ 
(Hempel 1965, 413), and then later when he says: 
 
Very broadly speaking, to explain something to a person is to make it plain and 
intelligible to him, to make him understand it. Thus construed, the word 
‘explanation’ and its cognates are pragmatic terms: their use requires reference to 
the persons involved in the process of explaining. ... Explanation in this pragmatic 
sense is thus a relative notion: something can be significantly said to constitute an 
explanation in this sense only for this or that individual’. 
(Hempel 1965, pp.425-426)  
 
But as Friedman notes in connection with these remarks, pragmatic can be taken to mean 
either psychological or subjective, and these are not the same. He argues that there can be a 
sense of scientific understanding that is both psychological (‘pragmatic’) and objective – and 
that the D-N model fails to show how explanations result in such understanding (Friedman 
1974, pp.7-8).  
 
De Regt (2009) notes the persistence of the objectivist tendency to seek accounts 
of explanation that make no appeal to psychology, and highlights enduring scepticism 
about the philosophical value of psychological interpretations of understanding, for 
example as evident in Trout (2002). He defends an account of understanding that 
challenges these objectivist positions by recognising the epistemic relevance of skills and 
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judgement. This account, which touches in various ways on what I say later, begins by 
distinguishing between three different senses of understanding: 
 
FU:  feeling of understanding – the phenomenal experience accompanying an 
explanation 
UT:  understanding a theory – being able to use a theory 
UP:  understanding a phenomenon – having an adequate explanation of the 
phenomenon 
 
UP is the objective sense of understanding that is, as de Regt puts it, an ‘essential epistemic 
aim of science’ (p.26), and which may or may not be accompanied by FU. Regarding the 
latter de Regt agrees with Trout that this phenomenal sense of understanding, the possible 
accompaniment of UP, is epistemically irrelevant. The novel aspect of de Regt’s argument 
centres on UT: he claims that UT is necessarily pragmatic, but is necessary for UP. 
Specifically what is required for objective understanding is pragmatic skill and judgement. 
The example given (deriving from Harold Brown) is the construction and checking of a 
logical proof. Each step in proof construction involves deciding which rule to apply at that 
step, and this decision-making is not itself guided by a set of rules; rather it is shaped by the 
application of a learnt skill (p.26). This means that scientific practice interweaves epistemic 
and pragmatic factors and that the latter have epistemic significance – contra the arguments 
of Hempel and others that they can and should be kept separate, and that the epistemic 
necessarily excludes the pragmatic. 
 
How do these ideas relate to explanation and understanding? De Regt espouses 
Cartwright’s simulacrum account of explanation, in which ‘to explain a phenomenon is to 
construct a model that fits the phenomenon into a theory’ (Cartwright 1983, p.17). Here a 
model is understood to be a mediating, idealized construction which combines aspects of 
theory and empirical information (Morgan and Morrison 1999).  Models on this semantic 
view of explanation perform a similar role to bridge principles in the reduction accounts 
mentioned earlier, but are considerably more flexible in terms of structure and manner of 
coupling to the relata between which they mediate (Giere 1988). It is this flexibility and 
freedom of choice involved in their construction that makes models a point of entry into 
scientific practice for the skill and judgement to which de Regt draws attention. Specifically, 
attaining pragmatic understanding (UT) means exercising tacit skill and judgement, for 
example in relation to approximation, idealization or visualization, in order to construct 
perspicuous and epistemically potent models. This in turn requires that theories be 
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intelligible, where intelligibility is defined as ‘the positive value that scientists attribute to 
the theoretical virtues [e.g. visualizability, simplicity] that facilitate the construction of 
models of the phenomena’ (p.20). De Regt concludes on this basis that scientific 
understanding is not completely objective, i.e. independent of the subject. Two people may 
possess the same theories and background knowledge, and one may understand a 
phenomenon while the other does not. The differences lie in their relative skills in 
developing and working with models that effectively link theory and phenomena. 
 
Explanation and understanding in biology 
 
Aspects of De Regt’s account of scientific understanding overlap significantly with 
my overall orientation, which accentuates the desirability of integrating internal 
(psychological, subjective) considerations with external (objective, ontic) ones. But at the 
same time it is unclear to what extent the account lends itself to biology, for it remains 
largely wedded to a positivist-derived concern with theory and the semantic accounts of 
theories and explanation to which that concern has given rise. To conclude this 
introductory chapter I now reflect briefly on biology’s distinctive explanatory character. In 
the concluding chapter I reconsider de Regt’s account in the light of what I say in the 
intervening chapters about ontological and epistemological issues in molecular and cell 
biology. 
 
I have already drawn attention to one respect in which much of biology appears to 
differ from the physical sciences: its relative ‘lawlessness’ and corresponding lack of formal 
theories (Beatty 2006). Physics is largely composed of mathematically expressible theories 
involving law-like quantitative relationships amongst variables, and chemistry is largely 
defined by the desire to account for and exploit law-like patterns of molecular 
interconversion. In many branches of biology, however, there is a need for more complex, 
irregular, or context-dependent epistemological and ontological frameworks. In these more 
heterogeneous knowledge structures, some of which I discuss in subsequent chapters, 
lawful regularities figure more as the exception than the rule. How much significance 
should be attached to this difference? On the one hand it seems clear that philosophical 
accounts of explanation and understanding that are framed principally in terms of theories 
qua mathematically expressible generalizations will be of limited utility in many biological 
domains, including molecular and cell biology. On the other hand maybe it pays to be 
sceptical about the viability of drawing neat distinctions between the major scientific 
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disciplinary categories. Perhaps simple views that contrast biology tout court with physics, 
say, are liable to be not just simple but simplistic.17 The fields of population biology, 
population ecology, population genetics and epidemiology, for example, are replete with 
(perhaps to the extent of being defined by) mathematical models, approximations and 
generalizations. 
 
Another important characteristic of explanation and understanding in many 
branches of biology is the central importance of visualization techniques. Investigation of 
the cell, for example, arguably began in the seventeenth century with the microscopic 
investigations of Leeuwenhoek and Hooke.18 Its subsequent development has been closely 
intertwined with the development and evolution of techniques for imaging cells and their 
contents, such as staining and electron microscopy. In recent years fluorescence-based 
techniques have become particularly important, especially in conjunction with possibilities 
for genetic manipulation (exemplified by the rapid adoption of green fluorescent protein 
(GFP) by cell biologists). At the molecular scale our knowledge of protein structure 
likewise depends on the 2D images and 3D models generated by specific techniques such 
as X-ray crystallography and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy, increasingly 
allied to the possibilities for computer modelling and visualization that I discuss in Chapter 
3. Publications reflect this visual emphasis – to the extent that the journal Cell has 
investigated the use of graphical abstracts as a supplement to the traditional textual 
abstract.19 Yet here again, as with laws, it is dangerous to generalize to all of biology. 
Structural characterization and visualization may be a fundamental aim of much work in 
molecular and cell biology, but visualization techniques arguably play a lesser role in 
population biology. By this I mean that while they still play a part, for example in 
representing and analysing the numerical datasets generated by mathematical models, the 
role of visual images here is secondary and instrumental, and obtaining them is not the 
principal goal or chief burden of the researcher. Figures in publications from these fields 
often take the form of graphs depicting quantitative relationships, as is common in 
publications in the ‘harder’ physical sciences (Smith et al. 2000). 
 
A third characteristic of explanation and understanding in biology is the part played 
by functional concepts. It is generally agreed that a significant difference between biological 
explanations and explanations in the physical sciences is that the former tend to make 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Elgin 2006 and Morgan 2009 on the idea that biology is not devoid of laws. 
18 Although it could probably not be said to have represented a distinct field of scientific enquiry until at least 
the mid-nineteenth century, with the advent of cell theory (Harris 1999). 
19 http://beta.cell.com/index.php/2009/07/article-of-the-future/ (last accessed 3 December 2009). 
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heavier use of functional terminology and concepts than the latter (see e.g. Hempel 1965, 
p.297; Ruse 2000). (I discuss this aspect of biological explanation in Chapter 7, in relation 
to ‘information talk’ and its application to genetic and genomic processes.) Why should this 
be so? One reason may be the more abstracted character of the physical sciences. The 
phenomena studied by physics and chemistry are often synthetically derived: the scientist 
constructs an elaborate experimental system which elicits or makes manifest a 
phenomenon that might not otherwise occur under normal terrestrial conditions20. The 
focus in physics is thus on the general properties of matter or forces believed to underpin 
the behaviour of specific physical systems and material configurations. These general 
properties are seen as exactly that – general (in the sense of universal) – and frequently they 
are revealed by and studied in non-natural systems. Sometimes they must be inferred from 
what can be observed on the basis only of a substantial body of theory, and acceptance of 
the inferences made is conditional on acceptance of that body of theory (which in turn is 
contingent on agreement about exactly what theories are relevant). In these circumstances, 
divorced from specific material configurations that might occur ‘naturally’ in the world (i.e. 
in the absence of artificial experimental constructions), and perhaps at some remove from 
direct observation, it is difficult to regard the ontological elements that are discerned or 
appealed to by physicists as being ‘for’ anything in particular. If they are functionless then 
(I conjecture) perhaps it is because they are context-free. 
 
The upshot of these initial reflections is that explanation and understanding in 
specific areas of biology appear to have distinctive characteristics that are not common to 
all areas of biology and which are not necessarily shared with the physical sciences. Any 
account that aspires to provide a comprehensive view of scientific explanation and 
understanding will almost certainly have to take these characteristics into account. I shall 
argue that the requisite account-taking must combine what we know about biological 
systems and what to an increasing extent we know about ourselves as cognitive agents. (It 
has been suggested that one of our cognitive characteristics is a generalized bias towards 
simplicity (Chater 1999), a proposal which calls to mind the well-known epistemic dicta of 
                                                 
20 An obvious objection here is not that this claim is wrong, but that it fails to distinguish physics from 
biology since increasingly research in the latter also depends on capacities to modify, intervene in or even 
synthesize novel systems, for example by applying genetic engineering techniques. However, there remains an 
important difference in that physics is concerned less with understanding specific material configurations 
than with elucidating relationships between abstract quantities and properties that may in principle be 
manifested by a diversity of physical systems. The relevant material configurations may be entirely absent 
from the known universe, or may at least not occur in a scientifically tractable form, and hence it is necessary 
for physicists to build colliders and so on in order to generate phenomena that reveal the physics in which 
they are interested. 
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Ockham21 and Newton22. Perhaps such a tendency is what underlies some of the strands of 
reductionism that the complexity of biological systems is so often liable to wrong-foot.) 
 
In the next chapter I focus on the concept of mechanism, which it has been argued 
represents an especially important explanatory concept in molecular and cell biology. Over 
subsequent chapters I will examine the relationship between mechanistic explanation, 
molecular and cellular complexity, and biological function, to illustrate how ontological, 
external and objective factors are interwoven with epistemic, internal and subjective ones. 
Additionally I aim to show some of the implications of this interweaving for the accounts 
we give of explanation and understanding. The following summary sets out the path I shall 
take. 
 
Outline summary 
 
In Chapter 2 I describe several senses of mechanism. Macroscopic artefacts such as 
clocks, engines and other mechanical contraptions (‘machines’) I take to be paradigm 
instances of a material sense of mechanism. I suggest that it is the neat alignment between 
structure and function in the generation of patterns of entailment that best captures what is 
distinctive and causally interesting about them. Another more general sense of mechanism 
concerns causal processes, a category which potentially includes singular and more-or-less 
unique causal phenomena. It is helpful to think of causal mechanisms in this second sense 
as being sometimes instantiated or implemented by material, machine-like, mechanisms in 
the first sense. I then discuss the popular and influential account of mechanisms and 
mechanistic explanation recently advanced by Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC). 
Their account frames the concept of mechanism in terms of a dual ontology of activities 
and entities. Whilst it goes some way towards addressing problems in biological explanation 
to do with the relative ontic and epistemic status of structures and processes, it can be 
considered only a partial account. I argue that it lacks the means to distinguish satisfactorily 
between equilibrium and non-equilibrium structures and processes, and downplays the 
explanatory importance of functional attributions. However, the idea expressed by MDC 
that mechanism descriptions are explanatory because they make phenomena intelligible, 
                                                 
21 Occam’s Razor is the principle that entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (‘entities must not be 
multiplied beyond necessity’). 
22 Rule 1 of the ‘Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy’ listed in the Principia (second and third editions): ‘We are 
to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their 
appearances’. 
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and that they do this by ‘showing how’ they come about, is attractive, and one to which I 
return.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the biologically fundamental phenomenon of protein folding, 
the spontaneous process by which a synthesized polypeptide chain adopts (in most cases) a 
sequence-specific three-dimensional structure. The phenomenon constitutes an interesting 
example of a process that is best regarded as schematically mechanistic, or as semi-
mechanistic. Examination of the nature of protein folding and the methods used to 
investigate it highlights the importance of visualization for explanation and understanding, 
consistent with what MDC say about intelligibility. It also forms a useful background to the 
discussion of biological complexity that occupies Chapters 4 and 5. I do not provide a 
monolithic account of complexity but rather approach the topic from several directions, 
for it is in the nature of the biological complexity exhibited by the cell to resist 
subsumption under a single all-embracing account. However, it proves useful to pay 
attention to the diversity and biophysical specifics of cell processes. Doing so leads me to 
discuss structures versus processes as explanatory bases, as well as the nature of biological 
organization. The chapter closes by assimilating these reflections into a novel and 
somewhat epistemic perspective on mechanism.  
 
The topic of emergence that arises in Chapter 4 in the context of cellular 
complexity is the subject of Chapter 6. I develop a perspective that stresses the intimate 
relation between the ontology and epistemology of emergent phenomena. My approach is 
compatible with several other recent accounts, but I argue that the epistemic neglect that is 
often a feature of those accounts is potentially more problematic than their proponents 
would have us believe. My negative account of emergence depends on the idea that 
(roughly speaking) we see phenomena as emergent when we lack causal schemas that allow 
us cognitively to model the entailment structures that underpin them. This offers as its 
corollary a corroboration of my preferred perspective on the metaphysics of causation. In 
addition it sheds further light on the perception of complexity and constraints on our 
understanding of complex phenomena.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 show how our understanding of phenomena in the world reflects 
our psychological natures. Function is an important explanatory concept in biology, but 
functions are not given to us as properties inherent in the objective nature of phenomena. 
Rather we attribute functions to structures and processes. On what basis do we do this? 
Frequently the answer is none too clear. I explore this theme in Chapter 7 by investigating 
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how the causal status of the genome has often been understood in informational terms. I 
am somewhat agnostic and non-prescriptive about such biological ‘information talk’, but 
think it interesting and useful to reflect on why informational properties have been 
attributed so readily in respect of genetic processes. I suggest that an under-appreciated 
view of the genome is as a data storage or memory structure that – necessarily, from an 
evolutionary point of view – partially encodes phenotypic details about organisms. This 
view goes well beyond what might reasonably be held to be ‘in the phenomena’, and 
teleological reasoning about the conditions required for evolution appears readily to play a 
part in its comprehension. Trying to see how material cycles of development and 
reproduction fit particular teleological schemas confirms the suspicion that biological 
explanation often depends on exactly the psychological factors that have been downplayed 
by the positivist philosophical tradition.  
 
The thesis concludes with further reflection on the topics discussed and with a 
number of speculations concerning explanation and understanding, in biology and in 
general. In particular I synthesize what I say regarding mechanistic understanding to 
provide a rough sketch of how the sensory (and especially visually grounded) forms of 
understanding often sought in molecular and cell biology might work in cognitive terms. 
The overall philosophical burden of the thesis is that epistemological considerations are as 
important as ontological ones for our understanding of explanation and understanding. 
Getting to grips philosophically with those and related subjects requires us to combine 
internalist and externalist styles of thinking and give consideration to the total system of 
mind in the world. This is because the concepts involved in discussion of these subjects 
frequently pertain to the relationship between mind and world, rather than being localizable 
to just one or the other. 
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2. Concepts of  mechanism 
 
Introduction 
 
 
mechanism n. 1 a piece of machinery. 2 a process by which something takes place 
or is brought about. 3 [Philosophy] the doctrine that all natural phenomena allow 
mechanical explanation by physics and chemistry. 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Tenth Edition, Revised)  
 
Much recent work on explanation, especially explanation in biology, has focused on 
the concept of mechanism. Very plausibly it is argued that biological explanation must be 
accounted for in terms other than the D-N model or any other framework that depends as 
heavily as it does on nomic regularities, for in biology these are in general few and far 
between. It is suggested that the concept of mechanism provides just the kind of 
philosophical resource we need. But what is the attraction of mechanism as a concept for 
making sense of explanation in biology? One might suppose its appeal to be connected 
with its seeming promise for relating causation to overtly material and spatial factors, 
thereby getting away from the syntactic or logical concerns that the logical empiricist 
tradition emphasized, say (as well as from the semantic accounts of theories to which it 
gave rise – see e.g. Thompson (1989) and Sloep and Van der Steen’s (1991) review). In 
addition there is the fact that that ‘mechanism talk’ plays an important part in the 
explanations scientists give of phenomena, there being an abundance of references in the 
scientific literature to the mechanism for or of X. Protein scientists, for example, talk about 
‘the mechanism of protein folding’, and in reflecting on their use of mechanistic language 
cell biologists have observed how ‘those of us who work on cell signaling would be hard-
pressed to avoid terms such as ‘machinery’ and ‘mechanism’’ (Mayer, Blinov and Loew 
2009, p.81). These researchers go on to question the basis for this reliance on mechanism 
talk:  
 
The analogy between cell signaling and man-made machines is all-pervasive, 
frequently adopting the imagery of elaborate clockwork mechanisms or electronic 
circuit boards. This perception is undoubtedly shaped by what we know: the 
machines that we use in our everyday life and the ways that we describe such 
machines in diagrams or words. But is this really an accurate, or useful, description 
of the actual processes used by cells? 
(Mayer, Blinov and Loew 2009, p.81) 
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(Answering that question will occupy much of the next several chapters.) Mechanism talk is 
not confined to biology, however: cognitive psychologists and philosophers of mind also 
speak of mechanisms. For example (picking a book that happens to come readily to hand), 
Alvin Goldman notes on p.3 of his Simulating Minds that insect species ‘feature sharp 
divisions of economic labor and intricate mechanisms of communication’. 
 
Do these different usages have a common basis? The dictionary definitions quoted 
above – especially the second one – seem to pick out quite economically apparently 
different senses of the concept involved in such phrases.23 But a number of questions arise 
in relation to those definitions and the intuitions to which they appeal. What distinguishes a 
piece of machinery from a process by which something takes place or is brought about – 
are the two senses related at all? If machines can be thought of as somehow representing a 
special or limiting case of the latter, then in what respect? (The third definition is rather 
different from the other two, and clearly taps into the extensive debates that have taken 
place concerning reduction. As I have already discussed major aspects of these I do not 
consider them here.) To begin with we can distinguish between material and causal senses 
of mechanism, with the latter being more general and more plastic. The two senses are 
related if one thinks of a mechanism as a causal structure, with some causal structures 
being realised materially. 
 
Machines, if they are taken to be largely macroscopic and for the most part solid-
state artefacts, are the classic exemplars of the material sense of mechanism. A key feature 
of the machine conception is the approximate alignment of structural and functional 
decompositions. After discussing this idea and some general issues concerning structures 
and functions I consider the much looser causal sense of mechanism involved in the 
second dictionary definition. Looseness notwithstanding, not all causal processes attract the 
designation of mechanism, and I outline some of the limitations under which the term is 
employed in this causal sense.  
 
                                                 
23 My colleague Dan Nicholson has reminded me that in using the Concise Oxford Dictionary as a point of 
departure in this way I am following Michael Ruse, who structures his (2005) on exactly this basis. In his own 
PhD thesis Dan is also examining the concept of mechanism, but from a perspective that is more historical 
than mine. In addition he is, if I understand him correctly (on the basis of the several presentations I have 
heard him deliver), concerned to make an ontological case for the view that it is thoroughly mistaken to think 
of organisms in mechanistic terms. I am interested, on the other hand, in how and under what circumstances 
biological explanations, including those that invoke mechanism talk, work. 
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These initial explications of mechanism form the background against which I 
discuss recent philosophical articulations of the concept and discussions of mechanistic 
explanation in science, with the emphasis on biology. The foundations of these influential 
neo-mechanistic perspectives are papers by Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) (which 
outlines what henceforth I shall refer to as the ‘MDC account’ of mechanism), Craver 
(2001), Glennan (1996, 2002), and the papers making up a 2005 special issue of Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science. A number of other publications have 
appeared since 2005 which develop and amplify discussion of some of the issues on which 
those works dwell (e.g. Bechtel 2006), and the mechanism literature continues to expand 
rapidly. Unless otherwise stated, it can be assumed that when I talk about neo-mechanistic 
perspectives I am referring to the MDC account as the dominant exemplar.  
 
I take one of the principal motivations underlying these new articulations of the 
concept of mechanism to be the desire to make sense of biological explanation in a way 
that does justice to the lability of biological structures, and to the fact that explanatory tasks 
consequently often focus on processes as much as on structures. Biological mechanisms, 
construed as the ontic targets of mechanistic explanation in biology, are thus rather 
different from the man-made structural assemblies we often think of as being 
quintessentially mechanistic. This basic orientation is one that I share, although I argue that 
there is more to be said about mechanism in biology than has been said thus far. In 
particular, I suggest that it is helpful to augment the new perspective with older ideas about 
mechanism that emphasize the importance of function.  
 
One consequence of thinking about mechanism in structure—function terms is 
that it becomes easier to distinguish between different kinds of biological process. I see it 
as a limitation of the MDC account that it employs novel terminology in a manner that is 
sometimes rather ambiguous and vague. The paucity of discussion by MDC of the exact 
respects in which cell biological phenomena might not be amenable to mechanistic 
interpretation leaves it unclear just how significant the concept of mechanism is to 
understanding biological systems, irrespective of whether the concept is construed ontically 
(in terms of what such systems are like) or epistemically (as regards how we gain knowledge 
of them). An account of mechanism so flexible that it looks potentially capable of 
subsuming all molecular cell biological phenomena is probably less useful than a narrower 
account capable of distinguishing between different kinds of such phenomena. An account 
of the former sort is likely to achieve its universality by discarding valuable distinctions, 
whereas the latter kind of account is likely to say something important about the diversity 
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of the phenomena that interest us and (by implication) the methods by which we 
investigate and explain those phenomena. 
 
One of the main tasks in this chapter is to interpret neo-mechanist positions 
regarding biological phenomena while keeping in mind the diversity, causal complexity, and 
explanatory challenges posed by such phenomena. I end up arguing that the concept of 
mechanism that MDC articulate is most promising not in relation to the features that have 
attracted most attention (concerning its ontological commitments) but rather as regards 
what it says about the epistemology of mechanistic explanation. Thinking about 
structure—function relationships may help to distinguish between mechanistic and non-
mechanistic (or between more and less mechanistic) cellular processes, potentially 
providing the basis for a more comprehensive account of explanation in molecular and cell 
biology than we currently possess.  
 
This chapter and the next three form an integrated series. In Chapter 3 I examine 
the phenomenon of protein folding while in Chapters 4 and 5 I describe the complexity of 
cellular phenomena, and argue that current mechanistic concepts provide an inadequate 
basis for making sense of some of the most significant features of such phenomena. 
Especially problematic is the relationship between structure and process. This leads me to 
develop a new perspective on mechanism that is, I argue, better able than the MDC 
account to deal with some of the distinctive characteristics of biological systems. 
 
A material conception of mechanism: machines 
 
A long tradition, going back at least to the mechanical philosophy we associate with  
Galileo and Descartes, identifies the concept of mechanism with the structural and 
functional characteristics of mechanical devices and machines such as clocks (Canguilhem 
1952/2008).24 This is the first sense of mechanism mentioned in the dictionary definition 
quoted at the start of this chapter. On this view systems are regarded as mechanistic to the 
extent that they share various features with such artefacts. These include being constituted 
of parts that are assembled into structures having definite and relatively stable spatial 
relationships, and when the relationships amongst parts do change it is in accordance with 
particular points, lines and planes of articulation. Typically such structures are readily 
represented diagrammatically: 
                                                 
24 Much of what I say in this chapter is based on or inspired by Gregory (1981, Chapter 3) and Dupré (2008).  
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A key property of such a structure [i.e. a ‘bona fide manmade machine’] is that it 
can be described in terms of a parts list or blueprint for how those parts fit 
together. Any machines, from a can-opener to a computer chip to an Airbus, can 
be rendered in a diagram with sufficient detail that someone who has never seen 
one could make it from the component parts. Using the diagram, one could 
assemble any number of individual machines, each of which would be virtually 
identical in appearance and performance. 
(Mayer, Blinov and Loew 2009, p. 81) 
 
The shape and shape stability of a machine’s parts are critically important. Shape stability is 
attributable to the fact that – under the intended operating conditions of the mechanism – 
the parts are solid aggregations of matter. Shape stability matters because part shapes put 
very stringent spatial constraints on the relative motions that can occur between parts 
under standard operating conditions, and it is these structural constraints that define the 
action of the mechanism (qua pattern of configurational change). A simple illustration of 
the importance of shape stability is the fact that an extended cylinder situated in an 
appropriately sized cylindrical hole running through another object will rotate only if it is 
straight. A more complex example concerns a system comprising two cogs, for which it is 
intended that rotation of one of the cogs will cause the rotation of the other. One cog will 
mesh satisfactorily with another throughout its rotation only if its teeth are uniformly 
spaced in a circular arrangement, with the tooth spacing matching that of the teeth of the 
cog with which it is intended to mesh, and with its axis of rotation lying at the centre of the 
circle its teeth define, and so on.25  
  
Associated with this conception of mechanism is the idea that parts have particular 
functions. If the overall mechanism has function F, then its components can be thought of 
as having sub-functions that contribute towards the accomplishment or performance of F. 
The overall structure of the mechanism is the result of the hierarchical assembly of a 
number of structural sub-systems, the overall function of the mechanism results from the 
combination of sub-functions, and structural sub-systems implement the sub-functions. In 
other words there is an alignment between the structural and functional decompositions of 
the mechanism. This alignment of structure and function is related to notions of system 
                                                 
25 Actually, even this short description is not strictly correct. It is unnecessary for the teeth of the two cogs to 
share the same uniform spacing around the entire circumference, so long as the tooth spacing on one cog 
corresponds with that on the other at the point of engagement, for each rotational position (of each cog) – 
and so long as the circumference of one cog is an integral multiple of that of the other. And for the teeth of 
the two cogs to always engage the cogs need not even be circular, if the location of the axes of rotation are 
either positioned appropriately vis-à-vis rotational positions or can move laterally in a system that pulls the 
two axles together to maintain cog engagement at all times.  
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decomposability and modularity discussed by, for example, Simon (1996) (in relation to 
which see also Chapter 4).  
 
The toy mechanical clock shown in Figure 1 illustrates these ideas. To understand 
how the clock works involves recognising and appreciating the roles of several functionally 
distinct structural sub-systems. First there is the sub-system comprising the mainspring, 
winder and driving wheel. Turning the winder places the spring under tension that is 
released by rotation of the driving wheel. Rotation of the driving wheel is communicated 
via a series of cogs called the driving train to the clock hands. The driving train can be 
thought of as a functionally discrete sub-system. The bell clapper arm is driven by the 
driving train in such a way that the clock chimes four times for each rotation of the hour 
hand. If this were all that the clock consisted of – the driving train, the hands and the 
bell/clapper sub-system – then the relevant hand rotations and chimings would occur, but 
at the wrong rates. To ensure that the clock keeps time requires the presence of another 
sub-system, the escapement mechanism. Another cog train, distinct from the driving train, 
couples the driving wheel to the escape wheel, the teeth of which engage with the anchor 
that is attached to the pendulum. The movement of the pendulum, the period of which is 
determined by its mass and length, causes the anchor to rock back and forth. With each 
rocking movement the escape wheel is permitted to rotate by one cog tooth (driven by the 
driving wheel’s mainspring-powered rotation) as one of the anchor teeth lifts clear, before 
being arrested as the other anchor tooth engages. The escapement thus acts as a brake on 
the driving train, and places the hand rotations under the regulation of the pendulum. 
 
Another more subtle feature should be noted. In order to ensure that the pendulum 
regulates the driving train, it must be able to exert a force at the escape wheel sufficient to 
brake the rotation of the driving wheel. In practice this is readily achieved, since the gearing 
is such as to favour the possibility, i.e. the escape wheel rotates much faster than the 
driving wheel. Whether this strikes the reader as readily intelligible will depend on a variety 
of factors, but practical experience with building and manipulating systems of gears using 
Lego or Meccano, for example, no doubt helps to develop the relevant intuitions. (I shall 
return to some of these psychological matters in due course.) 
 
 
 36
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Mechanical clock 
The driving wheel is the lower of the two red cogs (with white front fascia). This turns the 
black cog, which turns the green cog, which in turn rotates both the pink cog that turns the 
hour hand and a smaller white cog (barely visible) that turns the minute hand. The driving 
wheel is regulated by the escapement mechanism, formed by the cog series blue – yellow – 
upper red – upper white. The last is coupled to, and regulated by, the pendulum via the 
anchor (lower picture). The bell is the silver dome behind dial numeral ‘6’. 
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 First thoughts about structures and functions 
 
The material, physical aspects of the characterization given above of machine-type 
mechanisms – that they are composed of solid-state parts arranged in particular ways 
defined by their shapes – provide the foundation for the more abstract claim that in such 
mechanisms the structural and functional decompositions are aligned. But given that this 
alignment too is a spatial matter – structural and functional boundaries are in rough spatial 
correspondence – why does the claim seem more abstract? It is, I suggest, because 
functional attribution is itself a somewhat problematic idea, raising not just the question of 
what is meant by a function, but also the issue of the basis on which we make functional 
attributions in respect of system components.26 In contrast, structural concepts seem much 
more straightforward, at least in the context of machine-type solid-state mechanisms. This 
is presumably related to the visibility and stability of solid-state forms. Our perceptual 
capacities mean that we are well-equipped to recognize objects in the world by their shapes, 
colours, textures and so on, and we have strong aptitudes for recollecting, imagining, 
transforming and comparing the objects we recognize (Bruce et al. 2003). In addition we 
are capable of imagining both wholly new (as yet unseen in the world) objects and modified 
versions of objects we have experienced, and we can imagine acting on these imaginary 
objects in a wide variety of ways. Such imaginary thought is underpinned by the confidence 
with which we believe that, under the conditions under which we ourselves exist, solid-
state objects are likely (all other things being equal, if they are not in tension, etc.) to retain 
their forms.27 
 
Yet even in this structural sense matters are not as straightforward as they might 
seem. We experience ourselves as having little difficulty thinking about structures as three-
dimensional objects, but three-dimensional structure must be derived from raw sensory 
stimuli. The processes by which this occurs depend on the interplay of immediate visual 
experience with prior visual experience, and on the integration of visual data with data 
from other senses such as touch. Perceptual illusions sometimes shed light on the 
automatic and subconscious bases on which such derivations are usually made (Gregory 
1997). My purpose here, however, is not to discuss in laborious detail the psychology of 
visual perception and its role in the generation of our structural knowledge of the world. 
Suffice it to say that the fact that the structural side of the structure—function relation 
                                                 
26 I pick out the issue of functional attribution for further analysis in Chapter 7. 
27 Later I discuss the idea that living systems are organized in ways that potentially make the drawing of 
parallels with the structures of artefacts somewhat problematic. 
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seems relatively straightforward is largely a reflection of the strength and automaticity of 
our combined perceptual and cognitive capacities. An upshot of this is that we tend to 
think of persistent structural phenomena as being unproblematically ‘out there’ in the 
world, and hence view them as more a matter of (objective) ontology than (subjective) 
epistemology. 
 
On the functional side things are more difficult. What are functions, and how do 
we attribute functions to objects and systems (including biological ones)? These are 
enormous questions attended by a correspondingly voluminous literature, and I will not 
attempt to do them full justice here. As regards the first question Wouters (2003, 2005) 
provides useful summaries and discussion of some of the major philosophical options. 
Among the most prominent issues that arise in connection with the concept of function is 
the fact that it seems to make sense to attribute functions only in respect of certain kinds of 
object. We speak naturally of the function of a cup, or of the liver, but prima facie it seems 
odd to talk about the function of the moon28. And similarly pressing is the way in which 
functions are often not so much about what things straightforwardly do as about what they 
ought to do; hence something can operate incorrectly, or fail to perform its normal function. 
As Wouters notes, ‘the main task of a theory of function is to explain how this norm arises 
in biological contexts’ (2005, p.124). One option for explaining the normativity of function 
in the context of man-made artefacts is to appeal to the intentions of a designer, and it is 
suggested by some, e.g. Millikan (1984), that in the biological realm the role of designer can 
be fulfilled by natural selection. Subtly different from these ‘selected effect’ accounts are 
so-called ‘consequence etiology’ accounts of function (e.g. Wright 1973), that see both 
artefacts and organismic parts as being present because of their biologically advantageous 
consequences. Boorse (1976) frames his account in terms of goal-directedness: things have 
functions inasmuch as they contribute towards the attainment of particular goals. 
Meanwhile Cummins (1975) develops an account around the idea that functions are related 
to the causal roles objects play within particular systemic contexts.  
 
Wouters himself argues that in attempting to derive an account of function relevant 
to biological contexts we should pay attention to scientific practice. He notes that biologists 
make extensive use of functional terminology, but rarely does such use relate to diachronic 
matters like evolutionary origins. This suggests that we might be well-advised to direct our 
                                                 
28 But it would probably not seem so if we were to use the moon as a component of some astronomic 
contraption for achieving specific aims, e.g. for hurling a spacecraft out into space by harnessing the moon’s 
gravitational field. 
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efforts towards explicating and utilizing something like a Cummins-style account, by 
attending to what it is for something to play a certain causal role within a system. This is 
the second of the four senses of function Wouters describes in his (2003) (his function2) 
and is the kind of account of function that I shall adopt in what follows. At times, 
however, I will also have recourse to his first sense (his function1), which is the idea of 
function as activity. Unless otherwise stated it can be assumed that I mean function as 
causal role. 
 
One reason why functional attribution is problematic is that functions are in 
general underdetermined by structural and causal/mechanical facts. A car factory, for 
example, can be seen straightforwardly as having the function of making cars, of course. 
But for certain purposes it may make as much sense to see its function as being to provide 
jobs for large numbers of workers, and that is a role it does indeed also fulfil. (One can well 
imagine a politician, for example, seeing it in just such terms.) The functions of man-made 
artefacts often appear to be interest- or purpose-relative in this way, which perhaps bodes 
ill for attempts to provide an account of function solely in terms of the objective features 
of objects or processes in the world. Indeed maybe this subjective aspect of function 
attribution is an important feature and something to be incorporated into the account we 
give of functions and functional explanation, rather than something to be factored out or 
bypassed.   
 
When we attribute a function to an artefactual object or process we are implicitly 
saying something about what could replace it without detriment to the fulfilment of some 
specific goal or ongoing purpose, or the occurrence of some activity. To continue with the 
car factory example, if our interest is in ensuring employment for large numbers of people, 
a functional alternative to the factory – albeit perhaps not a terribly satisfactory one – 
might be a shopping complex. If the goal is to consume lots of steel then the car factory 
could be replaced by a tractor factory, or a ship-yard. Ascribing a function to something 
also enables us to think about how to improve its performance relative to that function.  
 
Discussions of function in biological contexts often focus on the heart as an 
example. It seems straightforwardly the case that the function of the heart is to pump 
blood. But the beating of a heart means that as well as pumping blood it produces sound. 
What is it that makes pumping blood the function of the heart and not the production of 
sound? Again, thinking in counterfactual replacement terms is helpful: it forces us to think 
about what activity it is that the heart provides for that means that its possessor is able to 
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live a biologically normal existence. If the heart were replaced by a device for producing 
heart sounds – perhaps by playing a recording – then this condition would not be met 
(unless the production of the sound happened to be accompanied by the pumping of blood 
as a side-effect). If the heart were replaced by an artificial device for pumping blood then 
the condition would be met, even if the device were silent. (By stipulating that an organism 
with a heart replacement is able to live a biologically normal existence, I mean that it would 
live the existence it would live in the absence of heart replacement, assuming that its 
original heart were typical of those of other members of its species.29) 
 
It might be felt that this counterfactual way of looking at function has little 
connection with a Cummins-style role-in-a-system interpretation. Yet there is common 
ground inasmuch as there is a focus on the causal possibilities that obtain in a given 
context. Function attribution can be seen as relating specific structures or processes to 
broad classes of counterfactual structures or processes, all of which would ensure that 
certain goals are capable of being met given a certain context. And goal accomplishment is 
about bringing things about, which relates to acts, activities and states of affairs (with 
connotations of Wouters’ function1). (But note that it can be a goal to ensure that things 
remain as they are, in which case what is to be brought about is continuity or maintenance 
of the status quo.) A goal can be accomplished if an event occurs by way of an act or if an 
activity is performed, perhaps on an ongoing basis, or if a state of affairs is brought into 
being or perpetuated. Part of what functional attributions do is allow us to think about 
causation in structurally (physically) non-specific terms. Knowing that something fulfils a 
particular function provides reassurance about the fulfilment of causal requirements within 
a particular context, whilst allowing for what could be called ‘explanation with abstraction’. 
The parts of an artefact set structural and functional constraints on each other. If an 
artefact part P has function F, then the structures of the parts that P interacts with will set 
constraints on P’s structure or any functional replacement for P. But recall that I said that 
by attributing functions we associate structures with classes of counterfactual structure. 
Many man-made systems are composed of structural and functional modules that interact 
via standardized interfaces of various sorts. A replacement module need only respect the 
relevant interface standards for system function to be maintained. Hierarchical organization 
means that if a module contains sub-modules, then a replacement module need not respect 
any particular organization in respect of its sub-modules, so long as it respects the 
standards relevant to interfacing with other modules. Two functionally equivalent artefacts 
                                                 
29 There are no doubt still issues here that would merit further discussion in a fuller and more detailed 
treatment, but this gloss I believe serves present purposes adequately. 
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may have quite different internal architectures, provided that they end up presenting the 
same functional capacities to the host system or functional context.30  
 
In general then I shall, as I say, adopt the view that functions equate to causal roles 
within systems. Typically the fulfilment of such a role is associated with the performance of 
acts and activities of various kinds. More specifically, fulfilling a function depends on 
provision of the causal capacities that underpin particular acts and activities in a given 
context. Sometimes it is possible to identify the occurrence of particular acts or the 
performance of particular activities with goal attainment. However, we tend to attribute 
goal possession and attainment to only certain sorts of causal system, and to identify what 
it is that makes for such systems is not my immediate concern.  
 
If we think back to the example of the clock then it can be argued that there is a 
certain perspective we adopt when we are confronted by such a mechanism and wish to 
understand how it works, relative to our knowledge that the clock is intended to display the 
time by appropriate variation of the positions of its hands. If asked what we think the 
function of a certain part of the clock is, we examine the physical structure of the clock and 
observe it in operation. Through mechanical reasoning we are generally able to hazard a 
good guess as to what it is that a part accomplishes in material cause/effect terms. Thus we 
might say that the function of the chime wheel is to raise the clapper arm so that the bell is 
periodically struck. This mechanical form of reasoning comes very naturally to us, and is 
interesting in its own right, but I shall not reflect further on it just yet. For now I shall be 
content to note merely that where material mechanisms – artefacts, machines – are 
concerned it is possible to think of the functions of parts in physical cause/effect terms in 
the overall context of the mechanism’s ‘normal’ operation. Almost invariably, however, 
even mechanical reasoning takes place in the context of orienting knowledge (or 
guesswork) about overall artefact function, i.e. about the activity or overall ends to which 
the artefact’s structures contribute. 
 
A causal conception of mechanism 
 
The machine conception of mechanism can be contrasted with a looser and more 
abstract sense that I shall call the causal conception. This pertains to the second dictionary 
                                                 
30 Structural diversity in biology can be related to the idea that natural selection acts at the functional level and 
is blind to structure (Rosenberg 2001). 
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definition – which stated that a mechanism is ‘a process by which something takes place or 
is brought about’. The range of phenomena this notion comprehends is vast; potentially it 
might be thought to include all the processes and events in the world to which the notion 
of causation might be applied. In principle it would therefore seem to include singular 
causal events and chains of events. Shortly I shall show how in practice a range of factors 
serve to narrow down substantially the domain of applicability. Consider the kind of 
singular causal process that we often recount in narrative terms and of which the following 
is an example: 
 
‘The man got on the bus at High Street at 5pm, but the traffic going out of town 
was slow owing to an accident that had occurred earlier in the day. By the time the 
bus reached the ring-road two miles away the supermarket had shut. As the bus the 
man had caught was the last bus of the day he had to walk home and, because he 
had been unable to buy food, he had to have beans on toast for supper.’ 
 
Such a narrative answers numerous potential questions. When did the man catch the bus? 
Why was the traffic slow? Why did he have beans on toast? In interpreting the narrative we 
make lots of assumptions, on the basis of common sense as well as through the application 
of more specific cultural knowledge. We know that most shops close in the late afternoon 
(in the United Kingdom at least – cultural context presumably matters), so it seems 
unsurprising that he was unable to buy food once the supermarket had shut – presumably 
other shops would have been shut at the time in question. Traffic accidents often do 
disrupt the flow of traffic. And so on. A picture of a series of entailments is created that 
explicates how events unfold in space and time, and this is what mechanisms in the loose 
sense of causal process are about.  
 
We would probably not describe the pattern of causal connections sketched in the 
narrative as constituting a mechanism, but it is useful to reflect on why this should be. The 
most significant factor, I suggest, is the role we assume to have been played by chance in 
structuring the events the narrative describes. It was presumably just a coincidence that an 
accident occurred earlier on the day the man decided to catch the bus to the supermarket, 
and the fact that the traffic out of town was slow, whilst connected with that in a causally 
significant way, might also have involved a degree of chance. Had the traffic been lighter 
perhaps there would have been less of the congestion that we presume resulted from the 
bottleneck created by events related to the accident and that retarded the progress of the 
bus. Another factor besides chance that is of importance in guiding our mechanism-
attributing tendencies may be the length of the causal event chains that connect events. If 
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they are so long that we cannot imagine – without making assumptions about large 
numbers of intervening events that we feel unjustified in making – how they could be 
connected, then (I conjecture) we tend to regard them as coincidental or down to chance.  
 
How would we feel about applying the term ‘mechanism’ if the pattern of events 
described in the example happened every week, perhaps to multiple people in different 
locations? Perhaps then we could speak, without raising too many eyebrows, of a 
mechanism for public transport-related baked bean consumption (or the failure of a 
supermarket-reaching mechanism). But in that case we would presumably infer the 
existence of additional causal factors to account for the repetition of the same event 
patterns at different locations. In other words we would infer the presence of an underlying 
causal process, and its discovery would go some way towards legitimizing mechanism talk. 
If in even those circumstances we were to baulk at use of the term then this would point to 
the involvement of issues of social convention in its deployment (above and beyond the 
basic causal facts). The status of singular causal processes in the causal conception of 
mechanism is rather uncertain, then. But I suspect that where a singular causal process 
appears not to involve a strong element of chance it is for pragmatic reasons rather than 
substantive ones that we would not apply the term mechanism to it. When we talk about 
singular causal events and processes it is usually precisely their singularity, the specifics of 
the case, to which our attention is being drawn. 
 
More abstract examples of mechanism in the sense of the establishment of 
entailment can be given. For example, the setting of interest rates constitutes the 
mechanism by which the Bank of England attempts to control inflation. Software 
applications consist of lines of code that can be thought of as logical mechanisms that act 
on data to transform or manipulate it in various ways. More biologically, but perhaps less 
mechanistically (I consider the point in the next chapter), the ‘mechanism’ by which protein 
molecules fold involves the aggregation of hydrophobic amino acid residues and the 
satisfaction of the polypeptide chain’s hydrogen-bonding potentialities through the 
formation of hydrogen bonds either internally or with surrounding water molecules. These 
diverse uses of the term ‘mechanism’ all point to the existence of, or possibility for the 
existence of, particular patterns of implication, entailment or causation that serve to define 
– or could be used to instantiate – some kind of process, event or operation. In Chapter 6 I 
develop, in the context of a discussion of emergence, the idea that we recognise these 
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patterns by paralleling them in our minds.31 We simulate bits of the world, and see 
entailment or causal structure, a causal ‘mechanism’, when our thoughts are able to stay in 
step with, retrodict or anticipate events in the world. Roughly speaking, then, the causal 
conception of mechanism relates to the accessibility of a pattern of cognitive entailments 
that connects the real or imaginary event or phenomenon that the mechanism is ‘for’ with 
real or imaginary antecedent events, conditions or states. Such a model adverts to the 
existence of a parallel system of entailment in the world, or the possibility of one, and 
where the scientific study of nature is concerned a physical system exhibiting a particular 
causal structure is the ontologically robust ‘mechanism’ indicated by use of the term.32  
 
The neo-mechanistic perspective 
 
Having briefly considered the material and causal conceptions of mechanism I now 
turn my attention to what it is that biologists mean when they speak about mechanisms, as 
in the examples I gave in the introduction to this chapter. On the face of it the machine 
conception would seem to have little to offer biologists, since they are generally not dealing 
with largely solid-state devices. Does that mean that mechanism talk in biology appeals to 
something like the second sense? In their 2000 paper (‘Thinking About Mechanisms’, or 
MDC as I shall refer to it), Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver attempt to 
explicate what is going on when biologists talk about mechanisms. That paper has shaped 
much of the subsequent philosophical debate about mechanisms and explanation in 
biology. They begin with the assertion that in ‘many fields of science what is taken to be a 
satisfactory explanation requires providing a description of a mechanism. So it is not 
surprising that much of the practice of science can be understood in terms of the discovery 
and description of mechanisms’ (MDC pp.1-2). They state their goal as being ‘to sketch a 
mechanistic approach for analyzing neurobiology and molecular biology that is grounded in 
the details of scientific practice, an approach that may well apply to other scientific fields’ 
(MDC p.2). That the aim is described as being ‘to sketch a mechanistic approach’ raises the 
issue of the distinction between mechanistic ontology – mechanisms as things in the world 
– and mechanistic epistemology. It sounds here as though mechanism is regarded by MDC 
                                                 
31 An early statement of this sort of idea is found in Craik (1943/1967). 
32 The identification of a mechanistic pattern of entailments in the world can be thought of as an example of 
inference to the best explanation (Lipton 2004) – provided that what is considered to be ‘best’ is understood 
to be context-relative and contingent on what we already believe. ‘Most adequate’ might be a preferable 
phrase, but that is not to say that scientific explanations don’t typically connect deeply with the phenomena 
they account for. (They don’t just model surface phenomenology, in other words; they are dependent on 
postulated counterfactual-supporting structures and properties that underlie what occurs – as I discuss in 
Chapter 3 in relation to the simulation of protein dynamics.)  
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primarily as part of the explanatory toolkit we can bring to the world in order to make 
sense of it, although talking of ‘the discovery and description of mechanisms’ makes 
mechanism sound more ontologically grounded.33 In fact their position has both ontic and 
epistemic aspects. 
 
To motivate the case for their account MDC provide quantitative evidence 
regarding use of the term ‘mechanism’: 
 
Mechanisms have been invoked many times and places in philosophy and science. 
A key word search on ‘mechanism’ for 1992-1997 in titles and abstracts of Nature 
(including its subsidiary journals, such as Nature Genetics) found 597 hits. A search in 
the Philosophers’ Index for the same period found 205 hits. Yet, in our view, there is 
no adequate analysis of what mechanisms are and how they work in science.  
(MDC p.2) 
 
The aim in quoting these statistics is presumably to show that scientists and philosophers 
alike make extensive use of the term. The numbers given fail to make this point, however, 
for no information is given regarding how the numbers of hits for ‘mechanism’ in the 
corpora mentioned compares with the numbers of hits for other terms in the same 
corpora. Neither is it possible to judge whether a certain number of hits for a term in a 
specific corpus should be judged high or low unless one knows how frequently the same 
term occurs in a larger, less discipline-specific corpus. But this is a methodological gripe. I 
think MDC are right to claim that scientists make extensive use of the term ‘mechanism’, 
and I agree with them that the task of making sense of scientific explanation will be easier 
if we can come to some understanding of what is meant by it.  
 
MDC encapsulate their view of mechanism in the following definition: 
 
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of 
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.  
(MDC p.3) 
 
Amongst the examples they discuss from molecular biology and neurobiology is the case of 
DNA replication: 
 
                                                 
33 The phrase ‘a mechanistic approach for analyzing neurobiology and molecular biology’ is unfortunate, since 
it is ambiguous about whether the analysis in question is of the subject matter of those disciplines or of the 
conceptual content of the disciplines themselves. I suspect that MDC would defend both interpretations. 
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In the mechanism of DNA replication, the DNA double helix unwinds, exposing 
slightly charged bases to which complementary bases bond, producing, after several 
more stages, two duplicate helices. Descriptions of mechanisms show how the 
termination conditions are produced by the set-up conditions and intermediate 
stages. To give a description of a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that 
phenomenon, i.e., to explain how it was produced.  
(MDC p.3) 
 
This kind of example provides some sense of what MDC mean by set-up and termination 
conditions, but still it would be as well to try to spell it out. I take them to mean that such 
conditions are specifiable or visualizable material states of affairs that bracket or delimit, 
spatially and temporally, the phenomena of interest – a point to which I return later. The 
use of the concept of productivity is a distinctive feature of the account, but I think Torres 
is right to argue that it is best regarded as an idiosyncratic way of importing causal notions 
into the account by the back door (Torres 2009, p.242).  
 
A central feature of the account is its commitment to the ontic dualism of entities 
and activities, and this is potentially both appealing and problematic. Some of the appeal 
may stem from a tendency to think of entities as corresponding to structures and activities 
to processes, and the idea that the account succeeds in combining structural and processual 
thinking. (Torres thinks that activities do correspond to processes (Torres 2009, p.241).) 
But in that case why do MDC not use the terms structures and processes? Why is novel 
terminology needed? Worry about this point makes it important to be able to state clearly 
what entities are and what activities are. Entities are described as ‘things that engage in 
activities’ (MDC p.3) and it seems reasonable to suppose that entities do correspond to 
structures or parts of structures.  
 
At the molecular level this interpretation is straightforward enough, but it must be 
borne in mind that at the cellular level many ‘structures’ are actually highly dynamic. For 
example, the relatively stable appearance of the Golgi bodies and other forms of 
endoplasmic reticulum seen in electron micrographs obscures the fact that there is a 
constant cycling of membrane structures through the cell, inwards from the cell membrane 
and outwards to it. An activity associated with a structure in which the relationships 
amongst parts are constantly changing, but through which matter does not flow, is 
significantly different from one associated with an apparent structure maintained despite, 
or indeed by, an underlying turnover of matter. It is important not to lose sight of the 
distinctive thermodynamic character of cellular processes and one of the principal ways in 
which man-made machines differ from biological systems. If we do, the chance to gain 
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insight into particular methodological issues may slip away. The equal weighting MDC 
place on entities and activities should I think be understood as reflecting recognition of this 
very point – assuming that we can equate activities with processes. Entity/activity dualism 
represents an acknowledgement of the difficulty we sometimes have in assigning causal 
priority, and hence making an ontic commitment, to just structures or just processes.  
 
Activities are described as ‘the producers of change; they are constitutive of the 
transformations that yield new states of affairs or new products’ (MDC p.4). This sounds 
like a causal matter, but the avoidance of overt causal talk problematizes the nature of the 
relationship between activities and causes. MDC themselves say that activities are ‘types of 
causes’, but then add a little confusingly that ‘[a]n entity acts as a cause when it engages in a 
productive activity’ (MDC p.6). But as I discussed earlier, in the context of a discussion of 
the machine conception of mechanism, we can think of functions as just the kinds of acts 
of doing that MDC appear to associate with activities. This is Wouters’ (2003) function1 
sense. Appealing to Wouters’ function2 sense of function as causal role they also say that 
functions are ‘the roles played by entities and activities in a mechanism. To see an activity 
as a function is to see it as a component in some mechanism, that is, to see it in a context 
that is taken to be important, vital, or otherwise significant’ (MDC p.6). Overall, the way in 
which entities, activities, functions, and causes are interrelated in the account is far from 
clear. Of functions MDC go on to say that: 
 
It is common to speak of functions as properties ‘had by’ entities, as when one says 
that the heart ‘has’ the function of pumping blood or the channel ‘has’ the function 
of gating the flow of sodium. This way of speaking reinforces the substantivalist 
tendency against which we have been arguing. Functions, rather, should be 
understood in terms of the activities by virtue of which entities contribute to the 
workings of a mechanism. It is more appropriate to say that the function of the 
heart is to pump blood and thereby deliver (with the aid of the rest of the 
circulatory system) oxygen and nutrients to the rest of the body. Likewise, a 
function of sodium channels is to gate sodium current in the production of action 
potentials. To the extent that the activity of a mechanism as a whole contributes to 
something in a context that is taken to be antecedently important, vital, or 
otherwise significant, that activity too can be thought of as the (or a) function of 
the mechanism as a whole. 
(MDC p.6) 
 
The point about avoiding speaking of functions as properties ‘had’ by entities, 
related to the ‘substantivalist tendency’, is well-taken. Moreover it is consistent with hints in 
the paper that to think of biological mechanisms in structures-with-functions terms is 
simple-minded. But other authors with whom MDC appear to be broadly sympathetic, 
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such as Bechtel, sometimes construe biological mechanisms in terms of a position on 
structure—function relationships that sounds distinctly machine-like: 
 
The part—whole relationship between a mechanism’s component parts and its 
structure can be understood as falling within the type of hierarchical, mereological 
framework that systematic biologists and others have long used to bring orderliness 
to types of entities at different levels. The relationship between a mechanism’s 
component operations and its overall function have roughly the same character ... . 
What is important here is that both kinds of components (the parts and their 
operations) can be regarded as occupying a lower level than the mechanism itself (a 
structure with a function).  
(Bechtel 2006, p.40) 
 
In MDC it is asserted that  
 
Mechanisms occur in nested hierarchies and the description of mechanisms in 
neurobiology and molecular biology are frequently multi-level. The levels in these 
hierarchies should be thought of as part-whole hierarchies with the additional 
restriction that lower level entities, properties, and activities are components in 
mechanisms that produce higher level phenomena’.  
(MDC, p.13) 
 
This kind of mereological view, in which mechanisms are seen as nested part-whole 
hierarchies, sounds like an unpromising way of addressing cellular phenomena that are 
often characterized by fluidity and the dynamic turnover of material noted earlier. But 
further reflection raises an opposing worry, that mechanisms seen in this way might 
encompass too much. The problem I think is that it is hard, and perhaps ultimately 
unrewarding, to think of nested hierarchies of entities-and-activities, which are the terms in 
which MDC encourage us to think about mechanisms. A nested hierarchy of structures has 
at least the merit of ready conceivability, but what is a hierarchy of entity/activity 
complexes like? Perhaps part of the difficulty lies in the capacity of the entities and 
activities making up complex biological systems to pay little heed to neat mereological 
distinctions. The binding of a single signalling molecule to a specific receptor can trigger a 
ramifying set of processes that may be widely distributed throughout the cell and beyond, 
for example. The fact that the cell incorporates structures and aggregates of structures, 
contained within bounded compartments, encourages levels talk, but it is prudent to regard 
the idea of levels as a schematic idealization or as a fiction that is only sometimes 
explanatorily helpful. 
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In terms of scope and looseness the MDC conception of mechanism sometimes 
looks little different from the causal conception I outlined earlier. And indeed, when 
scientists talk about cell signalling mechanisms, say, I think a simple causal interpretation is 
a major part of what underlies the ascription of mechanism. (There is a way in which 
signalling events are brought about, but no parallel with machines is intended.) But the 
emphasis in MDC on process regularity demonstrates that something narrower is meant. 
Again, however, the language is unclear. Recall that the main definition states that 
‘[m]echanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions’ (p.3). Thus it seems that it 
is the changes that mechanisms bring about that are regular. (Although the question arises: 
what sorts of change?) But then MDC also say that mechanisms are regular ‘in that they 
work always or for the most part in the same way under the same conditions. The regularity 
is exhibited in the typical way that the mechanism runs from beginning to end’ (p.3). Later, 
in comparing activities with laws, MDC describe a mechanism as ‘the series of activities of 
entities that bring about the finish or termination conditions in a regular way’ (p.7). The 
sense that regularity is an important constraint on the projectibility of mechanism concepts 
is thus conveyed, but quite what the relevant regularities are is far less clear.  
 
Despite these sorts of interpretative difficulty, I think that it is generally clear that 
what MDC are trying to do is address the relationship between the causality of molecular 
and cell biological phenomena and our methods for explaining them. They seek to do so in 
a way that reflects their distinctive spatiotemporal characteristics and their materiality, and 
which makes no appeal to strict nomic regularities. The problem facing anyone attempting 
to describe and explain cellular processes is how to talk about dynamic systems rather than 
mere static structures, and moreover systems that turn over their parts whilst retaining 
particular forms of process architecture. MDC pin their hopes on the flexibility conferred 
by thinking in terms of complexes of entities and activities. A danger, however, is that it is 
too easy to switch in an unprincipled way between entities and activities in order to reveal 
the mechanistic nature of a phenomenon. (If the status of entities looks problematic then 
trace out the mechanism through the activities, and vice versa: these do not appear to be 
obviously illegitimate strategies for mechanistic explication under an MDC-style approach.)  
 
Torres has proposed a heavily modified version of the MDC account which, he 
claims, circumvents the difficulties associated with ontic dualism about entities and 
activities. These, he argues, attach especially to the latter: activities for MDC are reified 
causes, and the problem is that some molecular/cellular processes involve activities that 
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amount to negative causes.34 He gives the example of neuronal long term potentiation (LTP), 
in which it is removal of blocking magnesium ions that enables (causes) calcium ions to 
diffuse throught the NMDA channel (Torres 2009, pp.242-247). MDC, Torres argues, 
conflate (through the notion of activities) how property changes are brought about with 
what it is that brings them about. The answer, he suggests, is a ‘descriptivist’ account in 
which activity verbs (including ‘enabling’ or ‘allowing’) explain by specifying how a 
property change is brought about without necessarily saying what does the bringing about. 
He defines mechanisms to be 
 
complex systems composed of entities organized in space and time such that (i) 
through engaging in activities they produce a phenomenon, and (ii) the activities in 
which the mechanism’s entities engage are characterizable in interventionist terms 
of direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. 
(2009, p.247) 
 
This definition has much going for it, even if the phrase ‘complex systems’, imported from 
Glennan’s account, is not especially helpful.35 The idea that mechanisms bring phenomena 
about by engaging in activities that involve entities is intuitively satisfying. And the appeal 
to Woodward’s interventionist account of causation (Woodward 2003a) circumvents the 
problems that would attend the invocation of universal laws. (In Woodward’s account the 
causal relation is associated with the possibility of manipulating one variable in a system by 
adjusting the values of other variables. The relationships between the variables need not be 
lawful in a universal sense; rather they need hold only within bounds (Woodward 2003a, 
p.240).) However, it is not obvious that Torres’ account out-performs the MDC account 
when it comes to explaining how mechanisms serve an explanatory purpose. For MDC, 
recall that mechanism description is constitutive of explanation – ‘[t]o give a description of 
a mechanism for a phenomenon is to explain that phenomenon, i.e., to explain how it was 
produced’ (MDC, p.3).  
 
Sometimes what are described are mechanism schemas, where a mechanism 
schema is ‘a truncated abstract description of a mechanism that can be filled with 
descriptions of known component parts and activities’. MDC suggest that mechanism 
schemas play some of the roles traditionally ascribed to theories – they are ‘discovered, 
                                                 
34 This is also his reason for rejecting Glennan’s interactionist account of mechanism (Glennan 1996, 2002). 
As Torres argues, in some mechanisms a causal role is played by absence of interaction. 
35 The ‘complex systems’ investigated by the ‘sciences of complexity’ are often exactly those that are regarded 
as least susceptible to mechanistic forms of understanding. (I discuss the complexity of biological systems in 
Chapters 4 and 5.) However, the phrase is arguably consistent with Torres’ view of an activity as ‘an occasion 
on which one or more entities brings about one or more property changes’. The danger with this view is that 
it threatens to result in most phenomena being construed as mechanisms. 
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evaluated, and revised in cycles as science proceeds. They are used to describe, predict, and 
explain phenomena, to design experiments, and to interpret experimental results’ (MDC 
p.17). By way of example they discuss the discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis, 
which they present as an illustration of the piecemeal discovery of a mechanism schema 
(MDC, pp.18-21). 
 
The further discussion of some of the epistemic aspects of their account that 
follows their exposition of mechanism schemas is the most satisfactory part of MDC’s 
paper. Especially suggestive is the discussion of intelligibility and explanation, which raises 
some intriguing ideas about explanation and understanding. What they propose is that 
mechanistic explanations render phenomena intelligible, and this is connected with 
‘showing how the phenomena might be produced’ (p.21). This encapsulates their view that 
 
The understanding provided by a mechanistic explanation may be correct or 
incorrect. Either way, the explanation renders a phenomenon intelligible. 
Mechanism descriptions show how possibly, how plausibly, or how actually things work. 
Intelligibility arises not from an explanation’s correctness, but rather from an 
elucidative relation between the explanans (the set-up conditions and intermediate 
entities and activities) and the explanandum’. 
 (MDC, p.21; their italics) 
 
Explanation is not, they argue, fundamentally a matter of regularity: rather, 
‘explanation involves revealing the productive relation. It is the unwinding, bonding, and 
breaking that explain protein synthesis ... . It is not the regularities that explain but the 
activities that sustain the regularities’ (p.22; their italics). I take these passages to indicate 
that mechanistic explanation is a matter of making phenomena and their production 
conceivable or imaginable, even though they do not speak in those terms. This points to a 
connection with cognitive psychology, in which regard MDC consider briefly the sensory 
basis of intelligibility. This is not just a visual matter: 
 
But seeing is not our only means of access to activities. Importantly, our 
kinaesthetic and proprioceptive senses also provide us with experience of activities, 
e.g. pushing, pulling, and rotating. Emotional experiences also are likely experiential 
grounds of intelligibility for activities of attraction, repulsion, hydrophobicity, and 
hydrophilicity. These activities give meanings that are then extended to areas 
beyond primitive sense perception. The use of basic perceptual verbs, such as “see” 
or “show”, are extended to wider forms of intelligibility, such as proof or 
demonstration. 
(MDC, p.22) 
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The link with emotional experience perhaps requires further explication (and clarification 
of what falls within scope) in order to amount to a convincing claim, but (as I argue in 
more depth in Chapter 6) the involvement of kinaesthetic and proprioceptive senses in the 
comprehension of phenomena rings true with psychological findings. And the implied 
centrality of the visual sense accords with the importance biologists place on visualizing 
phenomena and with their reliance on visual descriptions such as diagrams, images and 
visual metaphors – as seen in the next chapter in relation to protein folding.  
 
Torres’ modifications to the MDC account relate primarily to the ontological status 
of activities: he reinterprets the MDC notion in such a way ‘that activity verbs are 
explanatory by virtue of their descriptive content, rather than by reifying activities as the 
causal components of mechanisms’ (Torres 2009, p.249). This de-reification of MDC’s 
activities is a useful change, and moreover it is not necessarily inconsistent with MDC’s 
interesting epistemic ideas concerning intelligibility and understanding, if for example it is 
possible think of descriptions involving activity verbs (such as pushing or pulling) as 
internal cognitive stimuli of some sort for the senses that MDC posit as underpinning 
mechanistic interpretation. The change enables Torres to deal with negative (interaction-
free) causation, as occurs in his example of the removal of magnesum ions from a channel 
to allow the flow of calcium ions. This is not, I take it, the sort of scenario we have any 
great difficulty imagining, and the chief philosophical difficulty (if I allow myself to 
speculate rather freely here) is to find a meta-language which appeals to robust concepts 
that enable us to relate the language we typically use to talk about these kinds of imaginable 
phenomena to their spatiotemporal and other physical characteristics.  
 
If this thought has any basis then it seems to heighten the importance of remaining 
vigilant as regards the distinction between explanation in a broad sense that pertains to 
understanding (within a mind) and a narrower sense of explanations as vehicles for 
conveying and instilling such understanding (between minds). The interesting epistemic 
parts of the MDC account concern both senses, whereas Torres’ philosophical 
disagreements arguably attach principally to the latter. But if verbal descriptions of causal 
structures, which might include the descriptive content of activity verbs canvassed by 
Torres, succeed in evoking thoughts that connect with sensory experience (and especially 
with visuospatial senses) then MDC claim that intelligibility is the likely result. Thus MDC 
and Torres do not disagree at the fundamental level of the epistemology of explanation.  
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MDC say very little about constraints on intelligibility, although they go so far as to 
state that what is intelligible is likely to be ‘a product of the ontogenic and phylogenetic 
development of human beings in a world such as ours’ (p.22). From this I take them to be 
sympathetic to the view that the mechanism ascriptions we make are relative to our 
psychological capacities and dispositions, and in this case it becomes interesting to consider 
the relationship between mechanism and complexity, say. This is not to claim that 
mechanism ascriptions have no basis in the world: as a fundamental metaphysical 
assumption I take it that phenomena involve entities engaged in processes that unfold in 
diverse ways over a wide range of spatial and temporal scales. But what looks complex, 
what looks like a process, and indeed what looks like a mechanism, depends on our natures 
as much as it does on the objective nature of the phenomena in question. I investigate 
biological complexity in Chapters 4 and 5, and for now merely note the absence from the 
MDC account of overt reflection on some of the key physical properties of the sorts of 
system that interest its authors. The fluidity of cellular phenomena is a striking 
characteristic, but they do not discuss it explicitly except when they note that mechanism 
schemata can be ‘instantiated in biological wet-ware’ (2000, p.17). A thought at this point is 
that by paying attention to these biophysical characteristics and to the complexity of 
cellular phenomena we might gain insight into constraints on the propensity to discern and 
delineate mechanisms. Then it might be possible to obtain a more nuanced and 
comprehensive perspective on biological understanding.  
 
Varieties of molecular mechanism 
 
I have argued that the MDC account of mechanism suggests an orientation towards 
the epistemology of mechanistic explanation and understanding in biology. At the same 
time, however, the ambiguities to which its distinctive ontological features give rise means 
that its scope – in terms of the fraction of biological phenomena it might cover – is 
somewhat unclear. Is explanation in molecular cell biology just mechanistic explanation? Is 
there is an explicable fraction of phenomena which corresponds to those that are 
mechanistic, and how large is any non-mechanistic fraction? 
 
I have claimed that ideas about structure—function relationships are closely 
associated with traditional views about material mechanisms, yet they are largely absent 
from the neo-mechanist perspective. In this last section of the chapter I want to return to 
issues of structure and function, because they promise to provide an additional way of 
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thinking about mechanism, and moreover one which admits of a matter of degree of 
‘mechanism-likeness’ or ‘mechanisticity’ inasmuch as functional decompositions can be 
more or less aligned with structural ones. By such means it may be possible to address the 
causal complexity and striking diversity of cellular phenomena, and the apparent success of 
science in providing rich conceptual frameworks that help to characterize the nature of that 
complexity and diversity. To that end I shall attempt to develop a perspective according to 
which a process may be described as being either more or less mechanistic (from an 
ontological point of view), and either more or less amenable to mechanistic explanation 
(epistemically speaking).   
 
To begin it is worth acknowledging that what we are interested in where cellular 
properties, capacities and behaviours are concerned is causation. Understanding the cell is 
to a great extent about being able to answer questions such as ‘What causes A?’, ‘What 
effect does B have?’, ‘How does C bring about D?’, etc. The kinds of answer we give to 
such questions are shaped in important ways by the nature of the relationships that hold 
between structure and function. Sometimes, in relation to particular phenomena, it seems 
that we can identify particular structures with specific functions, while where other 
phenomena are concerned it is much harder to make straightforward associations. A 
structure may be associated with several functions, or a function may be associated with 
several structures – or it may be difficult to associate functions and structures at all. I 
suspect that it is on this kind of basis that some of the fundamental properties and 
behaviours of cells should not be thought of as mechanistic in any strong sense. And 
properties and behaviours that involve ambiguous or otherwise problematic structure—
function relations are probably good candidates for being the ones we are most inclined to 
describe as non-mechanistic.  
 
One approach to mechanism in cell biology, then, is to say that a phenomenon is 
mechanistic when it is possible to associate particular functions with the specific molecular 
and cellular structures it involves. This idea sets up a parallel with machine-type artefacts, in 
which as we saw earlier there exists just this kind of alignment of structure with function. 
However, it stops short of saying that cell mechanisms are machines. I have already stressed 
one significant respect in which cell processes are to be distinguished from machines: the 
fact that cell processes often take place in a more or less fluid phase of matter. This has 
important consequences. The interactions that take place between molecules are often 
quite specific, and interactional specificity provides an ontological basis for the 
establishment of specific causal networks that are to some extent functionally isolated and 
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independent of other networks. Specificity means that everything need not interact with 
everything else just as chance encounters dictate. In functional terms interaction networks 
may be thought roughly analogous to the parts of a machine-type artefact, but in structural 
terms they are quite different. The entities involved in a network need not all exist 
simultaneously, so a network can be partly virtual, an idealized conception derived by 
imaginatively integrating over time multiple causal steps; a network need have no definite 
or persistent morphology; networks may interpenetrate; networks may share entities, so 
that complex functional inter-relationships are formed; network entities can be replaced 
without functional disruption; and so on. These kinds of property make cell processes 
rooted in molecular interaction networks machine-like in just the rather abstract sense that 
particular structures can be identified to some degree with specific activities, capacities and 
functions, but it would be hard to mistake them for machines. 
 
Many cell functions, on the other hand, depend not on these evanescent interaction 
networks defined over more or less transient populations of mobile molecules but rather 
on what biologists are increasingly referring to as ‘molecular machines’ (Morange 2006a). 
An influential 1998 special issue of the journal Cell brought together a number of papers 
emphasizing the machine-like nature of a variety of functionally specific protein complexes. 
Bruce Alberts, in his editorial overview of the issue, suggests that ‘the entire cell can be 
viewed as a factory that contains an elaborate network of interlocking assembly lines, each 
of which is composed of a set of large protein machines’ (Alberts 1998, p.291; see also 
Reynolds 2007 regarding the factory analogy). He goes on to explain that it makes sense to 
view the large protein assemblies underlying certain cell functions as machines because ‘like 
the machines invented by humans to deal efficiently with the macroscopic world, these 
protein assemblies contain highly coordinated moving parts. Within each protein assembly, 
intermolecular collisions are not only restricted to a small set of possibilities, but reaction C 
depends on reaction B, which in turn depends on reaction A – just as it would in a machine 
of our common experience’. (Alberts cites his own (1984) in relation to this idea.) These 
highly constrained causal relationships amongst localized parts do indeed sound highly 
machine-like. What is more, the parts appear to be identifiable with particular functions, 
supporting the idea that the use of strongly mechanistic terminology is underpinned or 
motivated by the possibility of identifying neat structure—function relationships.  
 
A recent example from the literature illustrates some of these points. Michal 
Zolkiewski (2006) reviews what is known about the Clp ATPases, a class of ‘protein 
machines’ involved in protein degradation and disaggregation, all of which are members of 
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the so-called AAA+ superfamily of ATPases.36 Different subsets of the Clp ATPases 
perform different functions. ClpA, ClpX and HsIU are involved in protein degradation, 
while ClpB acts as a disaggregator of aggregated polypeptides. The functional difference of 
ClpB correlates with a structural difference, while the functional similarities of the others is 
reflected in their possession of conserved AAA+ sequence modules and ATP-binding 
motifs. The ATPases form ring-shaped or cylindrical oligomers (usually hexamers) through 
the centre of which runs a hollow channel. Different ATPases contain different additional 
domains that confer particular properties, for example specifying cellular localization or 
substrate specificity. Proteins destined for degradation have a peptide tag added to their C-
terminus, and this is recognized by the ATPases. ATP hydrolysis provides the energy 
needed to unwind and thread the polypeptide chain of the protein to be degraded through 
the Clp channel to associated peptidases that cleave the unfolded chain. Unstructured loop 
regions in the AAA+ modules appear to be involved in substrate binding – another 
example of ‘parts’ having particular functions. Mechanistic terminology appears to come 
readily to researchers working on macromolecular complexes like this: ClpX is described as 
working ‘like a machine with a two-speed transmission’, and a hexameric Clp ATPase as ‘a 
‘six-cylinder’ ATP-driven polypeptide-threading engine’ (Zolkiewski 2006, p.1096). 
 
This relatively recent talk about protein machines is perhaps the most overtly 
mechanist language seen in molecular and cell biology, and it appears to pick out properties 
of functional macromolecular complexes that bear comparison with the man-made 
artefacts discussed earlier. Common properties include comparative rigidity of structure, 
sufficient to confer specific molecular recognition capacities, and relative to which defined 
motions occur, e.g. via flexible hinge regions, and the association of distinct functions with 
different parts (often specific protein domains). The result is the reliable generation of 
highly constrained causal event sequences. Given the relative fluidity of the cellular milieu, 
the tight association of the functional sub-elements of a process that protein machines 
represent is, Alberts argues, biologically advantageous. Invoking what amounts to an 
entropic argument, he asks us to compare ‘the speed and elegance of the machine that 
simultaneously replicates both strands of the DNA double helix ... with what could be 
achieved if each of the individual components (DNA polymerase, DNA helicase, DNA 
primas, sliding clamp) acted instead in an uncoordinated manner’ (Alberts 1998, p.292).  
 
                                                 
36 AAA+ comes from ‘ATPases associated with various cellular activities’. 
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Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have presented an initial analysis of the concept of mechanism, 
which begins by resolving it into several senses. First there is the machine conception 
exemplified by man-made artefacts and characterized by certain physical properties as well 
as by the more abstract idea of structure—function alignment. Then there is the looser 
causal conception, which is the sense that is often invoked when we say that A is a 
mechanism for bringing about or accomplishing B. Employment of mechanistic 
terminology in this way is connected with a capacity to describe how a pattern of 
entailment comes about. The machine and causal conceptions are related inasmuch as 
machines harness matter to reliably instantiate particular causal structures or patterns of 
entailment. An examination of the most influential recent neo-mechanist articulation of 
mechanism, the MDC account, leads me to doubt that it provides a sufficient basis for 
addressing satisfactorily the diversity of molecular and cell biological processes. However, it 
does appear to be promising in relation to the development of a cognitively informed 
perspective on explanation and understanding. Structure—function concepts appear likely 
to provide a useful adjunct or extension to neo-mechanist accounts, however, and may 
have a valuable part to play in shedding light on particular aspects of contemporary 
scientific practice.  
 
Talk of protein machines shows how many cellular biological processes depend on 
functional structures that can be viewed as machine-like. These materially instantiate 
patterns of causality that are relatively independent of their typical contexts, and in doing so 
they exemplify the connection between the two dictionary definitions of mechanism with 
which the chapter began. In Chapters 4 and 5 I consider the diversity and complexity of 
cellular processes and discuss some of the perspectives that have been developed in 
response to the causal and other issues they raise. Further consideration in Chapter 5 of the 
structure—process distinctions leads me to propose a conceptualization of mechanism that 
addresses some of the most important issues head on. From the standpoint of this new 
perspective the MDC account is seen to be too simple and inexplicit to deal satisfactorily 
with those issues, even though it is shaped by recognition of their significance. First, 
however, I shall discuss protein folding and what it means to talk about the mechanism of 
protein folding.   
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3. Protein folding and mechanism schemas 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I investigated concepts of mechanism. As well as reviewing 
a perspective that is particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of biology I 
outlined two broader senses. The first pertains to relatively stable material systems 
involving hierarchical structure—function relationships and constrained patterns of 
configurational change. The sorts of functional artefact we describe as machines, in which 
these properties result for the most part from the nature of the solid state, best exemplify 
this sense. This is the conception of mechanism to which contemporary talk of ‘protein 
machines’ was seen to appeal. The second broad sense relates more generally to causal 
processes and patterns. I suggested that in principle it takes in singular causal processes, but 
argued that our linguistic practices reflect a pragmatic concern to exclude certain sorts of 
event patterns – those that involve a significant element of what we take to be contingent 
interplay amongst events – from being treated as mechanisms. Thinking of mechanisms in 
general as causal structures serving particular ends brings out the overlap between the two 
senses: machine-type mechanisms materially implement specific patterns of entailment. 
 
Now I explore the region between mechanistic and non-mechanistic phenomena 
by investigating the biophysically fundamental topic of protein folding. In particular I 
attempt to pin down what scientists mean when they talk about the ‘mechanism’ of protein 
folding. Reviewing the relevant science reveals how (consistent with what MDC say about 
intelligibility) increased scientific understanding can come about as much through 
progressive improvements in our abilities to visualize complex molecular processes as 
through more abstractly theoretical developments.  These enhanced abilities are the result 
of the interplay of a number of parallel scientific trends and research directions. I discuss 
the growth and use of computational techniques for simulating and visualizing the 
molecular dynamics of peptides and proteins to gain insights into the folding process. 
These developments have been accompanied by evolving visual metaphors for thinking 
about the phenomena they address. 
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My investigation reveals that protein folding is not a causally straightforward 
process: neat structure—function relationships and determinate sequences of events are the 
exception rather than the rule. Each folding ‘run’ for a given polypeptide sequence is likely 
to follow a more or less unique trajectory. Despite this stochastic element, evidence 
suggests that in the context of a specific amino acid sequence particular residues sometimes 
play key roles in establishing local structure. One might say of such residues that they are 
structures with particular functions in relation to the folding of a specific protein, but with 
the proviso that in a different sequence context the same residues may have different 
folding functions. In general there is regularity of process only at a rather abstract level, 
then, and to suggest that protein folding is mechanistic in any strong sense can be 
considered tendentious. I argue that it should instead be viewed if not as non-mechanistic 
then as only schematically mechanistic (semi-mechanistic, perhaps). I unpack the notion of 
mechanism schematicity by equating it with the possibility of viewing a phenomenon as 
mechanistic at a particular level of abstraction. A mechanism schema is a pattern to which a 
set of phenomena conform, but which can be ‘filled out’ in different ways by different 
members of the set. Sometimes, however, schema filling amounts to little more than a 
pragmatic willingness to take for granted the existence of some process connecting 
antecedent and resultant system states. 
 
Protein folding 
 
Many of the activities and structures on which life depends are grounded in the 
properties of protein molecules. The chemical reactions of metabolism are catalyzed by 
proteinous enzymes, and proteins play a variety of structural roles within cells (where they 
form the cytoskeleton) and externally, where they make up the extra-cellular matrix. 
Proteins such as collagen and keratin fulfill important structural functions in a variety of 
body tissues. The antibodies of the immune systems are large proteins specialized for 
molecular recognition, and other proteins perform transport functions or carry out other 
specialist tasks. A protein molecule is a chain of amino acids, and to a first approximation 
one can say that its biological properties are determined by its shape and other chemical 
properties (all within a given context). Each kind of protein – corresponding to a particular 
amino acid sequence – has (again, to a first approximation) a particular structure, which is 
the result of a process in which following synthesis, by translation of mRNA resulting from 
the prior transcription of DNA, the polypeptide chain produced adopts a compact shape, 
the protein’s so-called native conformation.  
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Perhaps surprisingly, work on protein folding has been little studied by 
philosophers of biology, whose attention has tended to be captured instead by the Central 
Dogma and the issues about information and causation that it raises (and which I discuss at 
length in Chapter 7).37 Yet assumptions about protein folding played a key role in shaping 
molecular biology’s early disciplinary identity, and the relative experimental intractability of 
the phenomenon has stimulated the development of a diverse range of investigative 
techniques. Study of these promises to provide insight into major aspects of scientific 
explanation and understanding. Here I aim to clarify the mechanistic status of protein 
folding, and reciprocally use the phenomenon to help refine the ideas about mechanism 
already discussed.38 
 
In the earliest days of molecular biology it was not known what factors were 
responsible for determining a protein’s structure (although the first X-ray diffraction 
patterns obtained from protein crystals implied at least that there was such a thing as a 
regular solid-state conformation (Ferry 1998, pp.91-94)). The sequencing of insulin by Fred 
Sanger and co-workers between 1949 and 1955 established that a protein is a chain of 
amino acids arranged in a specific sequence (Judson 1996, p.89)39, which led to the 
proposal that 
 
no general conclusions can be drawn from these results concerning the general 
principles which govern the arrangement of the amino-acid residues in protein 
chains. In fact, it would seem more probably that there are no such principles, but 
that each protein has its own unique arrangement; an arrangement which endows it 
with its particular properties and specificities and fits it for the function that it 
performs in nature. 
(Sanger and Thompson 1953, p.371) 
 
This conclusion has been described as a sine qua non of the rise of molecular biology 
(Stretton 2002, p.530), as it led the early molecular biologists to speculate that sequence 
alone is sufficient to specify a protein’s structure. Enshrined in the so-called Sequence 
                                                 
37 However, Michel Morange has discussed the parallel neglect and underestimation of structural biology in 
the historiography of molecular biology (Morange 2006a). He attributes it to three factors: (1) the steady pace 
of progress in structural work, (2) its technical complexity, and (3) the broader neglect of chemistry, with 
which it is continuous.  
38 The picture of protein structure and folding presented here is based on a wide range of sources, allied to 
earlier laboratory experience. Whitford (2005) provides a comprehensive modern introduction, while 
Dickerson and Geis (1969) and Schulz and Schirmer (1979) are dated but still valuable. Useful reviews and 
commentaries include Karplus (1997), Dobson (2003), Clark (2007) and Chen et al. (2008). 
39 Organic chemist Sir Robert Robinson thought it ‘astounding’ that proteins have such structure, because it 
was widely believed prior to Sanger’s sequencing of insulin that proteins are statistical polymers (Brenner, in 
Wolpert and Richards (1988), p.100). 
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Hypothesis this idea, together with the Central Dogma, formed a distinctive quasi-
theoretical foundation for the new discipline (Crick 1958). Brenner recalls the novelty of 
the idea: 
 
I can remember going to meetings where people said ‘Well, there’ll be genes for 
folding up proteins’ and so on, and we had just this remarkably simple hypothesis, 
the sequence hypothesis, which said that all you had to do was to specify the amino 
acid sequence and the folding would look after itself, and the energy would look 
after itself, and everything would be all right. 
(Brenner, in Wolpert and Richards (1988), pp.100-101) 
 
Evidence to support the Sequence Hypothesis had come in the 1950s when Christian 
Anfinsen found that ribonuclease, a small enzyme, can be made to unfold and refold in 
vitro. He found that refolding proceeded spontaneously once the conditions that induce 
denaturation (loss of native conformation through unfolding) – such as variation in pH or 
temperature, or the presence of specific bond-disrupting agents – were lifted, in a manner 
compatible with the idea that the ‘native conformation is determined by the totality of 
interatomic interactions and hence by the amino acid sequence, in a given environment’ 
(Anfinsen 1972, p.56).  
 
The first protein structures to be elucidated, by X-ray crystallographic methods, 
provided important clues about the principles on which protein structure might be said to 
depend. A common feature of the structures of myoglobin and haemoglobin, studied by 
Kendrew and Perutz respectively (at Cambridge), and to a slighter lesser extent lysozyme, 
studied by David Phillips at the Royal Institution, is the presence of extensive alpha helical 
structure. Alpha helices are formed when a stretch of polypeptide adopts a spiral 
conformation through the formation of hydrogen bonds between the peptidyl amide group 
of residue i and the peptidyl hydroxyl group of residue i-4.40 The sequence of amino acid 
residues is regarded as the primary structure of a protein, and the alpha helix represents one 
kind of secondary structural element.41 The other main classes of secondary structure in 
proteins are beta sheets and loops or turns, and a protein’s overall conformation is known 
as its tertiary structure.  
 
Amongst the factors responsible for the structural complexity of proteins are the 
properties of the twenty commonly occurring amino acids that make them up. An amino 
                                                 
40 Peptidyl means pertaining to the peptide bond.  
41 The structure of the alpha helix was predicted by Linus Pauling on the basis of model-building 
experiments, a feat that inspired Watson and Crick to approach the structure of DNA in a similar way (Olby 
1974/1994, chapter 17; Judson 1996, pp.62-69 and pp.134-135). 
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acid consists of a carbon atom (the so-called alpha carbon atom, or Cα) to which are 
attached an amino group, a hydrogen atom, a variable moiety called the sidechain or R-
group, and a carboxyl group. When amino acids are joined together to form a polypeptide 
chain the amino and carboxyl groups of adjacent residues combine to form a peptide bond 
(with the release of a molecule of water)42. Electrons are delocalized over the peptide bond 
with the result that it has a somewhat rigid, approximately planar structure. This means that 
the conformation of the ‘main chain’ of the polypeptide – the series of linked atoms that 
runs from one end to the other – is to a large extent defined by rotations around just two 
bonds per amino acid residue: the bond between the amide group and the alpha carbon 
(the angle of rotation of which is termed phi) and that between the alpha carbon and the 
carboxyl carbon (rotation angle psi) (but see Berkholz et al. 2009 for a qualification to this).  
 
G.N. Ramachandran had the idea of representing the structure of a protein 
structure as a two-dimensional plot of phi against psi (Ramakrishnan and Ramachandran 
1965; see also Kleywegt and Jones 1996, Ho et al. 2003). Using physical models in which 
atoms were represented as hard spheres he showed that steric (three-dimensional shape-
related) constraints limit amino acid conformations to just particular values of phi and psi, 
or regions of the phi—psi (or Ramachandran) plot. Different amino acids are limited to 
different regions, according to the bulk of their side-chains. The amino acid residue with 
the smallest side-chain, glycine, can adopt almost any conformation, whereas a bulky 
residue such as tryptophan is much more constrained. Side-chains differ markedly in terms 
of properties other than mere bulk. Some are charged, positively or negatively, or are 
capable of forming hydrogen bonds. These residues are termed hydrophilic (water loving). 
Others lack the ability to interact with water molecules (which are polarized and can form 
hydrogen bonds), and are described as hydrophobic. The cysteine residue’s side-chain, 
meanwhile, contains an –S-H group which is capable of forming a strong covalent bond 
with the –S-H group of another cysteine residue – a so-called disulphide bridge. Most side-
chains are capable of adopting a range of conformations, constrained again by the 
physically feasible angles of rotation around particular bonds.  
 
Most proteins consist of several hundred amino acid residues, each associated with 
a range of phi and psi rotational possibilities that may be compatible with large numbers of 
alternative side-chain conformations. These facts give rise to the so-called ‘protein folding 
problem’, which is how the protein reaches the native state given the astronomic number 
                                                 
42 In the context of a polypeptide chain, each amino acid becomes an amino acid residue – the residue being 
what is left after formation of the peptide bond. 
 63
of conformational possibilities apparently open to it. Even allowing only 3 conformations 
per residue, a protein of 100 residues would be associated with 3100 possible conformations 
– a number greater than the number of protons in the universe. In 1969 Cyrus Levinthal 
noted the paradoxical contrast between this number and the fact that proteins are capable 
of folding spontaneously and rapidly (Levinthal 1969; see also Karplus 1997). He took this 
to be one argument for the widespread view that folding proceeds not through an 
exhaustive conformation-by-conformation sampling of conformations but via particular 
pathways.  
 
Establishing the routes followed by polypeptide chains as they head towards the 
native conformation has involved the development and application of a range of often 
complex practical techniques and theoretical perspectives. These have been used to address 
an evolving set of questions. What is the nature of the unfolded state? What are the relative 
contributions made to folding by hydrogen bonding (internally, and with water molecules) 
and by hydrophobic effects? Does folding converge directly on the native conformation, or 
are intermediate conformations involved? Answering such questions was hampered for 
many years by the fact that structures were obtained in the solid state, by crystallography, 
whereas folding occurs in an aqueous environment. Over a period of several decades, 
however, nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy (NMR) and computer modelling 
evolved to a point where they could be used to address precisely these kinds of question 
(Wüthrich 1995). Knowledge of Anfinsen’s solution studies of denaturation and 
renaturation, and the fact that thinking about folding and unfolding involves connecting an 
image of the folded structure of a protein with some conception of the unfolded 
polypeptide, means that protein scientists had known for many years that proteins have to 
be conceived as more than static structures. But X-ray crystallography depends on the 
presence in a protein crystal of numerous copies of the molecule, all of which are 
constrained in roughly the same ways, and it focuses attention on the averaged image of the 
solid-state structure that results. This structure is generally corroborated by, and is 
consistent with, numerous and diverse other empirical findings, and indeed frequently 
makes sense of them. Hence it would be foolhardy to call into question crystallographically 
derived protein structures simply on the grounds that the crystalline environment is unlike 
the fluid milieux in which proteins typically function. On the other hand it is probably true 
to say that the thinking of protein scientists was significantly biased in particular directions 
by the attainability only of a solid-state structure that could apparently be equated with the 
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native conformation.43 No doubt thinking did to a large extent neglect the dynamic 
properties of proteins until practical and computational developments brought them within 
range of investigation (McCammon and Harvey 1989).  
 
Views about protein folding have slowly evolved as additional evidence has been 
obtained, in the form of new structures (from crystallographic, NMR-derived or other 
experimental data) and results from computer modelling. Work carried out in the 1950s 
and 1960s suggested the importance of a ‘hydrophobic effect’ (Kauzmann 1959; Tanford 
1978), and this led the interior of a protein to be seen as being akin to an oil drop. The idea 
is that hydrophobic residues become buried as a by-product of the optimization of the 
structure of the surrounding cage of water molecules, which as well as hydrogen bonding 
with each other form hydrogen bonds with the hydrophilic residues at the protein’s surface. 
An aspect of this picture is that – to the extent that a protein is partly hydrophobic – a 
protein’s structure is the result in part of the thermodynamically driven minimization of its 
surface-to-volume ratio. This can be explicated in terms of the entropic cost associated 
with the creation of a cage of relatively immobilized water molecules around the protein. 
(The smaller this cage, the lower the cost.) Debate continues today about the nature of the 
hydrophobic effect and its importance for folding. Early views also tended to interpret 
folding kinetics in terms of a simple two-state model of structure, featuring only unfolded 
and folded states. (Baldwin has described this as the ‘classical view’ (Baldwin 1995).) With 
more sophisticated kinetic measurements it became clear that folding kinetics are often 
more complex than can be accounted for by such a model.  
 
The ‘new view’ 
 
The contemporary view of folding begins with the idea that the unfolded state 
relates to an ensemble of conformations, populated according to relative thermodynamic 
stability.44 Constant jostling of a polypeptide chain by molecules of the surrounding solvent 
oscillates its atoms and causes the reorientation of parts of the chain relative to other parts, 
through rotation about those covalent bonds that are free to rotate. The resultant writhing 
of the polypeptide represents a sampling of accessible conformational space (CS), which is 
                                                 
43 David Phillips, who determined the structure of lysozyme, wrote that ‘[t]he period 1965-1975 may be 
described as the decade of the rigid macromolecule. Brass models of DNA and a variety of proteins 
dominated the scene and much of the thinking’ (Phillips 1981, quoted in Karplus 1997). 
44 The relative occupancy of two states differing in potential energy by ∆E is given by the Boltzmann formula 
NU/NL = exp(-∆E/kT), where NU/NL is the ratio of the number of molecules in the higher-energy state to 
the number in the lower-energy state, T is temperature and k is the Boltzmann constant. 
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the ultra-high-dimensional abstract space defined by extrapolating the concept of the 
Ramachandran plot such that each rotatable bond corresponds to a distinct dimension. 
Every possible conformation of a protein then corresponds to a point in CS, and protein 
dynamics deals with motions through that space. The unfolded state can be thought of as a 
set of points in CS, and folding can be identified with the set of pathways that begin at 
those points and that converge on the small region corresponding to the native state 
(Powell 1989). These ideas gave rise in the 1990s to the ‘new view’, in which folding is 
understood in terms of a funnel-shaped potential energy ‘landscape’ that directs unfolded 
conformations to the native conformation (Baldwin 1995; Dill and Chan 1997; Karplus 
1997; Matagne and Dobson 1998). What is still unclear is exactly how rough the landscape 
is (Chavez, Onuchic and Clementi 2004; Krivov and Karplus 2004). The kinetics of folding 
of some proteins is consistent with the existence of relatively stable folding intermediates 
(i.e. they exist for long enough to show up in spectroscopic experiments, for example), and 
some proteins fold via several major alternative pathways. Some pathways are fast folding 
routes, whilst others are slower, depending on the stability of the intermediate 
conformations along a pathway. In energy landscape terms, fast pathways are routes that 
avoid both high-energy hills (traversal of which would require the supply of sufficient 
kinetic energy to push the molecule over the hill, via relatively improbable high-energy 
collision events) and low-energy wells in which a conformation might become stuck (until 
kicked out of the well by similar chance high-energy events). Some fast-folding proteins are 
known that approximate the theoretical possibility in which folding is always ‘downhill’ – 
there being no stable intermediate conformations along the folding pathway to the native 
conformation (Dyer 2007; Li et al. 2009). 
 
Increasingly there is evidence to suggest that many unfolded polypeptides retain a 
considerable amount of secondary structure, and in particular a significant amount of alpha 
helical structure. And some proteins appear quickly to assume a non-native conformation 
or set of conformations that nonetheless is almost as compact as the native conformation. 
It is thought that this represents the fast burial of hydrophobic residues, and the 
corresponding realization of energetically favourable interactions between hydrophilic 
residues and solvent molecules. Rapid ‘hydrophobic collapse’ is thought to yield what is 
termed a ‘molten globule’ state, which in a slower stage then rearranges to attain the native 
conformation (Ohgushi and Wada 1983; Dobson 1992).  
 
Thus the current orthodoxy is that folding generally involves multiple pathways, in 
the context of an overall picture in which non-native states are funnelled towards the native 
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conformation largely through a progressive built up of structure based on the transient 
formation of elements of local structure (Ho and Dill, 2006; Jayachandran 2007; Mok et al. 
2007). Particular residues may be key to the formation of these stabilizing ‘flickering 
intermediates’, for example through the formation of specific hydrogen bonds or clustering 
of hydrophobic sidechains (Ybe and Hecht 1996; Neuweiler, Doose and Sauer 2005), but 
there are few hard and fast rules. A residue that plays a critical role when it occurs at a 
certain sequence position in one polypeptide may play no such role in the context of 
another sequence. And the order in which particular elements of structure form will vary 
from one instance of a particular polypeptide sequence to another, depending on the way 
in which contingent thermal events steer the trajectory through CS. Those are the rough 
outlines of an account of how proteins fold, but there is not yet complete consensus. The 
status of hydrophobic effects I mentioned earlier, and there is debate too around the 
significance of mainchain interactions versus sidechains as folding determinants (Rose et al. 
2006). Such debates are likely to be resolved – perhaps more through a change in the 
emphasis placed on different terms in the account than through the development of an 
altogether new perspective – as more data are gathered from structure determinations, ‘wet’ 
experiments (especially those based on spectroscopic methods) and modelling. 
 
Modelling and simulation 
 
That there has been real progress over recent years in the computer modelling of 
protein structure is shown by the increasing success modellers have had in accurately 
predicting structures (Lovell and Papp 2005). The bi-annual CASP (Critical Assessment of 
Techniques for Protein Structure Prediction) initiative provides an opportunity for 
modellers to pit their methods against each other by using them to predict the structure of 
a protein whose structure has been determined crystallographically but not yet published 
(Tramontano 2006, pp.51-54). Strategies and techniques for structure prediction are many 
and varied, but a basic distinction is between ab initio methods, which attempt to compute 
structure on the basis of just the amino acid sequence and general physical principles, and 
knowledge-based methods that utilize knowledge of the structures of other proteins (Helles 
2008, p.387). In recent years reasonably good results have been obtained using ‘threading’ 
methods, in which an attempt is made to fit the sequence of a protein of unknown 
structure to a known protein fold (Higgins and Taylor 2000, chapter 1). This kind of 
approach has become possible only with the availability of a large database of 
experimentally derived protein structures, and their success is contingent on the extent to 
which the set of known structures represents a comprehensive sampling of the folds that 
 67
occur in nature (Zhang 2009). Sometimes a combination of structure prediction methods is 
used, with an early example of such a hybrid approach being that of Martin et al. (1989). In 
recent years the ‘Rosetta’ methodology of the Baker group in particular has achieved some 
notable results (Das and Baker 2008; Raman et al. 2009).  
 
Computer modelling of protein structure has its origins in multiple lines of 
research, but one important branch goes back to the development of computational 
methods for visualizing protein structures. X-ray crystallographers at first constructed 
physical models from their data, but this was a laborious process on account of the size of 
macromolecules and the unsuitability of the available model-building kits for 
macromolecular work (Platt 1960). As computer power and capability increased, and with 
the development of generic computer graphics techniques (Sutherland 1963; Foley and Van 
Dam 1982), it became feasible to generate and display images of protein structures from 
the computerized atomic coordinate data yielded by crystallography (Francoeur and Segal 
2004). The Brookhaven Protein Databank (PDB) was established in the early 1970s as a 
central repository for storing and sharing protein structural data (which essentially consists 
of lists of atoms and their Cartesian coordinates) (Berman 2008). 
 
The first interactive molecular graphics system was developed in the mid-1960s by 
Levinthal and co-workers at MIT (Levinthal 1966; Francoeur and Segal 2004), and within 
five years or so a variety of similar systems had been developed. Early systems were 
expensive, however, as the computations needed to view, rotate and manipulate these 
structures on-screen taxed even advanced computing resources. One especially widespread 
protein display system consisted of a software package called FRODO running on a high-
end computing platform and usually outputting images via specialized graphics display 
hardware from Evans and Sutherland (Jones 1978). Technology developments led to the 
availability of increasingly affordable high-performance workstations, such as those from 
Sun Microsystems running the Unix operating system. By the 1990s it became possible to 
use powerful molecular display and modelling software, such as Biosym’s Insight/Discover 
applications or similar packages from, for example, Polygen or Oxford Molecular, on 
standard hardware. These software applications often incorporated a variety of novel 
molecular modelling algorithms exported from the academic research environment.45 
 
                                                 
45 For example, Oxford Molecular was formed in 1989 as a spin-off from the chemistry and biophysics 
laboratories at Oxford University, in part to commercialize software that had formed the basis of recent 
doctoral work (http://www.isis-innovation.com/spinout/index.html#pre1998 – last accessed 20 October 
2009). 
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Interactive molecular graphics techniques can be thought of as an epistemic 
prosthesis that compensates for our limited ability to view a 2-D image of a molecular 
structure and infer from it, and keep in mind, a 3-D structure. By rotating a molecular 
model on screen in real time it is possible readily to form an impression of molecular shape 
on the basis of the relative motions of the atoms making up the molecule. However, if the 
molecule is represented simply by connecting the x, y coordinates of the atoms with lines 
to represent covalent bonds, with no cues to indicate relative ‘depth’ (i.e. position along the 
z axis), then the stereo geometry of the molecule and its direction of rotation are 
ambiguous. This is because the shape of the molecule is inferred from the relative motions 
of the atoms across the screen. If an atom moves to the left then this could mean either 
that the atom is at the front of the molecule and that the latter is rotating clockwise about 
the vertical (y) axis (if one were to look down that axis from above), or that the atom is at 
the rear of the molecule and the direction of rotation is anticlockwise about the vertical 
axis. Graphical indications of relative depth (depth cues), such as drawing closer bonds 
with thicker or brighter lines, overcome this ambiguity. If molecular motion is controlled 
via hardware, e.g. by rotating knobs, then the problem may not arise however – and the 
sense of interacting with a real object may be greater. Efforts to heighten this impression 
have involved utilizing immersive virtual reality techniques and ‘haptic feedback’ to provide 
researchers with simulated physical experience of interacting with molecular shapes and 
forces, although such techniques have not entered the molecular modelling mainstream 
(e.g. Cruz-Neira, Langley and Bash 1996; Francoeur and Segal 2004, p.422). 
 
Computer modelling of protein structure involves more than just interactive 
visualization, however. Techniques for modifying and analysing structures, and for 
computing physico-chemical properties such as surface area, electrostatic potential and 
potential energy (e.g. Connolly 1983; Warwicker et al. 1985; Bash et al. 1987), provide 
insights into the properties of known structures and the likely properties of counterfactual 
structures. Such theoretical techniques also provide the foundation for a computational 
technique that now plays an important part in protein structural work and increasingly 
contributes to our understanding of folding: molecular dynamics (MD) simulation (Karplus 
and McCammon 2002). This is used to model, in what is intended to be a physically 
realistic manner, the behaviour of a molecule over time by iteratively solving Newton’s 
equations of motion for each of its atoms. Sometimes the solvent is also explicitly 
represented in atomic terms, or its bulk properties may be represented by modifying 
various parameters. To compute the atomic displacements at each time step it is necessary 
to compute the overall force acting on each atom (Wang et al. 2001). This is achieved by 
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calculating the value of a potential energy function that includes a number of terms to 
represent different kinds of interaction and force. For example there are terms in the 
function to represent the electrostatic interactions between the atom in question and each 
other atom in the system, or the (much weaker, and shorter range) Van der Waals 
interactions between an atom and its near neighbours. Reduced to its essentials the MD 
algorithm is rather simple: 
 
Bare-bones molecular dynamics algorithm 
 
(Time t at start of simulation = 0 s) 
Step 1: Calculate the overall force acting on each atom at time t as a function of the 
locations and identities of the other atoms in the system, in accordance with 
the specified potential energy function; 
Step 2: Displace each atom according to the force acting on it; 
Step 3: Increment t by the simulation time interval ∆t; 
Step 4: If t < tend then go to Step 1. 
 
(tend is the simulation duration – i.e. the amount of time to be simulated, not the actual 
time such a simulation might take to run.) 
 
When building a model from crystallographic data it can usually be automatically 
determined whether two atoms are covalently bonded or not: if they are separated by less 
than a certain distance then covalent electron sharing can be presumed. Different 
approaches exist for representing hydrogen bonds, but often they are treated as a special 
kind of electrostatic interaction. Because MD techniques are so computationally demanding 
(especially as regards processor time) simulations of even short peptides – of 20 amino acid 
residues or so – can generally be run only over simulated timescales of the order of 
microseconds (Karplus and McCammon 2002, p.650). This compares with typical real 
folding times for proteins on the order of milliseconds to several minutes. Nonetheless it 
has been possible to shed light on important aspects of folding, for example concerning the 
formation of local structure, by use of MD simulations. Studies have necessarily tended to 
focus on small proteins and peptides, such as bovine pancreatic trypsin inhibitor (BPTI) 
(Brooks and Karplus 1983) and more recently the villin headpiece (Jayachandran et al. 
2007), and often simulation work is paralleled by NMR and other spectroscopic 
investigations (e.g. Brewer et al. 2005).46 The findings of in silico and in vitro work are 
complementary, and when the results from the one are consistent with those from the 
                                                 
46 It might be interesting to compare the role of these ‘model molecules’ with that of model organisms in 
biological research more generally. 
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other confidence is gained that the picture we have of how proteins fold is on roughly the 
right tracks (Spörlein et al. 2002).  
 
Computational trends mean that ever-greater timescales are coming within reach, 
and the development of techniques for splitting problems into chunks that can be parcelled 
out to multiple networked processors has had a further amplifying effect. (MD simulations 
performed in 1998 of peptides of around 40 amino acid residues in length covered 
simulated timescales of 800 ps (Smith et al. 1998), whereas in 2007 researchers were able to 
follow the dynamics of the villin headpiece, a 35-residue peptide, over a simulated timescale 
of 20 µs (Lei and Duan 2007). This represents a 25,000-fold increase in simulation 
timescale.47) The results that have been obtained using MD simulations, their approximate 
congruence with findings from ‘wet’ experimental techniques such as NMR, and increasing 
success in predicting protein folds on the basis of both sequence similarity with known 
structures and ab initio methods mean that for the past decade the protein structure 
community has generally been optimistic about prospects for the dissolution of the protein 
folding problem (Baker 2000; Wolynes 2004; Dodson 2007; Service 2008). The principal 
obstacle to the accurate prediction of structure from sequence appears to the 
computational one of sampling enough of conformational space at sufficiently high 
resolution (Raman et al. 2009, p.99). 
 
Simulation, models and laws 
 
It has been argued that simulation techniques raise few new issues for the 
philosopher of science (Frigg and Reiss 2009). Perhaps that is so, but whether novel issues 
are raised is a different matter from whether old issues are touched on in interesting and 
perspicuous ways. How might MD simulations influence how we think about physical 
laws? The nature and status of laws has attracted considerable philosophical attention over 
a number of decades, but the relevant debates have often had a somewhat abstracted 
character. Seeing laws in a particular scientific application setting raises the possibility of 
unearthing hitherto neglected issues and aspects – or may simply help to appreciate the 
salience of issues exposed by more traditional decontextualized reflection.  
 
                                                 
47 These figures relate to different molecules and different computing setups, and are merely indicative of the 
sorts of performance improvements that have been made. 
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Two broad and perhaps contrasting points about laws are prominent in the context 
of MD simulations and the physical models that they are based on. The first relates to the 
fact that the laws seem to do real explanatory work: in large part it is the nature of the laws 
(in terms of their mathematical form) employed and coded into MD software that 
determines whether simulations generate virtual molecular behaviours that have any 
consonance with, and hence capacity to account for, (‘wet’) experimental data. I say ‘in 
large part’ since simulation accuracy is dependent too on the forms of molecular 
representation employed – for example as regards the treatment of atoms as point objects 
identifiable with specific locations in Cartesian space, or the way in which amino acid 
sidechains are represented. So perhaps it would be better to say that the laws used by 
current simulation techniques, such as the inverse square law governing electrostatic 
interactions between atoms, collectively appear – in tandem with the ways in which 
molecules are represented in virtual models – to succeed in allowing many of the qualitative 
aspects of the phenomena they are intended to model to be indeed modelled, along with 
some of their quantitative aspects. Replace an inverse square law with an inverse cube law 
and the simulation yields virtual behaviours that bear no relationship to the available 
empirical evidence, for example. On the face of things this seems grounds for presuming 
that the physical models that are ‘run’ in MD simulations of peptides and proteins in 
solution quite accurately mimic – at least within limits – the properties and behaviours of 
real physical systems involving those molecules.  
 
The second point is that notwithstanding the apparent adequacy of the laws used, 
they are readily acknowledged by scientists not to be fundamental but rather to be 
approximations. Current scientific orthodoxy tells us that a physically thorough approach 
to molecular simulation would involve solving extremely complex quantum mechanical 
equations for the relevant molecular systems, which would be even more computationally 
demanding than present, approximate MD methods. (So demanding as to be, today and for 
the foreseeable future, unfeasible for all but the simplest systems.48) Thus the fact that MD 
simulations appear to ‘work’ can be seen as confirming a working hypothesis to the effect 
that it is sometimes possible to model macromolecular processes realistically despite having 
to make substantial approximations to the way in which physical phenomena are 
represented. This hypothesis appears to be justified in the case of many such processes, but 
not all. Important exceptions include the electron transport processes involved in 
                                                 
48 New techniques for solving systems of QM equations for molecular systems have been developed that 
extend the range of simulation methods, however (see e.g. Leach (2001) and the special section ‘Challenges of 
Theoretical Chemistry’ which appeared in Science, 8 August 2008 issue (volume 321)). 
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respiration and photosynthesis. Additional support for this pragmatic confidence in the 
scientific validity of molecular simulation methods comes from the fact that as 
representations are made more detailed – for example by including hydrogen atoms in 
molecular models, or by reducing the size of simulation time steps – results model 
empirical findings with greater fidelity. This imparts a progressive character to simulation 
work which suggests that as computational resources become more powerful it will be 
possible not only to simulate molecular systems over longer timescales, but also to run 
more realistic simulations. 
 
Recent philosophical work on physical laws has tended to take place in relation to 
debates about realism, and hence has involved a focus on theoretical truth. Nancy 
Cartwright has argued that there are no exceptionless laws, even in physics – all are subject 
to a ceteris paribus qualification (Cartwright 1983, pp.46-47). However, MD work provides 
a powerful reminder that the idea of exceptionless physical laws is not necessarily 
incompatible with the existence of a ‘dappled world’ (Cartwright 1999). In other words it 
shows how a complex observable phenomenal ‘surface’, which is often resistant to 
encapsulation in neat mathematical generalizations, can come about as a result of the 
interplay of the underlying laws we infer. In an MD simulation laws function as 
components in a mechanism for generating virtual phenomena. It is hard not to believe 
that whatever the ‘real’ properties of atoms and molecules are, they result in behaviours 
that are well-modelled (that is to say adequately, if not perfectly, modelled) by the laws we 
employ.  
 
An interesting feature of Cartwright’s work on laws and explanation is the way her 
realism about theoretical entities is combined with an anti-realist stance about theoretical 
laws. Her reasoning is that often we explain something by inferring the most probable 
cause, and that causal explanations typically involve existential claims about entities rather 
than just the invocation of theoretical laws (Cartwright 1983, ‘When Explanation Leads to 
Inference’, p.92). What is striking about MD simulations, however, is just how spare the 
theoretical entities can be, and how intimately they are tied to theoretical laws. The atoms 
of an MD simulation of a peptide or protein are just points in Cartesian space, each one 
nothing more than the origin for a particular potential field, e.g. of electrostatic potential. 
The simulation scientist heavily approximates both entities and laws, does so knowingly, 
and obtains results that are nonetheless explanatory.  
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Caution is still called for, however, and we should remember that MD simulations 
only work within the ultimate bounds set by their approximations. To model the electronic 
phenomena involved in chemical reactions we cannot avoid using quantum mechanical 
approaches. And which of the laws we infer and use in our simulations are not to be 
regarded as themselves phenomena of a sort, part of a pseudo-nomological ‘surface’ 
generated by events and processes that conform to more fundamental laws? When can we 
be sure we have struck solid nomological bedrock? These are the kinds of worry I take 
Cartwright to articulate, and they are well-motivated. But I would contest the claim of Frigg 
and Reiss that simulation science is philosophically unfertile territory. Understanding 
simulation techniques is beneficial because it helps us to appreciate the nature of such 
worries and gauge the severity of the potential epistemological constraints they point to.  
 
Entropy and the stochastic exploration of state space 
 
Protein folding can be viewed as a battle against entropy: out of all the possible 
structures that a polypeptide can adopt, one or two must be favoured over others if the 
functional capacity of the native conformation is to be fulfilled. Perhaps the most 
significant anti-entropic factor is the formation of the polypeptide chain in the first place. 
If a protein’s constituent amino acids were not covalently linked then it would be 
overwhelmingly probable that they would diffuse apart, never to come together 
simultaneously in the right configuration to form a stable functional entity. Once the 
polypeptide chain exists, folding becomes a matter of ensuring that sufficient stabilizing 
interactions can occur to make remaining in a folded or partially folded state, once such a 
state is attained, favourable relative to returning to unfolded states. Proteins are presumably 
the size they are on account of the trade-off that must be achieved between there being 
enough stabilizing interactions in respect of one region of CS for there to be a functionally 
robust native state on the one hand (i.e. short peptides are too unstable), and ensuring that 
such a region is accessible from unfolded conformations in reasonable time (to avoid 
aggregation and misfolding, and to deliver the functionality afforded by the native 
conformation swiftly) on the other. The set of naturally occurring amino acids provides 
consistent backbone properties – enabling for example the formation of the hydrogen 
bonds that stabilize the alpha helix and beta sheet secondary structures – while providing a 
diverse set of side-chain properties, in terms of size and shape, hydrogen-bonding 
capabilities, electrostatic properties, and other chemical properties.   
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Complexity is a term used increasingly in a variety of scientific fields, although it 
can be quite difficult to explicate exactly what it means. In the context of protein folding 
complexity is associated with the vastness of a polypeptide’s conformational space (CS). 
Each rotatable bond represents a degree of freedom, a set of alternative configurations 
specifiable by variation of a single structural parameter. But the fact that sampling of CS at 
physiological temperatures is adequate to the relatively rapid ‘discovery’ of the native 
conformation implies that the topography of CS is such that unfolded conformations are 
separated from the native conformation by (perhaps a succession of) only relatively small 
potential energy barriers. The native conformation is stable enough that once attained it is 
not readily and irreversibly left. So the complexity of protein folding involves the stochastic 
sampling of a giant state space, through the random Brownian motions that are inevitable 
in molecular systems at non-zero absolute temperatures. The dependence of protein 
folding on the existence of what might sometimes be regarded merely as thermodynamic 
background noise makes the process rather different from the kind of machine-type 
mechanisms discussed in the previous chapter. (Blomberg (2006) uses the suggestive 
phrase ‘Brownian ratchet’ to capture the way in which noise plays a part in driving 
biological processes in a particular direction.) Machines were characterized in terms of 
highly constrained patterns of configurational variation, consistent with the degrees of 
freedom associated with particular points, lines and planes or articulation defined by the 
shapes of stable parts. To operate effectively, these man-made solid-state machines are 
typically engineered to operate consistently irrespective of environmental conditions. Of 
course, some artefactual mechanisms sense aspects of their operating environment and 
adjust to it, but in such cases the aim is often to compensate for such sensed properties 
(through feedback mechanisms) so that the usual mode of operation remains effective. 
Protein folding, on the other hand, depends on thermal noise: it is incorporated as an 
essential element of the process.49  
 
Mechanism schematicity and abstraction 
 
How does what I have just said about protein folding relate to the earlier 
discussions of mechanism and causal processes? On the one hand there seem to be broad 
physical generalizations that capture much of the nature of protein folding. There is an 
overall process trajectory in the progression from unfolded to folded states, and a certain 
amount of regularity as regards the causal roles played by classes of secondary structure and 
                                                 
49 Except, presumably, for fast-folding proteins for which folding is always energetically ‘downhill’. 
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key residue. It is not, therefore, that it is completely impossible to assign folding function 
to particular kinds of structure. There is substantial reliability of process too (i.e. most 
tokens of a particular sequence type fold to yield the same structure in a given 
environment). These attributes are, I suggest, enough to justify saying that folding has at 
least a partially mechanistic character. On the other hand it is a process in which chance, in 
the guise of the ‘random’ thermal motion of atoms and molecules, plays a major part. This 
element of contingency, acting in concert with the astronomic number of degrees of 
freedom a polypeptide’s structure represents, and the relatively limited variation in 
energetic stability across alternative configurations relative to those degrees of freedom (i.e. 
few sterically feasible conformations are not accessible at least occasionally at the energies 
available at physiological temperatures), gives rise to a high degree of process complexity. 
Any instance of a given polypeptide can reach the native conformation by way of a large 
number of routes, and it is difficult, if not frequently impossible, to assign specific 
functional roles in respect of folding to specific amino acid residues that hold good across 
an entire population of instances of a particular polypeptide. The relative lack of causal 
constraint (when contrasted with the very limited number of pathways through 
configurational space associated with the operation of a machine), and the difficulty we 
have in identifying simple structure—function relationships, makes folding look somewhat 
non-mechanistic. Hence I suggest we should think of protein folding as a semi-mechanistic 
process; it is a process poised somewhere between the machine and causal process senses 
of mechanism. 
 
So the short answer to the question of what the phrase ‘the mechanism of protein 
folding’ means is that it is the process by which proteins fold. But at a detailed level, in 
terms of what a particular amino acid does, there may be no general facts of the matter that 
hold true across either (a) multiple folding runs of the same polypeptide sequence or (b) 
the folding processes of different polypeptide sequences. Nonetheless I have argued that 
there is sufficient determinacy of outcome in the case of any given polypeptide, and 
sufficient regularity amongst folding processes in general, to warrant placing a slightly 
stronger interpretation on mechanism. One way of further explicating this sense of 
mechanism involved in protein folding – the process by which they fold – is through a 
concept of mechanism schemas and mechanistic schematicity. I shall try to make clear what 
I mean. 
 
Generally the phenomena studied by science represent instances of particular types 
or related sets of causal processes or events. As they are viewed at higher resolutions 
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and/or as the contextual scope is broadened the sets of which they are members become 
smaller. (All events presumbly have to be regarded as unique if the contextual bounds are 
set large enough, and if viewing resolution is sufficiently high.) But conversely when events 
and processes are viewed at a higher level of abstraction, by limiting the contextual bounds 
and / or by ignoring details visible only when the resolution exceeds a certain level, many 
phenomena appear to be repeated at different times or places or both. In addition, 
phenomena may be similar if not in their details then in terms of their effects in a particular 
context. We see patterns in phenomena and amongst events. So far as overall process 
causality goes, details may not matter. For example, a causally important event in a 
molecular setting might be the formation of a hydrogen bond between a residue at the 
surface of a protein and a water molecule. But the orientation of the hydrogen bond, and 
by implication perhaps the orientation of the water molecule, might not matter if the other 
water molecules that interact with it can adjust their orientations accordingly. Similarly, the 
exact identity of the amino acid may not matter. In such cases we might say that there is 
schematic similarity between two distinct cases, or that there is a shared mechanism 
schema. Here the schema is not very abstract, however, by which I mean something quite 
specific: there are not many ways of satisfying, or ‘filling out’, the schema. (That there are 
not many ways of filling the schema means that it is readily filled out. This might initially 
sound paradoxical – what are the chances of finding just those few ways of filling out such 
a schema? But the point is that the schema is highly constrained, and the constraints act as 
a stringent filter on our thoughts.) 
 
A mechanism schema, then, is a counterfactual space standing for a class of causal 
processes that must be filled by specific events and processes for the process to be 
instantiated. The more abstract a schema is then the greater the number, and perhaps 
diversity, of possible counterfactual events and processes that could fill it. A schema that 
imposes a large number of constraints on filling events and processes (as conditions to be 
satisfied) may be judged to be less abstract, or it may be that the filling processes must be 
more complex. For example, we can readily conceive of a process in which entity A must 
cause entity B to move in a certain way via a mediating event or process of some kind, such 
that B moves as close to simultaneously with A as possible. If B must be displaced in the 
same direction as A, and by the same amount, then the least complex counterfactual 
process needed to complete the overall process by which A displaces B is clearly quite 
simple. If, however, B must amplify the displacement of A, and reverse its direction, the 
minimally complex coupling process must be more complex. If it does not matter when B 
moves, so long as it is only after A moves, then A and B are more strongly decoupled and 
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the counterfactual space of mediating processes is larger. Presumably there is an upper limit 
to the complexity of a mediating process, beyond which – as a contingent, epistemic matter 
– the features of the mediating process in some sense come to dwarf the events and 
processes it couples.  
 
That is one relevant sense of abstraction relevant to talk of mechanism schemas. It 
focuses on mediation between two stages of a process. Another sense addresses the 
process stages that are coupled in a schema. It depends on our capacity to group kinds of 
antecedent event or process, and resultant ones. This may be on functional grounds, or 
causal grounds, or perhaps according to some other basis. But however it is done, the 
larger and more diverse the sets of antecedent and resultant events and processes, the more 
abstract the mechanism schemas they represent. (This ‘process terminus’-oriented sense of 
mechanistic schema abstraction can be combined with the first, ‘mediating process’-
oriented sense, of course.)  
 
A minimal schematic sense of mechanism is invoked when the term is used to 
describe an unknown causal process presumed to connect one state or set of conditions 
(the origin) with another (the destination). This use of the term amounts to little more than 
an affirmation of faith in materialism and determinism (i.e. belief that one state of affairs, 
materially speaking, will lead to another). Only where repetition of a phenomenon can be 
discerned without the need for much abstraction can we say that the phenomenon is 
mechanistic in a non-schematic sense. The greater the degree of abstraction required the 
more strongly we feel that a phenomenon is mechanistic only schematically.  
 
Conclusions 
 
What does the phrase ‘mechanism of protein folding’ mean? It cannot be taken to 
refer to anything that can be likened to a machine, if we take those to be material structures 
that implement particular patterns of physical entailment in order to fulfil some role within 
a broader context. In the protein folding process a polypeptide chain is the target, so to 
speak, of a variety of physicochemical principles (laws of electrostatic force, the tendency 
to form chemical bonds by sharing electrons, etc.), but these principles are not organized 
into any overall structure – qua diachronically stable spatial configuration – that stands 
comparison with the structure of a machine. (It is a mistake to attempt to associate them 
with any such structure at all.)  
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General statements can, however, be made about how folding occurs, in terms of 
hydrophobic effects, hydrogen bonding propensities and so on, and associated with these 
general statements are a variety of striking visual metaphors, such as ‘energy landscape’, 
‘potential energy well’, and ‘funnel’. Such topographical metaphors help us imaginatively fill 
the gap between unfolded and folded states despite the complex stochastic nature of the 
processes that we believe to occupy that gap. This I think can be seen as bearing out 
MDC’s proposal that intelligibility is connected with ‘showing how’ some phenomenon or 
effect comes about. Molecular dynamics (MD) simulations appear capable of filling the gap 
in physically explicit detail from moment to moment, by paralleling algorithmically what we 
take physical laws to do in reality. The laws used in MD simulations appear to approximate 
closely the effects of the causal capacities we attribute to atomic and molecular structures 
on the basis of their behaviour in a wide range of contexts.  
 
Minimally and schematically, then, the phrase ‘the mechanism of protein folding’ 
adverts to the existence of sets of causal processes that connect unfolded polypeptides (in 
general) with their folded variants, about which it is possible to make a variety of 
counterfactual-supporting generalizations.   
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4. Complexity and cellular causality - I 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter and the next concern the nature of cellular causation in relation to the 
processes it involves. These are distinctive in a variety of ways, and the limited 
understanding we have of many of the fundamental phenomena of cell biology implies that 
this distinctiveness constitutes a significant barrier to understanding. I have already touched 
on some of the characteristics of cell processes in relation to mechanistic concepts (for 
example when I mentioned interaction networks in a fluid environment) and I now 
examine them more closely, with a view to providing some account of how our 
understanding is shaped and constrained by specific issues. 
 
The epistemic deficit we encounter when faced with the cell seems in large part to 
be connected to the complexity of cell processes, but how is that characteristic to be 
understood? Perhaps it is unsurprising that attempts to capture the nature of complexity 
often appear partial or unsatisfactory in some respect, for example by being so abstruse 
that the connections with specific scientific, and especially biological, problems are unclear 
(e.g. Rosen 1991; Darley 1994; Jones 2008). A corollary of one view of the complexity of 
cell processes is that no simple unifying account of them can be given. However, by 
looking at a range of cell properties and processes and by considering several perspectives 
on them I hope to shed some light on what it means to say that cells are complex and also 
clarify how the issue of complexity relates to mechanism. (To what extent, if any, does it 
make sense to think of cells as mechanisms?) 
 
My approach consists in part of demonstrating how, depending on where our 
interests lie, a number of rather abstract ideas are potentially relevant to our understanding 
of cellular causality. The other part of my approach is to reflect on the dependence of cell 
function on a variety of different kinds of causal factor. These I describe in terms of the 
structures they involve, and the way in which those structures participate in the realization 
of particular functional outcomes. They range from the highly localized and machine-like at 
one extreme to, at the other, highly delocalized processes in which the functional capacities 
that contribute towards particular phenomenal outcomes or patterns are distributed across 
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multiple structures (if specific capacities or sets of structures can be identified at all). Some 
functions are implemented by relatively stable structures while others are instantiated 
fleetingly by highly dynamic or short-lifespan structures. Processes that are relatively 
insensitive to their environment can be contrasted with others that are more heavily 
modulated by contextual factors. 
 
Protein machines, which can be thought of as a kind of molecular gadget, I 
discussed in Chapter 2. As a causal factor in the processes in which they participate – 
which typically are chemical reactions – they act rather differently from the highly dynamic 
and rather labile structures of the cytoskeleton that are important causal factors in a broad 
range of cell functions and processes. These two cases are different again from solvent 
effects or macromolecular crowding, say, which are non-specific and collective in character 
(i.e. involve properties of large molecular ensembles that are to some extent independent of 
the exact structures of the molecules), and from the way in which DNA and RNA function 
as passive molecular templates. I suggest that the cell is epistemically intractable in part 
because of this diversity of causal factors, which often act simultaneously to bring about 
particular events, processes or outcomes. But causal diversity does not necessarily beget 
epistemic intractability, even if it can be an important contributory factor. Intractability may 
also stem from the nature of any logical or functional architecture exhibited by cell 
processes, supervening on events involving molecular structures and their transformations. 
(Or perhaps, to keep an open mind, the problem relates rather to the lack of such 
architecture.)  
 
It could be argued that an implication of the picture I present of the complexity of 
cellular causality, expressed in terms of the cognitively taxing interplay of diverse causal 
factors organized in functionally opaque ways, is that there are many routes into the topic. 
There would be a certain historical logic to beginning with the Central Dogma and the 
genocentric perspective on cellular causation to which it gave rise, which is a perspective 
now frequently considered misleadingly simplistic. In fact, however, I will only touch on 
the topic of gene action in the next chapter, and address it in depth only in Chapter 7. 
Instead my starting point is to review several related and influential accounts of complexity 
that touch on issues pertinent to biological systems. From the platform provided by this 
contemporary understanding of complexity I then look at recent work on the modelling of 
metabolism. This connects complexity with the topic of emergence (which I discuss at 
length in Chapter 6), and leads into a broader discussion of fundamental causal issues 
surrounding metabolism. The next chapter continues the discussion by describing some of 
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the biophysical and biomolecular specifics underpinning a variety of cellular processes. I 
argue that problems centring on the structure—process distinction, which the MDC 
account of mechanism tries to address through the ontic duality of entities and activities, 
remain pressing. In the final part of the next chapter I sketch a perspective on mechanism 
that seeks to avoid privileging either structure or process, whilst at the same time gratifying 
intuitions about the status of interactions and functions, for example. In addition I attempt 
to be explicit about the distinction between ontic and epistemic issues, and comparison 
with the MDC account suggests that some of that account’s problems stem from its 
conflation of the two categories. To begin, however, I want to motivate the case for a 
broader perspective on cellular processes than appears often to be countenanced by neo-
mechanists. 
 
Structures, processes and material flux 
 
The two broad senses of mechanism I outlined in Chapter 2 can be combined and 
situated within a rough and ready framework for thinking about material causal processes 
in general. At one extreme are systems involving relatively stable, persistent structures 
associated with discrete functions. Structural and functional organization tends to be 
modular and hierarchical, and the structure—function relationships are straightforward and 
robust. Causal influence in such systems typically acts in a localized and concentrated way, 
operates relatively independently of context, and conforms to simple schemas that are 
usually linear or cyclical. Such patterns of causation are in general readily described, 
analysed and comprehended. The operation of such systems may be so simple – if not 
globally then certainly within functionally significant local pockets – as to be expressible by 
way of simple mathematical functions involving few variables. These are the sorts of 
system we tend to think of as being mechanisms in a strong and relatively non-figurative 
sense. So far as an overall framework of causal processes goes we can think of these 
systems as implementing strongly mechanistic causal processes.  
 
At another extreme lie quite different kinds of causal process, in which it is hard to 
associate structures reliably with particular functions, or functions with specific, stable 
structures. Structure—function relationships appear neither simple nor robust, and causal 
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influences are complex, often being distributed, collective or delocalized in nature.50 It is 
generally much harder to describe, comprehend or analyse what is going on in these kinds 
of non-mechanistic systems, in which phenomena and behaviours sometimes occur 
unexpectedly, as if ‘out of nowhere’. These kinds of phenomena, and the systems that give 
rise to them, are often described as emergent or as exhibiting emergent properties. I want 
to stress that this framework for thinking about material causal processes is highly 
approximate and is not to be thought of as a simple one-dimensional spectrum of 
possibilities. I have just described two extreme kinds of causal process, but they are not 
simple polar opposites, for they are functions of a number of variables (i.e. those relating to 
the characteristics listed).  
  
Another way of thinking about material systems, some of which we tend to see in 
mechanistic terms, is to focus on (non-causal) spatiotemporal correlations between the 
particles that make them up. (For purposes of argument it could be assumed that the 
particles are the nuclei of the atoms making up the system, or the small groups of nuclei 
that co-occur in particular molecules.) Imagine that a virtual box defines the region we take 
to include the system of interest. If this virtual box contains a homogeneous fluid then the 
particles will be mobile and will move relatively independently. (Suppose that the fluid is a 
gas, so that the particles are not unduly constrained by their neighbours.) (See Figure 2A.) 
As a result, over a particular time interval ∆t each particle P will come within a certain 
distance r of N(r) other particles. For large values of ∆t each particle will come within r of 
the same number N(r) of particles. And suppose we number each particle P, and associate 
with each particle an ‘encounter list’ consisting of the numbers of all the particles that 
come within range r of P during ∆t. As ∆t increases the particles will tend to become 
associated with increasingly similar encounter lists.  
 
The encounter list properties that hold for a system consisting of a homogeneous 
gas are very different from those generated when the virtual box is filled by a solid (Figure 
2B51). Then, each particle is associated with a unique and fixed encounter list that is 
independent of ∆t. If instead of a fluid or a solid the system consists of a solid wheel – of 
radius 2r, say – immersed in fluid (see Figure 2C) then the encounter list characteristics are 
 
                                                 
50 My former Egenis colleague Jonathan Davies has explored the idea of distributed causal explanation in his 
PhD thesis (Davies 2008). In Chapter 8 I reflect further on the differentiation of systems according to how 
functions are distributed. 
51 In Figure 2B the particles have been drawn larger relative to r as compared with Figures 2A and 2C, for 
ease of preparation. 
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Figure 2A – Tracking particles: homogeneous fluid 
 
 
Figure 2B – Tracking particles: solid-state system 
 
  
Figure 2C – Tracking particles: solid-state wheel in fluid environment 
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modified again. Assuming that the composition of the wheel is stable then irrespective of 
the value of ∆t the encounter lists of particles lying within r of the centre of the wheel will 
have a fixed composition, representing just that fraction of the system’s particles that lies 
within a distance of r. Particles in the wheel lying further than r from the centre of the 
wheel will have encounter lists made up of two parts: a fixed set of particles (their 
neighbours in the wheel), and a changing set that grows with time (their fluid neighbours).  
 
If now the system is a cell in a fluid medium containing nutrient molecules then 
thinking in terms of particle correlations helps to make clear the distinctiveness of living 
systems. For although over short timescales (certainly shorter than the cell division interval) 
the cell looks to be structurally relatively stable, over longer timescales the compositional 
dynamics of the particle encounter lists will be unlike those seen in the cases just described. 
In particular, there will be few particles for which the corresponding encounter lists remain 
fixed for very long. This is because atoms are continually being taken up from the 
environment in particular molecular contexts, which are then broken down and their 
constituent atoms are recombined. Moreover, catalytic reactions shuffle atoms amongst 
molecules that differ widely in terms of mobility and lifetime. Thus the encounter lists will 
be both highly diverse (at a population level), and highly dynamic (individually).52 Over 
timescales longer than several cell division intervals, say, the system’s particle encounter 
lists may exhibit patterns of various kinds such that in statistical or formal terms they are 
similar to those that occurred earlier. In this respect the lists are like those of a machine-
type artefact. The key difference is that whereas in the artefact the particle numbers in the 
lists stay the same, in the living cell the particle encounter lists at one time will be associated 
with a different set of particles than at substantially earlier or later times. 
 
This ‘particle tracking perspective’ may be thought to offer no insights that more 
literal descriptions of material and chemical systems in terms of physical state and so on 
cannot yield. But it does help to draw attention to the different sorts of material dynamics 
that can occur in different kinds of system. It shows how different living systems and 
machine-type artefacts are – and yet how they are not unrelated. We can imagine 
intermediate systems of various kinds, and can see how a system can be more or less like a 
solid-state machine-type mechanism in terms of the dynamics of its underlying material 
composition. This is consistent with an aspect of the view I want to promote: where 
material systems are concerned, mechanistic status is a matter of degree, not an all-or-
                                                 
52 It may be that the statistical or other quantitative properties of particle encounter lists could form the basis 
for some measure of system complexity. 
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nothing affair. It also provides a salutary reminder that structures can be thought of – when 
considered at a particular level of detail – as processes.53 That living systems are different in 
kind from non-living systems would be reflected, I predict (detailed analysis and perhaps 
computer simulation would be required to prove the point), in differences between their 
respective particle encounter lists. The greater predicted diversity of those for living 
systems compared with those of simple gases or solid-state devices seems related to the 
increased complexity of biological systems, and indeed the idea that the complexity of 
biological systems is one of their most significant attributes is an influential one. It 
constitutes an important element underpinning the rapid growth in recent years of systems 
biology (O’Malley and Dupré 2005; Noble 2006; Alon 2007a). That said, what is 
complexity, and what form does biological complexity take?  
 
Capturing complexity 
 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the re-emergence of the so-called sciences of 
complexity or complexity science, which has been defined succinctly as ‘the study of 
systems with many interdependent components’ (MacKay 2008). Perhaps, however, this 
definition is too succinct: machines fit the definition while not being the focus of 
complexity research. An alternative approach is to see complexity science as a trans-
disciplinary set of conceptual orientations and approaches to understanding systems made 
up of numerous interacting entities and / or characterized by non-linear, and hence 
analytically intractable, mathematical relationships. Their origins lie in the growth of 
cybernetics in the 1950s and 1960s (Wiener 1948; Pask 1961), and while interest in 
complexity never disappeared completely it does for a time at least appear to have been 
displaced to the scientific margins as cybernetics gradually mutated into more focused lines 
of research in artificial intelligence, systems theory and computer science.54 Renewed 
interest in complex systems is closely associated with the explosion of interest in fractal 
mathematics and chaos that occurred in the 1980s, and it can be related too to the rise of 
personal computing and the consequent ready availability of the computing resources 
required to investigate them. Complexity research is concerned especially with developing 
an understanding of a variety of ubiquitous patterns that occur across a wide range of 
natural phenomena, such as chaotic or emergent properties and behaviour: 
                                                 
53 Even atoms can be thought of as processes, constituted by the interactions of sub-atomic particles such as 
protons and electrons, which in turn are understood in terms of the dynamics of quarks. 
54 An extensive list of complexity-related references is to be found at http://bruce.edmonds.name/thesis/ 
(last accessed 26 October 2009). 
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Complex emergent systems, in which interactions among numerous components of 
“agents” produce patterns or behaviours not obtainable by individual components, 
are ubiquitous at every scale of the physical universe, for example in neural 
networks, turbulent fluids, insect colonies, and spiral galaxies. Complex systems 
also appear in a range of artificial symbolic contexts, including genetic algorithms, 
cellular automata, artificial life, and models of market economies.  
Life, with its novel collective behaviours at the scale of the molecules, 
genes, cells, and organisms, is the quintessential emergent complex system. 
Furthermore, the ancient transition from a geochemical world to a living planet 
may be modeled as a sequence of emergent events, each of which increased the 
chemical complexity of the prebiotic world. 
(Hazen et al. 2007, p.8574; reference citations omitted) 
 
As well as reports of specialist work on topics such as fractal mathematics and 
chaos (e.g. Peitgen et al. 1992), emergence (e.g. Johnson 2002), self-organization (e.g. 
Kauffman 1993, 1996) and network dynamics (e.g. Watts 2003), a number of more general 
discussions of complexity have been published. In practice, however, these frequently 
amount to compendia of concepts and findings from those other specialist areas (e.g. 
Mainzer 2007). Sometimes discussions relate the concept of complexity to reduction, or 
rather to irreducibility (Casti 1994, chapter 5). Indirectly this reinforces the intuitively 
appealing idea mentioned in Chapter 1 of a possible link between reduction and simplicity, 
since the latter must presumably be considered the complement of some everyday 
conception of complexity.  
 
I shall not spend much time discussing the canonical technical ideas of the 
complexity sciences, or at any rate I shall not address them via the simple physics-based 
models characteristic of much of the field55. This reflects my belief that the biocomplexity 
exhibited by the cell is of a different kind, and perhaps degree, to that of simple model 
systems. In the introduction I hinted at the reasons for such an assertion, and one of the 
purposes of this chapter is to amplify those hints into something like a defensible position.  
 
Before going further, however, it will be useful to summarize briefly several of the 
more influential abstract accounts of complexity that have been advanced in recent 
decades. One especially prominent perspective is that of Herbert Simon, who associated 
complexity with the idea of ‘nearly decomposable systems’ (Simon 1996). Decomposable 
biological and physical systems are – to a first approximation – those in which the strength 
and frequency of causal interactions between system parts correlates in an approximately 
                                                 
55 For example lattice gas and cellular automaton-based simulations of physical systems (see e.g. Manneville et 
al. (eds.) 1989). 
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inverse manner with their separation (‘... in most biological and physical systems relatively 
intense interaction implies relative spatial propinquity’ (Simon 1996, p.187)). Thus the 
closest parts interact most strongly, while the weakest causal relationships are between the 
most distantly separated parts. Simon generalizes the notion of decomposability, however, 
by stressing the primacy of interaction intensity over spatial proximity, as this gives him a 
concept that can be applied to social as well as material systems. 
 
Decomposability tends to be associated with modularity, and in material contexts 
this in turn gives rise to the idea of mereological levels – or structural hierarchy, as Simon 
describes it more generally.56 A system is made up of parts or modules, and parts in turn 
are made up of sub-parts. A system can be decomposed into parts that can be individuated 
– theoretically and practically – because causal interactions amongst the sub-parts within a 
part are stronger than those between the sub-parts and other parts. Hence sub-parts have a 
coherence and identity that appears to be prior to, or at least largely independent of, that of 
the parts they make up. Where attention focuses on interaction rather than structure the 
concepts of modularity and levels remain useful, since they can be used to discuss parts of 
systems – sub-systems – which are causally relatively self-contained, irrespective of issues 
of spatial distribution.  
 
From this initial articulation of the concept of decomposability Simon identifies a 
class of system in which overall decomposability is accompanied by causal inter-
relationships that cut across the clustering of interactions that makes for hierarchical 
decomposability. These kinds of systems he terms nearly decomposable57, and he argues 
that many of the systems we think of as complex are nearly decomposable in this sense. A 
pertinent question from the point of view of my concerns in this chapter then is whether 
such systems are complex in a sense capable of subsuming biological systems such as the 
cell. Hierarchical and modular organization seem often to make for systems that are 
analytically tractable and thus rather simple (and in an organizational setting hierarchical 
structure provides a way of simplifying the management of large numbers of people). If 
this is so then we should associate complexity especially with the module- or level-crossing 
causal interactions that mandate the ‘nearly’ in ‘nearly decomposable’, rather than with the 
modularity that is the typical accompaniment of decomposability. 
                                                 
56 Modularity does not obviously follow from the idea that ‘intense interaction implies relative spatial 
propinquity’. It seems necessary, to account for modularity, to additionally postulate that there is not a 
continuous spectrum of interaction intensity but rather a clustering of intensities around particular values. In 
physical systems it is the different forces, with their different ranges and strengths, that give rise to structures 
at different scales and thus establish the ‘levels’ that naively we see in natural phenomena. 
57 Systems that are nearly decomposable are often referred to as ‘near-decomposable’. 
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Another perspective on complexity, related to Simon’s but less well known, is that 
of William Wimsatt. He distinguishes between descriptive complexity and interactional 
complexity. Descriptive complexity is a measure of the extent to which different theoretical 
concepts and frameworks, when applied to the same system, recognise the same sets of 
structural and process boundaries. (He terms the different spatial decompositions of a 
system S into sub-systems under different theoretical perspectives the different K-
decompositions of S.) If a system is amenable to analysis or treatment according to two 
distinct theoretical frameworks then the system is more descriptively complex when the 
terms and operations of each framework serve to pick out or define spatially distinct 
objects, regions or processes than when they establish or respect similar boundaries and 
objects (Wimsatt 2007, p.184; see also Peacocke 1989, pp.245-249). The concept of 
interactional complexity is intended as a tool for distinguishing between systems on the 
basis of the complexity of their causal interactions ‘with special attention paid to those 
interactions that cross boundaries between one theoretical perspective and another’ 
(Wimsatt 2007, p.184). A system is interactionally simple if none of the sub-systems in a 
decomposition made according to causal interaction criteria cross boundaries between its 
different K-decompositions, and interactionally complex to the extent that they do. These 
ideas are somewhat abstract, but an important result is that if S is descriptively complex – 
i.e. if the different K-decompositions respect different spatial boundaries – then the 
researcher has to take into account the relations of parts for all parts of the different 
decompositions, and S is correspondingly epistemically intractable. 
 
Wimsatt claims to part company with Simon over the consequences of evolution 
for system organization. Simon argues that evolution will favour modular system 
organization, on the basis that the attainment of a functional configuration will be more 
probable given hierarchical and progressive self-assembly. The argument he gives is 
essentially entropic: for all the parts of a complex system to come together simultaneously 
in the ‘right’ configuration (i.e. that selected on the basis of functional capability) is far less 
likely than for some subset of the parts to come together in the right way. Hence evolution 
will favour possibilities for the ‘successive aggregation of individually stable sub-assemblies 
into larger sub-assemblies’, as Wimsatt puts it (Wimsatt 2007, p.188). In biological contexts 
Simon’s idea, if it supposed to provide some kind of account of system development 
and/or functioning, sounds somewhat simplistic. As I discuss in the next chapter, the 
functional sub-systems of biological systems are typically not mereologically simple 
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structures assembled like building blocks, which is what seems to be implied by the 
mereological tenor of Simon’s treatment. 
 
Wimsatt takes issue with Simon’s thinking on the consequences for complexity of 
evolution, although his reasoning is hard to follow as it builds on what he says about 
interactional complexity. What it boils down to, however, is that ‘considerations of 
efficiency in evolution would lead to the co-adaptation and increased interdependence of 
parts of a functional system’, and this results in an increase in a system’s descriptive and 
interactional complexity (p.190). (He notes that modern man depends for survival on 
particular social environments, and similarly many bacteria prosper only in the context of a 
bacterial culture.) One result is a drift away from neat structure-function mappings – he 
speaks of ‘recognizable physical objects’ rather than structures – of the kind discussed 
earlier in relation to mechanism. This idea is an especially attractive one: a significant aspect 
of complexity of the kind seen in biological systems such as the cell is to do with the way in 
which functions are distributed over structures. (About which I say more later.) Moreover 
it speaks to the connection between complexity and mechanism in an intuitively plausible 
manner. But it is unclear to what extent Wimsatt’s conclusion is actually incompatible with 
Simon’s position. Simon’s entropic self-assembly argument concerns structure-building 
interactions, whereas functional relationships of the kind relevant to Wimsatt’s thinking 
about complexity are more to do with chemical interaction and reaction.58  
 
Emergence and metabolic reaction networks 
 
Having reviewed some fairly a prioristic, albeit apparently suggestive, thinking 
about complexity I now look at a specific strand of research in systems biology. This 
investigates the kinetic properties of the biochemical reaction networks that constitute an 
important element of cells as systems, and I shall look in particular at a paper by 
Westerhoff and co-workers (Boogerd at al. 2005). Reflecting on this work and the appeals 
it makes to philosophical ideas provides the opportunity both to introduce the idea of 
emergence and to identify a number of issues pertinent to causation in the cell that are 
connected to but distinct from the issue of complexity. (Making sense of the connection is 
                                                 
58
 Wimsatt appears to be aware of this issue when he attributes to Simon a position on the implications  of 
evolution for complexity that combines the ideas of near-decomposability and mereological hierarchy (p.188 
– ‘But Simon’s use of the concept of near-decomposability in the same article sometimes appears to suggest 
that he believes such hierarchical systems to be nearly decomposable in a nestable manner ...’). 
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one of the things I will attempt to do over the course of the remaining chapters of the 
thesis.)  
 
Boogerd et al. discuss the kinetic properties of coupled biochemical reactions in 
terms of the values of parameters such as enzyme and metabolite concentrations, the 
reaction-specific K values that express the affinities of metabolites for enzymes, and the 
equilibrium constant Keq for each reaction. (The lower the K value, the greater the avidity 
with which an enzyme binds the corresponding metabolite. Keq is the ratio of the product 
and substrate concentrations at equilibrium.) The dynamics of a system of reactions is, 
Boogerd et al. explain, a function of the properties of system constituents, system 
configuration and internal and external conditions (p.149). Modelling such a system 
requires, they claim, knowledge of two kinds of properties of the system parts: intrinsic 
properties, such as the mass or amino acid sequence of a protein, and relational properties 
such as the dissociation constant that characterizes the dissociation of a complex into its 
constituent parts. These relational properties, it is suggested, are ‘sufficient to determine 
which parts of the system interact with each other and in what manner’. The relational 
properties, plus what they term a composition relation or a description of the spatial 
organization of the cell, constitutes a model of the ‘static system’ which, under the 
application of physical laws, yields the ‘state-independent properties’ of the system.  
 
To obtain the dynamic properties of a system it is necessary to combine the state-
independent properties with boundary and initial conditions, such as (in the case of a 
bacterial cell) nutrient, enzyme and metabolite concentrations, temperature and pressure. 
Simulation given these quantities then generates a set of state-dependent properties of the 
system as a function of time; these include rate of free energy release, nutrient uptake fluxes 
and growth rate. Boogerd et al. then argue that the parts making up the system now, when 
the system consumes energy to perform work, display ‘component properties’, which are 
functions of the relational (i.e. non-intrinsic) properties of the parts and the entire state of 
the system. They include the rates of metabolite conversion and the sensitivities of these 
rates to change in metabolite concentrations.  
 
So far, Boogerd et al. have been treating the cell as a single-compartment system. 
Now they introduce the idea of modularity. Suppose that the total system A comprises two 
sub-systems, A1 and A2. (One could imagine that A1 is an organelle in a cell that constitutes 
A2.) Suppose in addition that A1 contains enzymes 1 and 2, and that A2 contains enzymes 3, 
4, and 5. Sub-systems (modules) A1 and A2 interact, and each contributes to the boundary 
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conditions that determine the dynamic component properties of the other. The key idea is 
that if A1 is studied in isolation then the interactions between A1 and A2 must be mimicked 
if its component properties are to be understood (p.156). But this may be easier said than 
done when the component properties of A1 and A2 co-determine (or co-constrain) each 
other. As the authors note, the system behaviour given compartmentation 
 
could then include oscillatory, or chaotic states that are not present in simpler 
systems. The behavior of A1, in isolation is sometimes qualitatively different from 
the behavior of A1 in A, and therefore, since the behavior of A is a function of A1, 
understood as a component, the behavior of A cannot generally be derived from 
studies on simpler subsystems of A. In general, the (dynamic) behavior of A is not 
simply the superposition of the (dynamic) behaviors of its subsystems studied in 
isolation. Dynamic interactions can bring about qualitatively new behavior in 
complex systems. This is precisely where prediction of system behavior on the basis 
of simpler subsystems fails. We cannot predict the behavior of the components 
within the entire system and so cannot predict systemic behavior. This is 
emergence, with novel system behavior that cannot be predicted on the basis of the 
behavior of simpler subsystems. 
(Boogerd et al. 2005, p.156) 
 
Such invocations of the concept of emergence are increasingly common, as possibilities for 
computer simulation bring the properties and behaviour of increasingly complex systems 
within range of scientific investigation. But what is emergence? I shall defer attempting to 
answer that question fully until Chapter 6, instead confining myself to considering briefly 
several relevant ideas. Popularly, the term is associated with notion of a whole being 
‘greater than the sum of its parts’. This phrase points to the way in which the properties 
and behaviour of certain systems prove difficult or impossible to explain or predict on the 
basis of the properties of their parts, as Boogerd et al. discuss in relation to metabolic 
reaction systems. One aspect of the emergent properties and behaviours such systems 
exhibit, related to unpredictability and apparent inexplicability, is unexpectedness or 
surprise (Casti 1994, 1997). The oscillatory or chaotic system behaviour that Boogerd et al. 
note, if unseen in non-modular system configurations in which enzymes 1-5 are present in 
a single compartment, would presumably be unexpected in just this way. But do Boogerd et 
al. succeed in demonstrating, as they claim to do, the existence of what they term a ‘strong’ 
form of emergence in cell biology, whilst avoiding what they regard as unpalatable 
metaphysical issues? (‘We seek an account of emergence that is not merely epistemological 
and yet does not suffer from the problems of a priori metaphysics’ (p.133).) I regard the 
claim that the emergence that is observed is of a different, ‘stronger’, kind to that typically 
studied in the complexity sciences, as being more problematic than the basic claim that the 
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At the outset of their paper Boogerd et al. suggest that if ‘some phenomenon is 
emergent, in the metaphysical sense, then it is somehow fundamental and irreducible. It is 
fundamentally different from the physical basis on which it nonetheless depends’ (p.131). 
The concern is that emergent properties, construed in the way in which Kim construes 
mental qualia as metaphysically emergent (on account of the way in which they involve 
intrinsic properties that elude functionalization59), ‘defy any naturalistic explanation’ 
(p.132). They suggest that 
 
For emergence to have any positive role to play in a scientific setting, it must be 
understood differently. It must be compatible with the thought that scientific 
explanations are mechanistic explanations. ... Ideally, emergence would be a natural 
consequence of physical processes. Finally, emergence should not be merely an 
epistemic notion, as Ernest Nagel thought it would be.  
(Boogerd et al. 2005, p.132) 
 
These passages raise a number of issues, with two in particular being especially important. 
First, there is the meaning of naturalism assumed by the phrase ‘naturalistic explanation’. I 
consider the account of emergence I offer in Chapter 6 to be thoroughly naturalistic, but it 
is not naturalistic in the sense of naturalism implicit in Boogerd et al.’s stated worry. 
Naturalism in my account is just the stance that sees the psychological capacities that arise 
from the operation of our mind/brains as causally integral parts of the world, and hence a 
naturalistic explanation may legitimately – and may sometimes – depending on what we are 
interested in – have to reference knowledge of our mind/brains as well as knowledge of 
the world external to the mind/brain. Explanations of the world beyond our mind/brains, 
on this account of naturalism, are explanatory relative to the structures, processes and 
properties of our mind/brains. For Boogerd et al., however, naturalistic explanation 
apparently means explanation in terms of functions of properties and objects that do not 
reference our psychological constitution, as a substrate, or the capacities that arise from it. 
Emergence, as I shall explain, I see as lying in a particular region of explanatory problem 
space, as a phenomenon that lies as close to problems of perception and cognition as it 
does to those to do with the trajectories of thrown objects, for instance. Boogerd et al. 
presumably would disagree with such an assessment. 
                                                 
59 That is, phenomenal experience has properties that cannot be defined in terms of causal or nomic relations 
to other properties in what Kim terms the reduction base, which is ‘the domain of properties (also 
phenomena, facts, etc., if you wish)’ which contains the ‘basal conditions for our emergent properties’ (Kim 
1999, p.10). When a property can be functionalized, on the other hand, it is possible to establish such 
relations. Kim suggests, perhaps rather tendentiously, that [a region of] DNA is functionalizable as a gene in 
virtue of its fulfilling the causal role of transmitting phenotypic characteristics from parents to offspring, 
which property means that it satisfies the property of being a gene. 
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The second issue raised by these brief passages concerns mechanistic explanation. 
Specifically, they say that ‘scientific explanations are mechanistic explanations’, and cite 
Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) and related sources as providing support. This 
assertion is contentious, for it seems to (a) imply that all scientific explanations are 
mechanistic explanations, whilst (b) leaving open the possibility that there are mechanistic 
explanations that are not scientific (if the assertion is not to be construed as a statement of 
the identity of scientific and mechanistic explanations). An MDC-style account of 
mechanism is invoked, but there is a suggestion that they are simply paying lip-service to 
such an account, and that what they actually mean is just something like mechanical 
causation, in which what happens is the result of physical interactions amongst material 
entities. This is suggested when they say that 
 
Microorganisms essentially are large biochemical networks. They exhibit a range of 
system properties, such as homeostasis, regulation, plasticity, and adaptation, that 
appear to transcend the physical properties of their constituent parts, including 
enzymes, individual pathways, organelles, and other systems smaller than the cell. It 
seems that it is here where life emerges from its inanimate constituent matter. 
Nonetheless, every phenomenon of the cell is mechanistically explainable. 
Emergent phenomena are mechanical effects. 
(Boogerd et al. 2005, p.133) 
 
The account of emergence to which Boogerd et al. cleave is that of C.D. Broad, 
and this is an account that now looks rather dated. Broad discusses emergence in The Mind 
and Its Place in Nature (1925) and in a 1919 article entitled ‘Mechanical explanation and its 
alternatives’. The two accounts are similar but not identical. In the former, better-known 
account, he defines (synchronic) emergence thus: 
 
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes, 
composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other; that all 
wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of 
the same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B, and C are 
capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not the same 
kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B, C) cannot, 
even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of 
A, B, an C in isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C). 
The mechanistic theory rejects the last clause of this assertion.  
(Broad 1925, p.61) 
 
The seeming epistemic relativism of the assertion about property deducibility is 
problematic. Deep theoretical knowledge allied to powerful simulation techniques is 
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perhaps a combination Broad could not have anticipated. (He was writing before the 
development of the first computers, and in the infancy of quantum mechanics.) In his 
earlier account Broad discusses the nature of ‘new and unexpected’ chemical properties. In 
a rather elliptical way he expresses the idea that what we know about the properties of 
particular chemical groups in one chemical context provides an inadequate basis for 
predicting the properties of the same groups in different contexts. But inasmuch as 
chemical theory, allied to a body of empirically derived chemical knowledge that has 
expanded greatly since the time when Broad was writing, does provide a basis for 
rationalizing and in many cases predicting the properties of chemical compounds, the force 
of the passage is now heavily attenuated. We tend not to think that the properties of novel 
chemical compounds are emergent in any interesting sense, even if we cannot in practice 
predict them. Rather we suppose that if we had the computing resources to carry out more 
detailed calculations we would be able to predict the properties of the compounds. (See, for 
example, Bukowski et al. 2007, reporting the prediction of the properties of water from 
‘first principles’.) 
 
The account of emergence to which Boogerd et al. appeal, then, is one that seems 
to set the bar sufficiently low that they can make their claim to see emergent properties. 
But the weaknesses of Broad’s account are to some extent ameliorated by the way in which 
Boogerd et al. extend it by developing the idea that the fulfilment of either of two 
independent conditions is sufficient for emergence. They term these the horizontal and 
vertical conditions. The vertical condition asserts that 
 
A systemic property is emergent if it is not mechanistically explainable, even in 
principle, from the properties of the parts, their relationships within the entire 
system, the relevant laws of nature and composition principles.  
(Boogerd et al. 2005, p.135) 
 
The horizontal condition on the other hand relates to the possibility of deducing the 
properties of the parts of a system from their ‘properties in isolation or in other wholes, 
even in principle’. The vertical condition is about the explicability of system properties on 
the basis of properties of the parts and their intra-system relations, then, while the 
horizontal condition is about the part properties within the system, and emergence arises 
from the fulfilment of either condition: 
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In this figure (based on Boogerd et al. 2005, p.136, Figure 1), A, B and C are the parts of a 
system R; S1, S2 and S3 are simpler wholes including these parts in different combinations. 
R1 is a system with the same number of parts as R, T1 is a system with more parts than R, 
and PR is a systemic property. 
 
Prima facie the horizontal/vertical distinction looks to be a meaningful one, and 
notwithstanding my reservations about Broad’s discussion of emergence it appears at first 
glance to represent a framework within which the phenomena studied by Boogerd et al. fit 
quite comfortably. But further reflection leads me to wonder how necessary it is in any case 
to appeal to Broad’s account of emergence to make the points Boogerd et al. wish to make. 
Key to Broad’s account is that it deals with synchronic, not diachronic phenomena, and 
that it makes heavy use of the concept of a property, of a part or of a system of parts. This 
introduces a tension that Boogerd et al. address by implying, but not stating, that 
component properties (which are determined in part by the state of the entire system) are 
emergent, while actually pinning the label of emergence to phenomena such as oscillations 
that are clearly diachronic in character, even if that fact goes unacknowledged. The 
examples of emergent phenomena I outline in Chapter 6 tend to be readily visible patterns 
or behaviours, and it is these kinds of phenomena that in general attract the designation of 
emergence, rather than any underlying changes to system parameters that result in such 
visible effects. On the other hand if we really are to take quantities such as metabolite flux 
rates and so on as emergent phenomena, then Boogerd et al. seem in danger of falling into 
the very trap they warn against (pp.134-5), of seeing everything as weakly emergent.  
 
PR 
R(A,B,C) 
A,B,C 
S1(A,B), S2(A,C), S3(B,C) 
R1(A,B,D), T1(A,C,D,F) 
Broad emergence vertical condition 
horizontal condition 
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What is clear is that when Boogerd et al. describe as strong the emergence they 
identify in the properties of reaction networks they mean something rather different from 
the sense of strong emergence indicated by Bedau (1997), or by Silberstein and McGeever 
(1999). Those other thinkers reserve the term for just two categories of phenomena: 
quantum mechanical EPR-style ‘spookiness’, and consciousness. Neither of those 
categories seems amenable to mechanistic explanation, in the MDC sense, in more 
straightforward ‘mechanical’ terms (referencing physical interaction between entities), or 
along lines compatible with what I have said about mechanism.  
 
Overall, I am willing to concede that some of the properties of biochemical 
networks they describe can be considered emergent, albeit with reservations along the lines 
stated above. However, Boogerd et al.’s heterodox ‘strong’ classification looks highly 
unconvincing when set alongside the special ontological difficulties posed by quantum 
mechanical non-localism and by consciousness. Hence I contend that the emergence they 
see is best bracketed with the other cases of weak emergence identified in the complexity 
sciences and elsewhere. If their emergent properties do seem different in kind from some 
of those other instances then I suggest that this argues for a model of emergence founded 
not on ontological claims of the kind advanced by Boogerd et al. but rather on 
psychologically grounded epistemological ideas (which I describe in Chapter 6).  
 
How does the work that Boogerd et al. report relate to the earlier discussion of 
complexity? One point of contact is in the area of functional distribution and implications 
for epistemic tractability. Irrespective of whether we see them as emergent phenomena, the 
oscillations in metabolite conversion rates, metabolite levels and so on that can result from 
the interaction of co-constraining metabolic modules or sub-systems seem likely to have 
significant causal consequences for the biology of the cell. Indeed, fundamental 
phenomena such as the cell cycle are known to depend on the levels and variations in levels 
of particular molecular species, and on the relative timing of processes that affect such 
quantities (Morgan 2007). (Relatedly, reaction-diffusion processes are thought to play a part 
in establishing chemical gradients and patterns that may have major developmental 
consequences (Turing 1952; Crampin, Hackborn and Maini 2002).) To the extent that the 
dynamics of the relevant processes are established through the kinetic specifics of reactions 
of the kind Boogerd et al. discuss, it is clear that key cell functions are sometimes to be 
associated not with specific structures but rather with interaction processes involving 
multiple structures.  
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This functional coupling of processes seems to illustrate rather well what Wimsatt 
says about interactional complexity and the co-adaptation of the parts of a system. And 
again, an important aspect of this kind of causal complexity is the difficulty we have in 
assigning functions to isolated entities or localized processes. If we interpret mechanism in 
terms of the alignment of structure and function then this, clearly, is non-mechanistic 
behaviour – yet such non-mechanistic processes may serve functionally critical ends within 
the larger context of the entire cell. Thus it is possible to see in this kind of example a 
reason why MDC frame their account of mechanism in terms of activities as well as 
entities: they want to speak of a set of coupled processes as constituting the mechanism for 
a certain phenomenon. I shall be looking again at the idea of mechanism at the end of the 
chapter, but for now it is worth noting how the MDC account is interposed between the 
machine (material) sense of mechanism and a looser causal process sense. They would say, 
I take it, that there is a way in which certain phenomena come about, and it involves 
particular entities, but they come about because of the processes (activities) in which those 
entities engage. 
 
This discussion of the complex dynamics of cell processes touches on biologically 
profound phenomena, as mention of the cell cycle made plain. The big trends, constancies 
and circularities of cell life – metabolism and homeostasis, growth, genome replication, and 
cell division – can perhaps be thought of as the overall ends to which such life is directed, 
and even as largely constitutive of it. Some theoreticians have argued that biological 
understanding must begin by addressing these ‘ultimate’ ends, to develop a theoretical 
framework that captures what it is that makes living systems more than mere ensembles of 
interacting molecules.  
 
Metabolic circularity and system autonomy 
 
M,R systems 
 
Theoretical biologist Robert Rosen argued that organisms are irreducibly complex, 
with knowledge of the parts of a living system providing an inadequate basis for 
comprehending the properties of the whole (Rosen 1991).60 By complexity, however, 
                                                 
60 One area in which Rosen found support for his view that machines and organisms are profoundly different 
was the many years of lack of success experienced by protein structurists in predicting structure from 
sequence. This led him to conclude that ‘when contemporary physics claims to speak about matters 
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Rosen appears to have meant something rather different from the sense implicit in 
contemporary work in the complexity sciences.61 There the sense prevails that complexity 
can be made a computable quantity, or is a system attribute that can be given an account in 
terms of the properties of a system’s entities and the relationships their properties establish. 
Rosen, on the other hand, connects complexity with non-computability. I will focus on a 
separate claim he makes, however: that what distinguishes living from non-living systems is 
what he refers to as the closure of the former to efficient causation.62 In other words, only 
living systems have the means to maintain and renew themselves from within – even 
though they are open systems in thermodynamic and material senses. Over a number of 
years he developed a theoretical framework concerning the causal circularity of metabolism 
that aimed at capturing this insight, which he termed the theory of M,R systems. (Here M 
stands for metabolism, R for repair – although some later interpreters have preferred to 
think of R as standing for replacement or resynthesis (Cornish-Bowden and Cárdenas 
2007, n.1).) Traditionally biochemists focused on the catalysis by enzymes of specific 
chemical reactions, which might for example take the form: 
 
    E1 
   A → B + C 
 
This focus on the kinetics of individual reactions, and on the chains of reactions that 
constitute the major metabolic pathways, led to the neglect of what for Rosen was the 
biologically more fundamental issue of the collective properties of the totality of reactions 
that occur in an organism. These become apparent when we enlarge our picture of 
metabolism to encompass the systemic origin and fate of enzymes such as E1 in the 
reaction scheme above. Turnover of E1 is associated with the creation of new enzyme 
molecules to replace those lost through damage and subsequent targeted destruction (by 
routing to proteasome complexes). Synthesis of E1 means that it must be seen as another 
                                                                                                                                               
biological, it either has nothing to say, or it gives wrong answers’ (Rosen 1991, p.270). Perhaps, however, he 
was partly right when he said that the ‘[molecular] species involved are not synthesized from elements in any 
ordinary sense; rather, they emerge through a process of morphogenesis. Thus, when we ask ‘why?’ about 
them, when we treat them as effects and inquire into their causal correlates, we cannot make do with syntactic 
answers framed in terms of sequence. As always, there is not enough entailment in syntax alone to permit it’ 
(p.275). I take these passages to draw attention to the difference between computation construed as 
deduction according to a simple logical schema, involving the performance of linear operations on tokenized 
representations, and computation of the kind involved in the molecular simulations discussed in the previous 
chapter. Protein structure prediction is clearly incompatible with the former but may, it seems, yield to the 
second.  
61 Although perhaps what he meant can be regarded as something akin to a strong manifestation of Wimsatt’s 
interactional complexity. 
62 ‘[A] material system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to efficient causation. That is, if f is any component of 
such a system, the question “why f?” has an answer within the system, which corresponds to the category of 
efficient cause of f’ (Rosen 1991, p.244). 
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product of a metabolic reaction, not fundamentally unlike the products of the reaction it 
catalyzes (B and C above). The reaction by which E1 is synthesized is presumably catalyzed 
by another enzyme – E2, say – and that enzyme will itself be turned over in the same way 
as E1. The theoretical problem that Rosen sought to address was the potentially infinite 
regress implicit in this line of thinking, in which we need always to posit an additional 
enzyme to replace that catalyzing what we hoped would be the last reaction in a series.  
 
Rosen’s articulation of these ideas was highly abstract, and moreover was expressed 
in the obscure mathematical language of category theory. Recent interpreters, however, 
have taken up his ideas and rendered them more readily intelligible by explicating them in 
terms of biochemically plausible reaction schemas (Cornish-Bowden and Cárdenas 2005, 
2007; Letelier et al. 2006). Their more concrete interpretations go some way towards 
demonstrating how the metabolic circle can be closed so that metabolism is closed to 
efficient causation. Such closure represents a considerable constraint on the permissible 
sets of metabolic reactions, for it requires that a metabolic reaction set generates its own 
catalysts. But, importantly, once a reaction set with this capacity arises it is self-sustaining to 
the extent that it requires only to be fuelled with the appropriate nutrient molecules.  
 
By explicating metabolic circularity and M,R systems principles in terms of the 
closure properties of sets of reaction pathways, Cornish-Bowden and co-workers have 
succeeded in narrowing the gap between Rosen’s abstract vision of what it is that makes 
living systems distinctive and the understanding we have of biomolecular processes. They 
offer a schematic picture that is simple enough that we can comprehend it almost without 
analysis, in the sense of not having to work through a lengthy chain of reasoning, and I 
suggest that it is this property of schematic conceivability that underpins any sense of 
understanding we are able to derive from it. However, just as it is troubling that the overall 
perspective articulated by the school of systems biology to which Boogerd et al. belong 
involves a heavy emphasis on reaction kinetics (Boogerd et al. 2007 – see especially 
Chapters 1, 2 and 4), so the focus on metabolic inter-relationships implicit in Rosen’s 
thinking appears to represent an insubstantial basis for gaining a comprehensive 
perspective on living systems. The basis for the unease in the two cases is the same, and 
relates to the importance of structure and spatiality.  
 
Suppose that a reaction generates a product molecule that in a particular milieu 
spontaneously associates with itself, or perhaps with another molecule. Maybe self-
assembly proceeds to create structures that go on to structure cellular space, or maintain a 
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pre-existing structuring of cellular space, in a manner that sets constraints on possibilities 
for molecular diffusion and interaction. Then reactions that would otherwise occur may, 
thanks to structural consequences of the occurrence of a particular reaction or associative 
process, be prevented from occurring at all (and reactions that would otherwise be 
incompatible may co-occur, say if they are confined to separate compartments). The 
structural properties of particular molecules, including their symmetry attributes, thus may 
be important factors in determining the specific morphological characteristics of cell 
structures of various kinds. The specifics of such structures may determine what chemical 
entities and transformations a metabolic reaction network might include, and will have to 
be specified in any description of the total system network as constraints on network 
structure. Moreover, it seems almost inevitable that the possibility of specific kinds of 
system intervention, and the explanations we give for why and how certain phenomena 
occur, will depend on structural factors as much as on relational, kinetic or stoichiometric 
details of the reactions implemented within a system. In short, it seems likely that our 
representations and explanations of cellular phenomena must often reflect or incorporate 
spatial properties – in spatial terms – as well as kinetic properties. Growing recognition of 
this can be seen in the online abstract for one of the plenary symposia at FEBS-
SysBio2009: 
 
Until now most of Systems Biology has focused on describing biochemical, gene 
expression or signal transduction networks in terms of changes in cell-wide 
concentrations with time. Less attention has been paid to the fact that these 
processes are also occurring in space. This symposium will address how movement 
of molecules through the cell is important for biological function and how 
macroscopic structures influence non-spatial processes.63 
 
When we think about the connection between reaction and structure, any approach that 
focuses exclusively on reaction network connectivity and kinetics looks somewhat 
simplistic, even if the proponents of such approaches express a strong commitment to 
systems thinking. Worry about the neglect of structure (for example as articulated by 
Harold 2005) is arguably addressed in part, in a somewhat abstract manner, by another 
framework that emphasizes the circularity and closure of living systems, namely the theory 
of autopoiesis64.  
 
                                                 
63 Online scientific programme, FEBS-SysBio2009: 3rd FEBS Advanced Lecture Course on Systems Biology, 
‘From Molecular Biology to Biological Function’, 7-13 March 2009, Congress Centrum Alpbach, Austria. 
Symposium S: Systems Biology in Space (Chair – Hans Westerhoff; lecturers – P Bastiens, M White, B 
Kholodenko). (Available at http://www.febs-sysbio2009.org/ - last accessed 30 October 2009.) 
64 The name autopoiesis derives from ‘auto’ meaning ‘self’ and ‘poiesis’ meaning ‘producing’. 
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Autopoiesis 
 
In the theory of autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela (‘M&V’) (1980) treat a living 
system as  
 
 a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes (transformation 
and destruction) of components that produces the components which: (i) through 
their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the 
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the 
machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.  
(M&V 1980, p.79) 
 
They go on to explain that an autopoietic system  
 
[A]  continuously generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a 
system of production of its own components, and does this in an endless turnover 
of components under conditions of continuous perturbations and compensation of 
perturbations. Therefore, an autopoietic machine is an homeostatic (or rather a 
relations-static) system which has its own organization (defining network of 
relations) as the fundamental variable which it maintains constant. 
 
Clearly there are significant similarities between autopoietic machines and Rosen’s 
M,R systems. In particular, there is the idea of a system that replaces its own resources. The 
major difference relates, as already hinted at, to the importance placed on spatial and 
topological considerations. In the context of the cell, particular significance is attached to 
the cell membrane and other structures in determining the ‘relations that determine the 
topology of the autopoietic organization’ (pp.90-91). It is important to note that it is not a 
specific structural organization that is kept constant (as one might infer from quotation [A] 
above), but rather an organization that preserves the capacity for autopoiesis – and it is 
towards the maintenance of [an organization that maintains] such a capacity that an 
autopoietic system is organized (as ‘a unity’): 
 
What makes this system a unity with identity and individuality is that all the 
relations of production are coordinated in a system describable as an homeostatic 
system that has its own unitary character as the variable that it maintains constant 
through the production of its own components. In such a system any deformation 
at any place is not compensated by bringing the system back to an identical state of 
its components as it would be described by projecting it upon a three-dimensional 
Cartesian space; rather it is compensated by keeping its organization constant as 
defined by the relation of the relations of production of relations of constitution, 
specification and order which constitutes autopoiesis. In other words, 
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compensation of deformation keeps the autopoietic system in the autopoietic space 
[i.e. of self-production].  
(M&V 1980, pp.92-93) 
 
For Maturana and Varela, autopoiesis is the defining property of living systems – a 
living system is such ‘because it is an autopoietic system in the physical space, and it is a 
unity in the physical space because it is defined as a unity in that space by and through its 
autopoiesis’ (M&V 1980, p.112). This unity is the result of ‘operational closure’ in that 
‘every process in an Autopoietic network is the direct consequence of the interplay of 
components produced in other parts of the network’ (Letelier et al. 2003, p.266). Letelier et 
al. reason that while all M,R systems exhibit the operational closure characteristic of 
autopoietic systems, by being closed to efficient causation, there is nothing in Rosen’s work 
to show how an M,R system represents a unity in the topological sense of M&V. Hence it 
makes sense to think of autopoietic systems as a subset of M, R systems that fulfill 
additional topological constraints.  
 
In the context of the present chapter key issues concerning the circular causality 
characteristic of the perspectives of autopoiesis and M,R systems theory are how it relates 
to the ideas of mechanism and complexity, and what the possible implications are for the 
analysis and understanding of biological systems. These questions can be addressed in part 
by focusing on the obvious point that these perspectives are pitched at the level of systems 
as wholes. This immediately invites comparison with conventional biological understanding 
grounded in the details of specific molecular and cellular processes, and draws attention to 
the possibility of an epistemic gap of some sort between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
perspectives. An intuitive worry is that autopoiesis threatens to demonstrate that 
analytically grounded understanding, especially that based on detailed structural knowledge 
of biomolecules and cellular structures, will simply prove inadequate as a basis for 
recognising the salient causal stories that such structures play out. To elaborate the precise 
nature of this threat is non-trivial – and perhaps that is part of the picture of causal 
complexity with which it could be associated. It is helpful, however, to think about how 
different kinds of system respond to perturbation. A mechanistic system – in something 
approximating the machine sense of mechanism discussed earlier – is especially sensitive to 
perturbations that disrupt the systemic organization of its parts. The overall operation of 
such a mechanism depends on the individual functional contributions of its parts, and 
disruption of a part usually leads to the disruption of some sub-function necessary for 
overall system function. Sometimes, especially in ‘mission critical’ systems, functional sub-
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systems are replicated so that if a particular functional element is damaged its function can 
be fulfilled by a back-up element. But even in this case of in-built functional redundancy 
we would be entitled to say that the system was now compromised relative to its condition 
prior to damage being inflicted on the original functional element, for if nothing else it now 
has a diminished capacity to tolerate further damage.  
 
Inherent in the concept of an autopoietic system is the idea that it is far less brittle 
in the face of perturbations than the kind of non-autopoietic machine just discussed, as 
quotation [A] above makes clear. Within certain limits perturbations can be accommodated 
by compensating adjustments amongst the parts of an autopoietic system so as to maintain 
the capacity to absorb further perturbations. This makes for the possibility of continuity of 
identity not in terms of the persistence of a specific structural configuration but rather in 
terms of the ongoing operation of a system as a delimited physical object or region that 
continues to have the capacity to absorb and adapt to further perturbations. The ability to 
reconfigure in response to perturbations is a very striking difference between the two kinds 
of system. A man-made machine is standardly capable of existing in only a very limited 
number of configurations of its parts, and lacks the resources to renew its parts from 
within. An autopoietic system on the other hand can – if my interpretation of Maturana 
and Varela is correct – exist in a multitude of different configurations, and the different 
possible system configurations can be chained together, and in fact do entail each other, in 
ways that are capable of tracking and responding to environmental changes to preserve 
autopoietic capability.  
 
The compensatory capacity of the cell to which the theory of autopoiesis draws 
attention appears potentially to relate to several distinct characteristics or sets of properties. 
First there is the physical amorphousness or plasticity of many cells65, and their consequent 
ability to conform to physical aspects of their environment. This is related to the flexibility 
of the plasma membrane and the ability of fluids to occupy volumes of arbitrary 
morphology. In a fluid medium particular structures can often be arranged in space in 
numerous different ways, and possibilities for altering their relative configurations are less 
constrained than in systems assembled from solid state structures. This kind of physical 
deformability cannot be considered a fundamental component of the autopoietic condition, 
however, for its utilization to absorb the effects of a perturbation sometimes represents an 
overall reduction in perturbation-absorbing capability – just as when a spring is compressed 
                                                 
65 I am thinking of the cells of animals, of course, not (for example) plant cells or bacterial cells possessing a 
hard cell wall. 
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the possibility for further compression is reduced. Simple physical changes that result in 
this way are thus non-adaptive, in that they do not promise to maintain a system’s capacity 
to absorb further perturbations. Perhaps we should think of the factors underlying the 
physical deformability of the cell just as buffering mechanisms that serve to reduce 
structural brittleness – or perhaps sometimes merely as by-products of other physical 
properties necessary for the maintenance of life. 
 
Quite distinct from these properties pertaining to the nature of different physical 
states and configurations of matter are chemically grounded possibilities for alternative 
patterns of gene expression. These provide a basis for the generation of different sets of 
metabolic reactions, structural characteristics and cell identities or phenotypes, and this 
looks like a more promising basis by which to understand the autopoietic capacity of the 
cell. The idea here is that it depends on the abilities of cells (and organisms) to sense their 
environment and for this to trigger specific patterns of gene expression, in order to 
generate or stabilize particular phenotypic characteristics appropriate to those conditions.66 
‘Appropriate’ in this context presumably has to be cashed out in terms of adaptiveness, by 
saying something to the effect that the triggered phenotypic features render the cell 
(organism) better able to withstand or exploit new or changed environmental conditions 
than would be possible under the prior expression pattern.  
 
The phrase ‘in order to’ several sentences ago points to the fact that such an 
account has a teleological component. In other words it sometimes seems natural to 
explain the behaviour of a system in terms of particular goals or purposes. Di Paolo (2005) 
argues for a position that is very congenial to my own, but he suggests that the notion of 
adaptivity is merely implicit in various interpretations of autopoiesis. It needs to be added 
as additional ingredient if the theory is to provide a basis for biologically grounding what he 
refers to as ‘intrinsic teleology’ and ‘sense-making’, as indeed I have done in my 
interpretation. Intrinsic teleology refers to the ideas Kant sets out in the Critique of Judgement 
concerning the ‘mutual generative relations between organismic components and between 
them and the whole, making the living system a natural purpose’ (Di Paolo 2005, p.433), 
while sense-making Di Paolo explicates in terms of an individuality that through self-
                                                 
66 A variety of epigenetic mechanisms also have the capacity to shape cell phenotype, and again these are 
‘chemically grounded’ in the sense that they depend on the specific properties of particular molecules. In the 
next chapter, however, I touch on how physical force can be sensed and generated within cells via 
interactions between the cytoskeleton and a range of metabolic and regulatory processes. The cell is thus a 
causal nexus in which behaviours arise as a result of the interaction and integration of aspects of external and 
internal contexts. 
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production has sensation and agency, ‘an entity for whom its own continuation is an issue’ 
(p.433).  
 
The link between autopoiesis, adaptivity and teleology is intriguing because it 
suggests a connection between the causal distinctiveness and complexity of living systems, 
in their metabolic aspects, and the roots of living systems as cognitive systems. To explore 
this topic fully would take me some distance from my central overall theme of biological 
explanation, so I merely advert to it. Before moving on, however, it is worth noting an 
additional link: that between biological adaptiveness and Rosen’s idea of anticipatory 
systems (Rosen 1985; Rosen and Kineman 2005; Pezzulo 2008). An anticipatory system is 
one ‘containing a predictive model of itself and/or its environment, which allows it to 
change state at an instant in accord with the model’s predictions pertaining to the latter 
instant’ (Rosen 1985, chapter 6). Perhaps biological complexity can be considered in part 
the price that must be paid if a system is to be anticipatory. A system that is anticipatory is 
capable of exhibiting many of the behavioural characteristics we associate with life – such 
as the appearance of agency or a capacity for goal-directed action. And it is perhaps by 
being autopoietic that a system is able to maintain the organization that underlies its 
anticipatory capacities. 
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5. Complexity and cellular causality - II 
 
The diversity of causal factors 
 
Whether or not autopoiesis and anticipation are indeed the ends which biological 
complexity is best seen as serving, it remains for me to provide some sense of the material 
nature of that complexity. To do so now I shall describe some of the different kinds of 
physicochemical factor that potentially enter causally into cell processes. These factors are 
many and varied, and rather than attempt to catalogue them exhaustively I shall contrast a 
number of strikingly different causal factors that figure prominently in our understanding 
of the cell, in order to appreciate the nature and degree of the diversity involved. The five 
kinds of causal factor I shall examine are: (1) synthesized ‘molecular gadgets’ such as the 
protein machines discussed in Chapter 2, which often implement chemical reactions or are 
instrumental in enabling processes such as the transport of molecules through membranes; 
(2) self-assembly, which underpins the formation of cellular membrane boundaries and 
compartments; (3) competitive assembly/disassembly, as involved in the processes that 
construct, rebuild and dismantle cytoskeletal structures; (4) the persistent molecular 
templating system represented by the genome and associated gene expression 
componentry; and (5) collective properties relating to the fluidity of the cytoplasm, such as 
diffusion coefficients and the phenomenon of macromolecular crowding.  
Molecular machines 
 
The protein machines discussed in the previous chapter are characterized by 
relative compactness and stability, and by the generally clear alignment of structure and 
function. Like machines they consist of parts that stand in particular relationships and that 
perform specific functions which contribute to the performance of the gadget’s overall 
function. These properties are exhibited by enzymes, which are protein molecules that 
catalyze specific chemical reactions, i.e. that speed up processes in which atoms are 
rearranged into new molecular configurations. Substrate molecules bind, generally in a very 
specific orientation, at a particular region of the enzyme molecule termed the active site. (It 
is thought that substrate molecules are sometimes guided into the active site by the 
electrostatic field surrounding the enzyme.) Substrate binding brings specific chemical 
groups of the enzyme into precise spatial relationships with parts of the substrate(s), and 
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generally the effect is to distort the substrate(s) into a conformation that makes the 
structures of the reaction products thermodynamically accessible. In other words, the 
catalytic action of an enzyme depends on stabilization of the ‘transition state’ of the 
reaction, thereby reducing the activation energy of the reaction. In this way a reaction that 
would usually occur only very slowly – if at all –  at physiological temperatures can be 
speeded up by many orders of magnitude. The key is the precision and specificity of the 
interactions between enzyme and substrate chemical groups. (Increasing the energy of 
random atomic and molecular motions by raising the temperature often will increase the 
speed of a reaction, but by nothing like the kind of factor routinely achieved by enzymes. 
This is because such Brownian motion is non-specific, and will distort the substrate in the 
required manner only infrequently.) 
 
In general the reactions catalyzed by enzymes constitute steps within larger 
networks, of the sort studied by metabolic biochemists and systems biologists. Regulation 
and coordination of the rates of different reactions is sometimes achieved by modulating 
enzyme action in some way. A co-factor may bind non-covalently to an enzyme molecule 
at a site remote from the active site but in such a way that the structure of the active site is 
modified. Or another enzyme may catalyze a reaction that adds or removes a chemical 
group to or from the enzyme, with similar activity-modifying effects. Thus many enzymes 
exist in phosphorylated and dephosphorylated forms of differing chemical activity. The 
enzymes that carry out phosphorylation (usually termed kinases) and dephosphorylation 
(termed, more prosaicly, dephosphorylases) may act quite specifically on a particular 
enzyme or class of enzymes. It is easy to see how this mechanism of enzyme regulation 
provides a means for establishing a high degree of causal interconnectivity between cell 
reactions. Moreover it enables rapid adjustment to the rates of specific chemical reactions 
without modifying the number of molecules of a particular enzyme present in the cell – 
although mechanisms also exist for making just such modifications through changes to the 
rates of both gene expression and protein destruction.  
 
In relation to earlier discussions about structure, function and the degree of 
‘mechanisticity’, it is worth noting that even a single enzyme molecule is likely to contain 
regions that are more machine-like than others, in the sense that specific functions are 
more readily assigned to some parts than others. In particular, the chemical groups 
disposed around the active site will tend to be functionally highly specific: it is common to 
say that the function of group X is to bind group Y of the substrate, for example. Other 
parts of the enzyme’s structure may be functionally much less individually distinctive. They 
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may serve simply to provide, collectively, a stable framework that establishes the structure 
of the active site and confers on it specific attributes relating, for example, to flexibility or 
(perhaps) to the establishment of an electrostatic field capable of selecting and steering 
substrate molecules towards the active site. 
 
As I said, not all molecular gadgets catalyze chemical reactions. Some function 
more passively to enable or facilitate particular processes – with some of the pore 
complexes that support the transport of molecules across membranes perhaps providing 
good examples.67 Functional protein complexes can be large structures, so we should 
probably resist the temptation to pick out what might count as a molecular gadget on the 
basis of size alone. Rather, it is functional specificity in relation to structure that is criterial.  
Self-assembly  
 
The second causal factor I mentioned was self-assembly, or the tendency for a 
structure to come together through the spontaneous association of its components. There 
is overlap and continuity here with the molecular gadgets discussed above, since 
functionally specific protein complexes may form through self-assembly processes (and 
protein folding can be regarded as a form of self-assembly). Different epistemic contexts 
emphasize different causal factors. If what we want to explain is the formation or stability 
of a functional complex then localized self-assembly may be one of the relevant causal 
factors, whereas if we seek to explain how a protein complex implements a particular 
function then the causal characteristics of molecular gadgets will have explanatory 
significance.  
 
Some of the more functionally non-specific structures that make up the cell are 
formed through the assembly of multiple copies of the same molecular species, or large 
numbers of similar species. Examples are the plasma membrane and the proteinous 
filaments of the cytoskeleton, the former closing off volumes of space and the latter 
serving to structure membrane-delimited space and provide a dynamic scaffold capable of 
resisting or exerting force and of supporting other more specialist structures and processes. 
The plasma membrane of the cell consists – as predicted by Gorter and Grendel (1925) – 
of a bilayer of amphiphilic lipid molecules, each of which consists of a hydrophilic head 
region and a hydrophobic tail (Singer and Nicholson 1972). In an aqueous environment 
                                                 
67 Although some such complexes function selectively and actively by orchestrating complex reaction 
schemes. 
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self-association of lipid molecules takes place spontaneously, with the bilayer structure in 
effect being the result of two sheets of lipid molecules coming together in tail-to-tail 
orientation, so that their hydrophilic heads face the surrounding water molecules. (The 
biophysics of the process has obvious parallels with aspects of protein folding.) Bilayer 
closure results in the formation of lipid vesicles, and the cell itself can be thought of as 
being based upon a giant lipid vesicle. Lipid bilayer membranes, all other things being 
equal, are highly flexible, but in cells their structural properties are modulated in a variety of 
ways. These include alteration to lipid composition – for example cholesterol serves to 
make the membrane less permeable to protons and sodium ions – and anchoring 
membrane via specific membrane proteins to cytoskeletal elements.  
 
Vesicular compartments can serve to sequester particular molecular species so that 
their activities take place in specific conditions distinct from those prevailing in the bulk 
cytoplasm. Some activities are ones from which the rest of the cell must be protected, for 
example the proteolytic activities that occur in lysosomes, while other processes can be 
seen as requiring protection from other cell components. (Chaperone complexes serve 
such a purpose by protecting folding proteins from aggregation, as well as favouring 
compact conformations and thus promoting folding. However they are not lipid but 
proteinous structures.) 
Competitive assembly/disassembly 
 
The cytoskeleton itself consists of at least three main types of filament: actin 
filaments (‘microfilaments’), intermediate filaments, and microtubules (see Lodish et al. 
1999, chapters 18 and 19). Microfilaments and intermediate filaments maintain cell shape 
primarily by bearing tension. The former are found beneath the cell membrane, while the 
latter structure the internal space of the cell and provide support for organelles. Actin 
filaments form part of many signalling mechanisms, coupling the action of transmembrane 
receptor systems to internal signal processing reaction cascades. In conjunction with 
actoclampins (actin filament-associated molecular motors) actin is involved in a variety of 
cell motility functions, including the movement of podia of various kinds, dendritic spines, 
and intracellular vesicles, and it is implicated in membrane-trafficking processes such as 
endocytosis, exocytosis and phagocytosis. Many of these processes are powered by ATP 
hydrolysis. 
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Microtubules are hollow polymers of dimers of alpha and beta tubulin, and form a 
variety of intracellular structures including the mitotic spindle involved in segregation of 
the chromosomes during the division of eukaryotic cells. They also provide more general 
structural support within the cytoplasm, for example for organelles. The microtubule 
organizing centres (MTOCs), which play an important part in microtubule nucleation and 
organization, consist of alpha, beta and gamma tubulin subunits arranged in a ring complex 
that acts as a scaffold onto which alpha/beta dimers polymerize. 
 
A key feature of the cytoskeletal filaments is their highly dynamic nature, 
attributable in part to the competition that exists between independent polymerization and 
depolymerization processes (i.e. between assembly and disassembly). In the case of 
microtubules rapid shrinkage is possible via a fast dissociative process. This depends on the 
fact that tubulin exists in GTP- and GDP-bound states. GTP-tubulin is what is added in 
polymerization, but the bound GTP may be hydrolyzed to GDP after addition, and GDP-
tubulin has a greater propensity to depolymerize than GTP-tubulin. A GTP-tubulin cap has 
the effect of stabilizing a microtubule, whereas GDP-tubulin at the tip of a microtubule will 
dissociate. Hence if the protective cap is hydrolyzed to GDP-tubulin then rapid 
disassembly of the microtubule results. Polymerization and depolymerization rates are 
influenced by a variety of microtubule-associated proteins (MAPs), and the ability to 
regulate these provides the means to couple cytoskeletal properties and dynamics to cellular 
events and processes, and, more indirectly, to extracellular events. 
 
Some argue that the cytoskeleton acts as an intelligent tensegrity structure, in which 
tensile forces can be distributed over the entire cell through the combination of tension-
resisting microfilaments and intermediate filaments and compression-resistant microtubules 
(Ingber 2003a). Whether or not this picture is correct, evidence exists for the coupling of 
many cell processes and events, including metabolic reactions and processes connected 
with regulation of the cell cycle, with cytoskeletal dynamics (Norris et al. 2005; Michie and 
Löwe 2006). Although the coupling mechanisms are in general currently poorly 
understood, knowledge is rapidly being gained of how mechanical force can be sensed and 
generated by macromolecular fibrils and skeletal structures both inside the cell (Ingber 
2003b; Albiges-Rizo et al. 2009; Christof et al. 2009; del Rio et al. 2009) and in the 
extracellular matrix (Smith et al. 2007; Hytönen and Vogel 2008). Such research suggests 
that cell processes are highly integrated despite their plasticity and adaptive capacity – or 
perhaps one should say that it is through being highly integrated that the cell is adaptively 
plastic. 
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Templating structures 
 
Of course, any discussion of the causal factors that contribute to cellular life would 
be incomplete if no mention were made of the genome. I shall say much more about 
genome function in Chapter 7, so here will confine myself to the briefest of remarks. In 
contrast to the labile, evanescent nature of many cell structures, the DNA complement of 
the cell is notable for its stability and persistence. Ignoring mitochondrial DNA, the cell’s 
DNA is packaged into chromosomes which for most of the cell cycle are present (in 
diploid cells) as pairs. Barring cell-specific mutation events each member of a chromosome 
pair has the same base sequence as every other equivalent instance in the organism 
(ignoring the gametes). Mechanisms exist to ensure that damaged DNA is repaired, and 
hence sequence is preserved across chromosome replication during mitosis. Despite the 
causal priority which has often been accorded to the genome (see Chapter 7), the DNA 
molecule itself can be regarded as playing a rather passive role in genetic processes.68 These 
depend not just on DNA but also on the presence of a large number of protein-based and 
RNA-based molecular machines, and it is only in conjunction with them that the DNA 
sequence can have any cellular effects. Then, as is well known, it acts – sometimes only 
rather indirectly, on account of complex downstream RNA processing operations (Nilsen 
2003; David and Manley 2008) – as a template for the production of specific proteins. 
Fluidity 
 
My final example of a causal factor that might necessarily figure in the explanation 
we give of some cellular phenomenon is the fluidity of the cellular milieu and properties 
related to it. It is an enabling condition for almost all the processes on which cellular life 
depends. Self-assembly and disassembly processes like those discussed above, for example, 
are possible in large part precisely because of the fluidity of the cytoplasm, for it is this that 
typically enables components to translocate, re-orient, come together and disperse again. 
Fluidity is a collective property, even if it depends on the properties of the molecules that 
form the fluid. If once it was supposed that the cell amounts to a bag of enzymes in 
aqueous solution then that image must now be discarded almost in its entirety. Just now I 
attempted to emphasize the contrast between the tight functional packaging characteristic 
of molecular gadgets on the one hand and the sometimes generic and often space-defining 
nature of self-assembly processes on the other. Now my inclination is to stress the 
                                                 
68 ‘DNA is a dead molecule ... it has no power to reproduce itself. Rather it is produced out of elementary 
material by a complex cellular machinery of proteins’ (Lewontin 1992). 
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continuities that exist between the various molecular species that compose the cytoplasm, 
for it is the high ‘bandwidth’ of molecular species that makes it so distinctive.  
 
In addition to water and other small solute molecules cell compartments are 
densely packed with heterogeneous populations of molecules that vary greatly in size, 
chemical properties, life-time and copy number (the number of tokens of a given molecular 
type that are present at a given time). Cytoplasm has been estimated to be a 70% solution 
of macromolecular species, and this phenomenon of ‘macromolecular crowding’ is 
increasingly thought to influence a range of processes (Ellis, 2001; Hall & Minton, 2003; 
Schnell & Turner, 2004; Golding & Cox, 2006). These include protein folding and stability, 
enzyme activity, DNA condensation, intracellular signalling, and pattern formation (Bray 
1998; Weiss 2003; Weiss et al. 2004). Presumably this is principally a result of the 
importance of molecular motion in cell processes. Reactants must encounter enzymes if 
metabolic reactions are to occur; reaction products must be able to leave an enzyme’s 
active site if the enzyme is to perform multiple catalytic cycles; synthesized proteins must 
reach particular sites, e.g. at the cell surface in the case of receptors. Some transport 
processes are active, i.e. involve the hydrolysis of ATP molecules (for instance those 
powered by motor proteins), but others occur passively, by diffusion. The rate at which 
molecules diffuse depends on a range of properties including size, shape, electrostatic 
charge, and hydrophobicity (and propensity to aggregate). This makes the cytoplasm unlike 
the simple fluids usually studied by physical chemists, the properties of which can often be 
expressed in terms of a small number of variables. To attribute to cytoplasm simple liquid 
properties looks naive or mistaken: its properties, because of the wide spectrum of 
molecular types that make it up, are complex and will affect different molecules differently, 
according to their size and other properties.  
 
Fluidity is a major factor behind the cell’s robustness and ability to replicate itself. 
This can be appreciated if we think about how a broken part in a man-made solid-state 
artefact is replaced. It is necessary first to dismantle the artefact by performing a series of 
specific manipulations, probably in a particular sequence, in order to access the damaged 
part. This can then be repaired in situ, repaired after its removal from the artefact, or 
replaced with a new part, and the artefact re-assembled. Re-assembly re-establishes the 
precise spatial relationships amongst the parts that define the causal action of the artefact’s 
mechanism, and again this involves performing another highly constrained series of 
manipulations. The artefact may well be unusable until the damaged part is repaired or 
replaced, and the repair must be carried out ‘from the outside’ – artefacts generally lacking 
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the capacity or resources to repair themselves from within. If a protein in a cell is damaged, 
on the other hand, then chances are that the cell is not thereby completely shut down. 
Other copies of the same protein will continue to perform the protein’s usual function, and 
the damaged copy can be tagged and routed through the cell to a proteasome complex for 
destruction. Additional copies of the protein may be synthesized using metabolites whose 
atoms are sourced ultimately from outside the cell, in accordance (to a first approximation) 
with a specification stored in the genome. The fluidity of the cellular environment means 
that multiple functions can occupy roughly the same volume, for functions are not defined 
by the maintenance of rigid relations amongst parts. Indeed, the avoidance of the 
formation of fixed relationships amongst parts, e.g. through macromolecular aggregation, is 
often a condition of cellular and organismic function. (Certain pathological conditions such 
as Alzheimer’s disease or Creutzfeld-Jacob disease appear to be associated with the 
formation of ‘plaques’ brought about by the large-scale aggregation of misfolded or 
partially folded proteins (Chiti and Dobson 2006).) 
 
Logic and structure 
 
It seems clear that important aspects of the complexity of the cell are the diversity 
of the structures it contains, the variety of the processes in which these participate, and the 
range of causally relevant properties these exemplify. The five CFs just described illustrate 
this diversity. Sometimes the biological phenomena we seek to explain (and perhaps 
control) depend primarily on just one kind of CF, but more often than not biologically 
significant phenomena depend on multiple processes acting in concert (Toettcher et al. 
2009), with each process in general depending on multiple CFs. For example, specific 
catalyzed reactions capable of modulating the dynamics of assembly and disassembly of 
structures have the potential to bring about large-scale structural changes in the cell. 
Mechanisms for sensing the conditions that result from these might conversely then have 
specific effects on particular reactions or indeed on the expression of particular genes. This 
latter possibility implies an additional level of complexity, inasmuch as the cell not only 
involves the interactions of a diverse set of molecules and ions but the interactions of a set 
that is constantly changing. And while some chemical species are present at very low copy 
numbers (such as the chromosomal DNA molecules), others are present in large numbers 
(for example ATP or calcium ions).  
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Notwithstanding the variety of cell structures and processes, the diversity of the 
molecular types that implement them, and the wide variation (high ‘bandwidth’) we observe 
with respect to molecular token number, lifetime and mobility, increasingly it is suggested 
that we should expect to discover an underlying functional simplicity to cellular life. Such 
claims come in particular from the developers and adherents of the network approaches 
which are common to many current interpretations of systems and synthetic biology (see 
e.g. Alon 2007a). These approaches focus on the dynamics and topology of genetic 
regulatory circuits and interaction networks rather than on structural details (Barabási & 
Oltvai 2004; Weiss 2005).  It is argued that cellular networks draw on a finite set of 
functional motifs that in many cases appear to be connected together in ways that ensure 
they do not interfere with each other. The resulting decomposability means, it is argued, 
that the cell can be expected to be complicated but not insuperably complex (Alon 2007b).  
 
Network approaches potentially raise once more the worry enunciated by Harold 
(2005), in that they threaten to discard too readily explanatorily important structural 
information. An interaction or regulatory network diagram that omits details about 
compartmentation and context, for example, or one based on interaction properties of 
proteins measured outside their normal cellular milieu, might imply a degree of causal 
simplicity (or for that matter interactional complexity) which is at variance with biological 
reality. 
 
Contrasting with the optimistic vision of an abstract underlying simplicity to 
cellular processes are perspectives that draw attention to the problematic complexity of 
fundamental phenomena such as the cell cycle. This complexity makes it hard to describe 
the cell concisely or in terms of a simple analogy with some other class of objects, and 
Norris suggests that the cell is uniquely complex. As a result it ‘cannot be reduced to a 
single simplified model system without losing its essence’ (Norris et al. 2004, p.125):  
 
The cell is neither a neural net nor an oscillating system of diffusible enzymes nor a 
dissipative system nor a set of phase-separated membranes and cytoplasm etc. 
Rather, the cell is the creator and the creation of an extraordinarily high density of 
different organizing processes that have autocatalytic relationships with one 
another. It is a system that produces self-organization and assembly by recruiting 
and dismissing a multitude of processes and molecules. Whatever does this is a cell 
and, for the moment, we only know one example: the biological cell. In other 
words, the cell is its own metaphor. 
(Norris et al. 2004, p.125) 
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A possible parallel here is with the sense of complexity articulated by Chaitin and 
Kolmogorov (Mainzer 2007, p.193), which relates the complexity of a string to the 
minimum length of the algorithm required to describe it. A string consisting merely of 
repetitions of a simple substring can be expressed more readily and compactly than one in 
which substrings tend not to recur, for example. In the limiting case of extreme algorithmic 
complexity a string is its own shortest description, and analogously ‘the cell cannot be 
understood adequately as anything other than itself’ (Norris et al. 2004, p.125). 
 
Norris et al. cast doubt on the idea that focusing on just biochemical and molecular 
biological details will yield satisfactory explanations of fundamental cellular phenomena. 
Certainly, detailed knowledge of many of the cell’s individual mechanisms at the 
macromolecular level has not yet resulted in our having a good sense of how such 
mechanisms collectively give rise to such core cellular activities as chromosomal replication 
and cell division – despite the considerable progress that has been made (Hartwell and 
Weinert 1989; Nurse 2000). Norris argues for an approach reminiscent of that advocated 
by Marr in relation the study of vision (Marr 1982): we must pose functional questions in 
order to identify the ‘design principles’ a system embodies. (‘What is the cell cycle for? ... 
Are ‘key’ regulator proteins simply the messenger boys instructed by the dynamics of 
structures? Are these proteins just part of a molecular overlay that behaves as a coupled 
oscillator?’ (Norris et al. 2004, p.124)).  
 
Hyperstructures 
 
The aim in asking and attempting to answer such questions is perhaps not wholly 
dissimilar to that of the network  researchers mentioned above: to identify and describe a 
functional architecture behind the material complexity of cell structures and processes 
(Nurse 2008). But the differences of attitude and approach are considerable: network 
researchers are willing to countenance the elimination of the material and spatio-structural 
from their descriptions and subscribe to the optimistic vision of underlying simplicity, 
whereas Norris and co-workers embrace spatial materiality and seek an account that 
confronts and accommodates the dynamic organizational complexity – indeed 
‘hypercomplexity’ (Norris et al. 2005) – of the cell (with a focus on bacterial cells). They do 
this by positing a level of organization situated between the molecular and cellular scales 
involving what are referred to as hyperstructures (Amar et al. 2002; Norris et al. 2007). One 
definition of a hyperstructure is ‘an extended assembly of diverse molecules and 
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macromolecules ... that is associated with at least one function’ (Norris et al. 2005, p.317), 
but the notion is richer than that of the protein machines discussed in Chapter 2. For 
whereas those we think of as stable functional molecular assemblies, hyperstructures can 
exist as non-equilibrium as well as quasi-equilibrium structures: 
 
A non-equilibrium hyperstructure is assembled into a large, spatially distinct 
structure to perform a function and is disassembled, wholly or partially, when no  
longer required. Its continued existence depends on its consumption of energy. 
(Norris et al. 2005, p.317) 
 
Moreover, a hyperstructure ‘interacts with other hyperstructures at a level of organization 
between the macromolecule and the bacterial cell’ to control the phenotype (Norris et al. 
2007). But how are hyperstructures to be individuated and classified? Norris proposes an 
approach that combines both structural and functional considerations, based on the idea 
that ‘[a] hyperstructure that appears, matures, and disappears follows a trajectory in a space 
in which the axes are the processes responsible for its existence’ (Norris et al. 2007, p.310). 
He then gives a number of examples of hyperstructures that might be classified according 
to form (topology) and process (function). These include coupled transcription-translation-
insertion (‘transertion’) non-equilibrium hyperstructures that (it is hypothesized) perform a 
variety of cell functions, and ‘metabolons’, which are large putative assemblies of metabolic 
enzymes in which intermediates are channelled from one enzyme to the next (Norris et al. 
2007, pp.311-312). It is also postulated that re-initiation of DNA replication in E. coli is 
prevented by a SeqA hyperstructure in which multiple copies of SeqA sequester the genes 
encoding replication-related proteins (Norris et al. 2007, pp.314-315).  
 
The concept of hyperstructures represents an attempt to describe elements of 
functional organization in a way that respects the dynamic character of cell processes. It 
shows the explanatory value biologists attach to structure—function relations, but argues 
for the necessity for a concept that extends beyond the stable structure—function 
relationships seen in machines and which the protein machine concept invokes. There is 
surely overlap here with the task MDC set themselves: to elaborate a concept of 
mechanism appropriate to the dynamic nature of molecular and cell biological phenomena. 
But the resources the MDC account provides for addressing the distinction between 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium structures and processes are limited, and the fact that the 
account is largely devoid of functional language seems to bring few benefits. On the other 
hand the concept of hyperstructures has not so far been articulated in especially precise 
terms, and it is unclear whether it should be regarded as primarily an epistemic notion or an 
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ontic one. Now I want to investigate whether it is possible to devise a descriptive-cum-
normative perspective on mechanism that retains the flexibility that the MDC account’s 
ontic dualism confers as regards processes but which is more explicit about functional 
issues. At the same time I want the new account to be rich enough to subsume yet have the 
potential to distinguish between different kinds of structure, process and organizational 
basis. Here the hyperstructure concept provides a useful model, although from a 
philosophical point of view it will be a virtue if we can be clear about when we are talking 
about ontic matters and when epistemic. As a starting point it is helpful to reflect further 
on the difference between equilibrium and non-equilibrium structures and processes, which 
in a systemic context can be thought of as constituting different organizational bases.  
 
Statically versus dynamically maintained organization 
 
The stability and resilience of machines, qua the kinds of solid-state artefacts 
discussed in Chapter 2, makes structure the natural basis for their explication, and has 
resulted in mechanistic explanation acquiring a certain sense – that which we associate with 
the word ‘mechanical’ – that again seems to foreground structure over process. On this 
view mechanisms are materially persistent structures, and when a mechanism such as a 
clock stops we are strongly inclined to say that the mechanism itself continues to exist; it is 
merely ‘not working’. This association of the term ‘mechanism’ with structure rather than 
operation is very striking when it is compared with the situation that obtains in the case of 
biological systems such as living cells. For when the molecular motions associated with a 
cell’s processes cease, the cell’s organization collapses and decays and the cell ceases to be 
alive. If the cell is a mechanism then it is one that ceases to exist when it stops ‘operating’, 
or when the processes in which its parts participate cease. This is what it means to say that 
a living system is far from equilibrium.  
 
Thus an important respect in which systems may differ is the way in which their 
organization is maintained. In machine-type artefacts of the kind I have described, 
organization is maintained by the properties of the solid state. To reiterate something I said 
earlier, parts have structures that are stable under ambient conditions, and this is true 
whether or not the parts are involved in the collective motions their shapes enable and 
which are characteristic of the operation of the machine. The organization of the cell, on 
the other hand, is dynamically maintained. The characteristic structures we see in the living 
cell reflect and depend on the occurrence – perhaps one could say that they are just the 
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visible manifestation – of a large number of dynamic processes, involving the sorts of 
causal factor already discussed.  
 
A crude but nevertheless helpful analogy is with a fast-flowing stretch of river. The 
overall form of the river, as expressed by its width, depth and the shape made by its 
boundary with the riverbank, may be relatively constant. But this constancy depends on the 
maintenance of water flow, i.e. on the continuity of operation of a particular process. The 
flow rate can be thought of as the amount of water passing within a certain time interval 
through a (notional) plane roughly normal to the direction of flow. Two such planes could 
be used to define a stretch of river, and the overall form of this stretch will be constant if 
the flow rate as measured at both planes is the same. Differences between the flow rates as 
measured at the two planes will be reflected in changes to the form of the intervening body 
of water: the river will be become deeper or more shallow, wider or narrower (depending 
on the structure of the river banks). If the two notional planes are now replaced by solid 
barriers (and the inflow of water appropriately re-routed), then the dynamically maintained 
stretch of river is transformed into an equilibrium system that has the same overall form as 
the non-equilibrium system but which is importantly different in terms of the basis for its 
form. 
 
An expanded view of mechanism 
 
The contrasts between structure and process and between static and dynamic 
maintenance of organization suggest a basis for distinguishing between different kinds of 
material systems which harks back to the particle correlation ideas outlined at the start of 
Chapter 4. This is to consider the relative timescales over which matter flows through, or is 
turned over by, a system and its parts. Such flux rates are relative to particular regions of 
space, defined by real or imaginary boundaries. The solid-state parts of machine-type 
artefacts are of roughly equal stability and persistence, and the changes relevant to 
accounting for the action of a machine relate principally to alterations to the relative 
configurations of the parts. In a complex system such as the cell, on the other hand, there 
is a wide variation in the stability and persistence of different parts of the system, and 
persistence where it does exist may be achieved in different ways. As I have noted 
previously, much of the apparent structural stability is somewhat illusory, in that it is the 
outcome of highly dynamic processes of parts generation, maintenance and replacement 
within an overall framework of causal circularity. The genome looks highly stable, and 
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indeed in sequence terms is exceptionally stable – for reasons that we believe we 
understand (if sometimes only in outline) in terms of the requirement to produce proteins 
that fold reliably and which are functionally specific relative to particular contexts, and the 
need for key regulatory events and processes to unfold in constrained (and, through their 
phenotypic effects, selected) ways. But the apparent stability of genome sequence depends 
on the action of an array of error detection and repair systems, and moreover with every 
cell division one strand of each chromosome is generated anew, in accordance with the 
template provided by the other strand. Thus the genome has a dynamically maintained 
stability. 
 
Why might this matter, so far as an account of mechanism goes? Because whether a 
system is statically or dynamically maintained has important implications for its ontogeny 
and operation, as well as for how we come to understand the system. The static 
organization characteristic of machines is maintained by the strength of its parts and of the 
couplings between them, with the latter generally being established by a complex 
spatiotemporal pattern of assembly operations. Breakages of parts are typically calamitous 
for the machine’s ability to perform its usual functions, and remedying them usually 
involves undertaking complex disassembly and re-assembly operations. Once established, 
the machine’s organization is not readily altered, and it is in general physically – 
topologically – impossible for different machines to share the same parts. None of these 
characteristics necessarily holds for the mechanisms making up cellular biological systems, 
thanks to the dynamic basis on which their organization is maintained. Fluidity and weak 
couplings mean that parts can be replaced without complete functional disruption, parts 
can be shared amongst mechanisms, and different parts can fulfil the same functions within 
a mechanism to tune and tailor its cellular role.69  
 
Presumably it is recognition of these points, or something like them, that underpins 
neo-mechanist denials that biological mechanisms are to be regarded as machines. 
However, it is hard to find confirmation of this suspicion. In seeking to go further than 
MDC, in terms of being explicit about the organizational issues just discussed, it is 
important not to throw the baby out with the bath water. This means retaining their even-
handed approach to the relative causal status of structures and processes. At the same time 
the explanatory importance to biologists of the idea of function, which the MDC account 
downplays to no great effect, argues for its incorporation. I propose that this is best done 
                                                 
69 In addition some proteins – so-called moonlighting proteins – are capable of fulfilling multiple functions 
according to context (Jeffrey 1999). 
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by structuring an account not around the ontic dualism of entities and activities but rather 
on the basis of epistemology versus ontology. The perspective I have in mind is illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Ontic/epistemic mechanistic framework 
 
The right hand side of the figure provides for the idea that within a particular system or 
system part, or within a particular region of space, material is turned over and reconfigured 
at a particular rate. We can therefore think of systems, parts of systems, and regions as 
being ‘high flux’ or ‘low flux’. What are in flux are entities, and it makes sense to say that 
these are the smallest structures that are stable over the time spans that we are interested in. 
These structures and their interactions, which I take to be real physical phenomena, 
establish what could be termed a physical process foundation. This is the set of physical 
processes that we observe, interact with, and intervene in, and on the basis of our scientific 
and perceptual engagement with them we individuate various structures and processes as 
having particular epistemic significance. (The question mark on the right hand side 
indicates the idea that the real physics making up the physical process foundation is 
presumably to a large extent unknown to us. The postulation of interacting entities flowing 
through regions of space – or of processes that support interpretation in these terms – 
represents the minimal metaphysics I think an account along these lines requires.) 
 
Engagement with the physical process foundation, and the perceptually mediated 
and psychologically grounded object individuation and property attribution that this entails, 
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yields the epistemic objects and properties shown on the left hand side of the figure. My 
approach to maintaining neutrality about structures and processes, which appear in the 
MDC account in the guise of entities and activities, is to combine them into a class of 
hybrid objects I refer to as P-structures (the ‘P’ denoting both their potentially processual 
character and the idea that they are psychologically grounded rather than objectively real70). 
P-structures are the structures and processes in terms of which we frame our explanations, 
and to which we attribute functions and other properties. Some P-structures are principally 
structural (they do not change much over the timescales we are interested in) whilst others 
have a more processual character. The functions of parts and systems are not given to us 
and do not inhere in things in the objective sense in which the physical structures and 
interactions on the right hand side of Figure 3 might be said to exist. Rather we attribute 
them on the basis of a wide range of criteria (some of which I discuss in Chapter 7 in 
relation to the genome). 
 
What can this more complex perspective on mechanism do that the MDC account 
cannot? First and foremost, it provides a way of distinguishing – on the basis of material 
flux – between machines, machine-like biological mechanisms, and more dynamically 
complex structures such as those indicated by the concept of hyperstructures. While there 
are strong overlaps on the left hand side of the diagram between these different kinds of 
system – in terms of the association of structures and processes with functions and causal 
roles – there are marked differences in terms of ontic underpinnings. Biological 
mechanisms are typically high flux processes (or sets of processes with different flux rates) 
whereas machines are almost invariably founded on low flux processes. This matters from 
a practical point of view, for high flux organization makes for physical intractability as well 
as epistemic opacity. The functionally significant dynamic material ensembles encountered 
in cell biology are hard to extract physically from their cellular contexts, and hard to study 
within them. To understand specific methodological issues in molecular and cell biology I 
think demands that we have an account along the lines just outlined. Moreover such an 
account provides the epistemological elbow room needed to address Torres’ point 
(mentioned in Chapter 2 in the discussion there of the MDC account) about the possible 
involvement of negative causation in our mechanistic explanations.  
 
The perspective just outlined remedies the inability of the MDC account to address 
squarely the issue of equilibrium versus non-equilibrium structures and processes, and I 
                                                 
70 The term ‘P-structures’ also, not unhelpfully, calls to mind the ‘P-’ notation used by Alva Noë to 
distinguish between objects of various kinds and their perceptual equivalents (Noë 2004).  
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think represents an ontologically more straightforward way of tackling issues of structure, 
process and function. Arguably the picture it presents is still too broad, however, in that it 
lacks the capacity to distinguish between systems on the basis of the rate at which their 
organization changes, over and above the basis on which their organization at any 
particular moment depends. Some systems exhibit an organization which is stable over 
time but which is dynamically maintained, with the genome providing (to a first 
approximation) an example of this. Other systems display an organization that while also 
dynamically maintained is itself changing over time. A fast-developing embryo might be a 
good example. Perhaps systems of the first kind, systems that have a dynamically 
maintained but stable organization, pose a particular explanatory challenge. It may be the 
case, for example, that they wrong-foot any tendency we have to interpret causality within a 
system using cognitive strategies that are appropriate, and perhaps especially suited, to 
comprehending equilibrium phenomena but not necessarily non-equilibrium processes.  
 
Another objection concerns the ability to distinguish between living and non-living 
systems. The earlier example of the river shows that it is not just living systems that exhibit 
the dynamic maintenance of stable form. In order to gratify our intuitions about what is 
deemed to be alive it is probably necessary to combine a hybrid ontic/epistemic account 
along the lines sketched above with ideas of the sort outlined in Chapter 4 about metabolic 
circularity, system autonomy, intrinsic teleology and the like. That ambitious project is alas 
not one I have the time or space to embark on here.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter and the previous one have had to cover a lot of ground, but given the 
nature of their topic that is hardly surprising. In them I have attempted to show that the 
cell is complex in highly distinctive, indeed unique, ways. Much of its complexity can I 
think be summed up in the idea that it is constituted from a diversity of structures that 
exhibit extensive property variation across a number of dimensions, and these interact to 
participate in processes that unfold over a range of timescales. It is thus a ‘high bandwidth’ 
object, indescribable in terms of a few concepts or parameters. There is more to cellular 
complexity than this, however. In addition there is the way in which cellular processes are 
highly interconnected – as seen for example in the apparent coupling of metabolism, 
cytoskeletal dynamics and the cell cycle. This interconnectedness or high degree of 
integration tests, I think, some of our basic intuitions about the origins of robustness. 
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Where artefacts are concerned we are often at pains to decouple or causally insulate 
processes from each other, so that the effects of defects in or insults to one functional 
region of a system do not propagate to other regions. The cell’s tolerance of substantial 
environmental variation, however, is positively correlated with its integration, since this is 
of a kind that confers a high capacity for adaptive compensation.  
 
In the light of all these findings it is reasonable to ask whether the cell should be 
considered as some sort of mechanism, or even as a kind of machine. The obvious 
question then, however, is relative to what conception of mechanism or machine? Ganti 
has memorably described the cell as a fluid machine, an idea which he models via the 
concept of the chemoton (Ganti 2003). This is a minimal living system composed of a 
membrane-defined compartment, a heritable information store, and autocatalytic metabolic 
machinery. This notion, like Rosen’s idea of M,R systems and the theory of autopoiesis 
described earlier, expresses much of the overall causal character of the cell. But it is hard to 
connect such perspectives with the extensive and detailed structural knowledge we have of 
molecular biological processes. The concept of hyperstructures helps to bridge the gap by 
providing a conceptual resource for thinking about dynamic processes defined in terms of 
specific groupings of molecular structures and events. I have tried to combine the spirit of 
hyperstructures with some of the insights provided by the MDC account to develop a new 
perspective on mechanism. This is flexible enough to subsume many (and maybe most) 
cellular phenomena, but that is not to say that the cell overall should be thought of as a 
mechanism by its lights.  
 
I suggest that in the end it comes down to whether we reach a point at which we 
can specify a set of P-structures in terms of which we can both conceive of the cell and 
describe how it operates. This is largely an epistemic matter to do with our ability to 
imagine processes involving multiple entities, and the ability to attribute functions to 
structures and processes is probably key to the data reduction problem we face when our 
finite cognitive capacities are confronted with an object involving as many causally 
interwoven elements as the cell. The regularity of the cell cycle, as well the robustness of 
individual development and the stability of identity exhibited by the individuals making up 
a species population, all argue powerfully for the idea that there is an underlying order to 
cellular entailment structures. Perhaps we would prefer the idea of mechanism at root to be 
associated simply with the existence of a robust entailment structure within a system. But in 
that case the cell may be a mechanism we can never explain. Faced with that possibility we 
might decide that it is better to draw a strong epistemic boundary around the concept of 
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mechanism and say that something is a mechanism only to the extent that we can explain, 
in a finite (and humanly reasonable) amount of time, even if only schematically, how the 
behaviours it exhibits come about.  
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6.  Emergence and cognition 
 
Introduction 
 
As Chapter 4 demonstrated, discussions of complexity often raise the topic of 
emergence (Darley 1994). Like complexity it is a concept that has proved remarkably 
resistant to analysis – as indicated by the growing literature surrounding attempts to go 
beyond the well-known notion of a whole being ‘greater than the sum of its parts’ (e.g. 
Holland 1998; Clayton and Davies 2006; Ryan 2007). A number of taxonomies of 
emergence, sometimes quite intricate, have been proposed (e.g. Stephan 1999; Fromm 
2005; Deguet, Demazeau and Magnin 2006), with a common feature of several recent 
accounts being to distinguish between strong and weak variants. Just such a distinction was 
noted previously in the context of the work of Boogerd et al. (2005) on metabolic 
modelling. As I explained there, strong emergence is usually mentioned in connection with 
consciousness and some of the puzzling aspects of quantum mechanics, and is typically 
held to be ontologically problematic (Kim 1999; Silberstein and McGeever 1999). The 
weak emergence associated with complex systems, on the other hand, is generally 
considered to be more benign – often seemingly on the grounds that it is considered to be 
as much a problem of epistemology as ontology – and a number of more or less technical 
explications have been proposed (e.g. Bedau 1997; Holland 1998). Nonetheless some 
recent authors are at pains to stress the ontological reality of emergence (Bedau 2008; 
Huneman 2008), as if any epistemic aspect is irrelevant to understanding the phenomenon. 
In this chapter I investigate the concept of emergence in more detail and propose that it 
should be seen jointly in ontological and epistemological terms. Failure to do so renders the 
basis on which emergence attributions are made appear needlessly mysterious. 
 
My starting point is to note that the word emergence, like reduction, can be used in 
a variety of senses which range from the trivial to the technically sophisticated. A rabbit 
appearing at the mouth of its burrow exemplifies emergence of the former, everyday, kind. 
But even this example is not quite as banal as at first it appears, and I will return to it later. 
John Holland begins his 1998 book with the example of the tale of Jack and the beanstalk. 
Holland suggests that the transformation of the bean into the beanstalk is a demonstration 
of emergence in a sense that relates to his subsequently elaborated, highly technical, 
account of the concept. It seems preferable to say, however, that the example combines 
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both everyday and more technical senses: there is the mere fact that something appears 
from the ground, and then there is the more mysterious transformative process by which 
bean becomes plant. Some of the intuitive force of terms like reduction and emergence, 
when used in technically specialist ways, no doubt trades on ambiguities arising from the 
possibility of conflation with everyday construals. 
 
An interesting characteristic of Holland’s account of emergence is that it takes for 
granted our ability to know it when we see it. Many accounts are like this: they attempt to 
address the question of what it is that characterizes the phenomena we recognise as 
emergent, but take recognition itself to be unproblematic and philosophically uninteresting 
– presumably because it is supposed that emergent phenomena are unified by their 
possession of an ontologically robust common property or set of properties. The task then 
becomes, if one inclines to this way of thinking, to identify the relevant properties. Thus 
although my particular interest is in the relevance of the concept of emergence to biological 
systems and consideration of our capacities to explain them, I begin my investigation by 
reviewing some of the ideas that recur in discussions of emergent phenomena across a 
range of areas. The diversity this reveals leads me to propose that there is not some one 
feature, or set of features, that when exhibited by phenomena leads us to describe them as 
emergent. Rather than asking what emergence is, in terms of objective features of 
phenomena in the world outside our minds and brains, we should adopt a more 
epistemically oriented stance. In other words we should ask what the psychological basis is 
for the ascription of emergence. I contrast our facility for explaining the behaviour of other 
people (and, to a lesser degree, animals) with the difficulties we sometimes encounter in 
relation to complex physical systems. This leads into a discussion of imagination, 
simulation and understanding, from which I derive a view of emergence that goes some 
way towards making sense of the application of a common term to highly disparate 
phenomena. 
 
Facets of emergence 
 
Reducibility, deducibility and predictability 
 
Philosophical accounts of emergence, such as that of Broad (1925) outlined in 
Chapter 4, have often been framed in terms of irreducibility or non-deducibility. Broad was 
concerned especially with synchronic emergence, or with the dependencies that hold 
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simultaneously between the properties of wholes and parts of systems. This contrasts with 
diachronic emergence, which deals with how phenomena unfold over time. A property of a 
system is emergent, he says, if it cannot be deduced from the properties of its parts as they 
occur in it or simpler systems, and with this non-deducibility comes unpredictability.71 
Closely related to this, especially if reduction is seen in terms of formal derivability, is the 
idea that a system property is emergent if it is not reducible to the properties of its parts. 
For this to be illuminating requires that we already have a satisfactory account of reduction, 
but as Chapter 1 showed reducibility can mean many things. The formal derivability 
interpretation has the merit of clarity but in general lacks applicability to biological 
phenomena, even though we presumably would not say that those phenomena are in 
general emergent. On the other hand if we construe reducibility as explicability in terms of 
X then we obtain a concept which has greater potential salience to biology, but which now 
seems to be almost too weak to be worthy of anti-reductionist ire.72 (It is possible to see a 
stronger motivation for that as arising from a combination of factors. One is the fact that an 
organism’s phenotype is not fully accounted for by its genotype, even though genes are 
undoubted difference-makers (Waters 2007). Another factor, more spatial or mereological 
in character, is the recognition that causal influence does not simply radiate outwards from 
the micro to the macro, but rather acts bidirectionally.) 
 
One problem with linking predictability and deducibility is that doing so seems to 
make predictability too dependent on the possibility of formal derivability. The possibilities 
presented by in silico simulation methods, such as those applied to the study of protein 
folding and dynamics discussed earlier, substantially decouple prediction from the 
constraint of mathematical analyticity. Some of Broad’s examples, to do with the 
derivability of the physico-chemical properties of compounds from those of their 
constituents, are rendered suspect if not actually mistaken by scientific developments.73 
Nonetheless, the relationship between predictability and emergence is interesting, and not 
                                                 
71 Many discussions of emergence highlight unpredictability as a major characteristic, e.g.: ‘[o]ne of the 
characteristics of many complex systems is the phenomenon of emergence in which properties of the system 
emerge that cannot readily be predicted from a knowledge of the constituents of the system’ (Norris et al. 
2005, p.313). 
72 Curiously (if we start off by assuming that reduction and emergence are straightforwardly complementary 
concepts), philosophers of science and philosophers of biology tended not to mention the concept of 
emergence in the context of the extensive debates about reduction that occurred from the 1950s onwards. If 
the concept was deemed to be philosophically uninteresting then this may have been because it was assumed 
to connect more closely with epistemological than ontological matters. If this is the correct explanation then 
it seems revealing of the philosophical values then prevailing, and suggests a bias which perhaps owed 
something to a positivist aversion to psychology and a preference for identifying what might be said about 
the objective nature of things in the world without reference to properties of the mind. 
73 For example, success has recently been reported in simulating the properties of liquid water from quantum 
mechanical principles (Bukowski et al. 2007). 
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straightforward. Many things happen in the world that we do not, and could not, foresee, 
just because of interactions between multiple contingencies in space and time – 
contingencies of a kind we often expect. In addition, many phenomena we call emergent 
occur reliably given certain conditions, and hence we expect them to occur.74 Thus often 
the issue is not that phenomena are unforeseeable as such, for frequently we do expect 
them to occur, so much as that they threaten us with unintelligibility, in that we are unable 
to connect initial or underlying conditions with the resulting phenomena.  
Downward causation and levels 
 
Sometimes emergence is associated with downward causation, in which macro-level 
phenomena ‘loop back’ to exert a causal influence on, and so partially determine, micro-
level phenomena. A classic articulation of the idea is that of Campbell (1974). He describes 
how the morphological specifics of an ant’s jaws can be accounted for in terms of 
evolutionary selection forces acting on multiple generations of entire organisms. Ultimately 
these large-scale influences (large-scale in both spatial and temporal senses) serve to 
determine the DNA sequence of the genome that through developmental processes is 
associated with the generation of the particular jaw morphology of an individual ant. 
 
Downward causation appears to run counter to the microphysicalist intuition that 
phenomena at a given level are fully accounted for by properties, processes and events at 
lower levels. In Campbell’s example, population- and organism-level phenomena are seen 
to play a part in an account of how particular structures at the molecular level come about. 
Two salient points here concern first the nature and status of his example as a 
representative of downward causation in general, and second the idea of organizational 
levels in biology and the ontic and epistemic weight we should attach to them.  
 
Regarding the first point it could be argued that selection is somewhat complex and 
causally rather distinctive when compared with more proximate biological processes (Mayr 
1961). Many of the material phenomena we wish to explain can be accounted for in terms 
of the continuous or direct interactions and transformations of particles and larger 
aggregations of matter – it presumably being the frequent realization of this kind of 
possibility that establishes and reinforces the microphysicalist’s intuitions. Evolution by 
natural selection operates by applying a filter to a population of genome-bearing organisms, 
                                                 
74 Relevant examples here include the deterministic chaos seen in the dynamics of systems that are indefinitely 
sensitive to initial conditions. 
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against a backdrop of slowly accumulating genetic change. The generation of individual 
organisms does seem to be resolvable in principle, from one perspective, into continuously 
connected micro-level material events and processes. But the filter of natural selection 
typically cuts across, i.e. applies simultaneously and without regard to, the levels we 
standardly recognise, from the whole organism down to its constituent molecules. It 
effectively deletes subsets of a population so as to change the extent to which a particular 
class of genome sequences is represented in that population. This change in relative 
representation level biases the chances that a particular sequence will be propagated to 
subsequent generations.  
 
The fate of a specific instance of a particular DNA sequence thus depends not just 
on interactions and transformations at its own spatiotemporal scale (i.e. the molecular) but 
also on the fate of the organismic container in which it resides – which is a matter of 
chance and the overall fitness of an organism in the context of a particular environment. 
Whether a particular sequence carries through to subsequent generations, however, 
depends on the fates of all the individual organisms in which it occurs. Therefore the 
presence of the particular DNA sequence that might account for the morphology of a 
specific ant’s jaw may have to be explained by appealing to several rather distinct sets of 
factors. One is the continuous series of molecular-scale material events and processes 
(genome replication steps and so on), in principle traceable back to the ant’s earliest 
ancestors, that resulted in a specific genome sequence being present now in the particular 
ant in question. Another, more negatively, is the history of random drift and selection 
events that these micro-level material genetic processes survived. Subtly different concepts 
of downward causation apply to these different sets of explanatory factor.  
 
The sense of downward causation I take Campbell to have intended to emphasize 
relates primarily to the diachronic determination of the microphysical (DNA sequence) by 
population-level and macroscopic events and processes. This connects the term with the 
causally distinctive feature of evolutionary selection noted above: its capacity to ‘cause by 
deletion’ (of a subset of a population). Another, more exclusively spatial, sense of 
downward causation is pervasive, however. It enters into Campbell’s account in terms, for 
example, of the way in which particular selection events may be realized by the 
consumption of one organism by another (think of an amoeba engulfing a bacterium). But 
it can also be illustrated rather well by thinking about a protein’s conformation as 
represented by way of the Ramachandran plots described in Chapter 3. When the crystal 
structure of a protein is analysed to produce a Ramachandran plot, most of its residues are 
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found to fall within the allowed areas – but there is considerable variation amongst the 
precise phi/psi values, even amongst residues of the same type. Whilst some of the 
variation can be attributed to imperfections of crystallographic structure refinement 
(Kleywegt and Jones, 1996), for most residues local steric factors of course leave 
considerable latitude as to the exact conformation adopted. So what determines the actual 
phi/psi values that obtain in the context of a specific protein? One surely has to say: 
downward causation. To a first approximation, in the context of the folded structure any 
single residue is subject to the sum of the forces exerted on it by the other residues, and 
these will compel it to adopt that configuration which is energetically accessible and in 
which the overall energy of the molecule is minimized – even if as a result the individual 
residue is distorted into a conformation it would not, ‘in isolation’, frequently adopt. 
Proteins thus illustrate in microcosm how wholes can determine the properties of their 
parts. 
 
Generalizing from this example it is possible to express one kind of downward 
causation – which could be referred to as inward causation – in terms of the way in which the 
influences, or causal potentials, that act at a particular location or region can come from 
multiple directions and distances. The way the influences sum and act, together with the 
nature of whatever exists at that location, determines what happens there. 75 (Influences 
here often means forces arising from fields, whether acting over long or short ranges. At 
different scales, different fields predominate.) Certain sorts of effect depend for their 
realisation on the attainment of a minimum local concentration of causal potential, and 
sometimes this can only be brought about by a summation of the individual causal 
potentials of multiple parts. (Think of light being focused onto a small region so as to heat 
it to its ignition point.) Conversely, parts are compatible – in the sense that they can retain 
their integrity or identity – only with particular contexts, within bounds beyond which they 
are changed. The conditions under which, and the manner in which, they are changed 
depend in complex ways on energetic and other factors. Highly non-linear behaviours can 
thus be generated: if a causal threshold is met, X happens; if it is not met, X does not 
happen. 
 
I mentioned above that the topic of downward causation raises the issue of 
organizational levels and how we should regard them. In this connection it is worth bearing 
in mind that biological causes may be highly dispersed. Extracellularly, fluid media such as 
                                                 
75 This sense is the same as that implied by the title of Abraham Pais’ book on the history of atomic and high-
energy physics, Inward Bound (Pais 1986). 
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the bloodstream can be used to broadcast a wide variety of signals to different cellular 
targets with varying degrees of specificity. Intracellularly, causes may similarly be 
distributed, taking advantage of the properties of the intracellular environment in order to 
exert their effects. Should these kinds of contingently acting, message-based phenomena be 
grouped under the heading of downwards causation? Arguably not, to the extent that we 
can think of the messages and their targets as lying at the same structural level, i.e. the 
molecular. On the other hand one might argue that such cases go some way towards 
undermining the concept of levels altogether. In an animal, for example, signalling 
molecules – a hormone say – might originate from the cells of one organ, such as the 
pituitary gland, and travel around the body to the cells of other organs where – if those 
cells bear the relevant receptors – they set in train molecular processes that might 
ultimately result in the expression of a particular gene. The pituitary gland cells may have 
been stimulated to secrete the hormone as a result of the collective activity of neurons 
distributed across a variety of cortical levels, including those associated with higher (more 
abstract) cognitive skills – neuronal activity which could well have been triggered by the 
organism finding itself in a particular kind of environment.  
 
Another example which shows how causal explanations for phenomena often cut 
across level boundaries involves protein unfolding rather than folding. It has been 
proposed that cells such as fibroblasts can exert enough force on matrix fibrils to stretch 
them, resulting in the partial unfolding of their constituent fibronectin molecules. This 
brings about the sequential exposure – creation would be a better word – of binding sites 
for specific signaling molecules. The extracellular matrix, rather than being a passive 
support, enters into dynamic patterns of reciprocal causation with the cells it surrounds. 
Cells are able to sense the state of the matrix (since they are coupled to it via cell 
membrane receptors which in turn connect with intracellular signalling pathways) and alter 
their patterns of gene expression in order to regulate their environment (Smith et al. 2007). 
It is hard to see how thinking in terms of levels helps much in these and many other kinds 
of case; more helpful is to try to track the flows of causal influence and see how they 
propagate and act through space and time. And it is sometimes useful, in that regard, to 
think in terms of inward versus outward causation. 
Agents, environments and parallel processes 
 
In recent years the concept of emergence has frequently arisen in the context of 
debates about systems consisting of multiple agents and the collective behaviours to which 
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their interactions give rise. Termites, for example, are individually rather simple, with 
important aspects of their behaviour being interpretable in terms of a relatively small 
number of rules that key their actions to contexts. Despite this individual simplicity 
termites are collectively capable of sophisticated adaptive behaviours, such as the 
construction of complex mound structures (Clark 1996). Cellular processes – including, or 
perhaps especially, the fundamental capacities of metabolism, genome replication and cell 
division – may be thought emergent in a sense that is rather like this, for they result from 
the combined operation of numerous apparently independent activities. However, it is 
becoming increasingly apparent that many processes are in fact highly integrated, as was 
noted in the previous chapter. In Chapter 2 I discussed how those activities are 
implemented by molecular mechanisms – ‘protein machines’ – of sometimes surprising 
sophistication. A common feature is that the actions of individual agents or mechanisms 
appear not to be directed in any readily apparent manner towards the realization of the 
ultimate ends to which they do in fact contribute. An analogy is with a musical 
performance in which multiple instrumental parts are played simultaneously (Noble 2006). 
The overall melodic, harmonic and rhythmic effects for which the composer has striven 
arise – sometimes, and to an extent that varies according to the composer and the 
composition – out of the simultaneous performance of the different parts, but cannot 
necessarily be identified with any part in isolation. 
 
Patterns and surprise 
 
Musical analogies suggest another aspect of the phenomena we describe as 
emergent: the appearance of patterns or order of some kind. Sometimes the order is 
straightforwardly visual or spatial, as in the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, in which the 
existence of alternative reaction pathways gives rise to spatial patterns that are analogous to 
the wave-like growth patterns exhibited in certain circumstances by the slime mould 
Dictyostelium discoideum (Peacocke 1989, pp.40-41). Sometimes however it takes the form of 
mathematical regularity or lawfulness that is apparent only under certain forms of analysis. 
The fact that the frequencies of words in a natural language corpus are inversely 
proportional to their rank order in a table of word frequencies (a relationship also referred 
to as Zipf’s Law76) is an example of this kind of ‘emergence under analysis’. 
                                                 
76 Thus the most commonly occurring word will occur roughly twice as frequently as the second most 
commonly occurring word, which will occur twice as often as the fourth most common word, and so on. The 
law is named after George Zipf, who discussed the phenomenon in his Human Behavior and the Principle of 
Least-Effort (1949).  
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Why the appearance of order, symmetry, repetition or lawfulness in phenomena 
should strike us as significant is a fertile topic for speculation. Perhaps there is an entropic 
explanation: entropy favours disorder, and a lack of disorder implies the operation of some 
organizing force or causal principle that if understood or mastered might confer powers to 
predict or control. However, some spontaneous processes tend to result in homogeneity 
and isotropy (the dissolution of a substance in a solvent is an obvious example), and this 
could be characterized as a high degree of symmetry. In many cases little significance is 
attached to the symmetry associated with such uniformity; it is as if the significance we 
attach to patterns and symmetries reflects what we know or feel justified in assuming about 
their etiology. When and why significance is attached to order and pattern are thus 
somewhat  problematic issues and it is perhaps unwise to generalize from specific cases. 
Nonetheless, it seems mistaken to say that emergence attributions necessarily depend on 
the appearance of patterns. The oscillation of a single pendulum exhibits a simple kind of 
order that we would not think of as demonstrating emergence. However, when a second 
pendulum is coupled to the first the regular periodicity is disrupted, to be replaced by 
chaotic oscillatory behaviour – and that behaviour probably would be described as 
emergent.  
 
The pendulum case shows how an element of unexpectedness is often one of the 
hallmarks of phenomena we describe as emergent, leading some to talk of emergence as 
‘the science of surprise’ (Casti 1994, 1997). Often, however, the surprise is of only an initial 
or second order character. The configurations of cell occupancy seen in John Horton 
Conway’s well-known ‘Game of Life’ cellular automaton (Gardner 1970), or the patterns 
characteristic of the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction, occur reliably subject to certain 
conditions being met, and so we come to expect them irrespective of our capacity to 
explain them. Much of the surprise is connected with the nature of what occurs, be it the 
appearance of order or its disruption. However, when rule-following agents interact with 
novel environments and emergent behaviours are observed, as can occur in robotics 
(Ronald and Sipper 2001), perhaps the surprise is rather that something unforeseen occurs.  
 
Divergent and convergent processes 
 
Some authors have used the term emergence to describe the development of 
material complexity in the universe, concomitant with its expansion following the Big Bang 
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and the decrease in energy density this has brought about. Nagel sees this ‘cosmogonic’ 
sense of emergence as being fundamentally different from the sense of emergence implicit 
in interpretations that seek to tackle issues arising from the way in which systems are 
organized (Nagel 1961, pp.366-380). Often, however, it is unclear in which precise sense a 
phenomenon should be judged emergent, in part because it is difficult to give either sense a 
precise articulation. Nonetheless it is clear enough that when an author writes about ‘The 
Emergence of Everything’ (Morowitz 2002) an interpretation that connects closely with 
Nagel’s cosmogonic sense is intended.  
 
This sort of perspective overlaps with the work of the emergentists of the early 
twentieth century such as Samuel Alexander  (‘Space, Time, and Deity’, 1920) and C. Lloyd 
Morgan (‘Emergent Evolution’, 1923). Emergence here can be seen as a conflation of 
appearance (as per the earlier example of the rabbit appearing at the burrow entrance) with 
novelty – echoing the point I made at the outset about Holland’s Jack and the beanstalk 
example. But in addition the emergence claim implies that the novel phenomena are more 
complex than those that have already appeared, and there is an implication too that the 
novelty is of a metaphysically radical kind (Van Gulick 2007). Alexander regarded 
consciousness as an example of this kind of radical novelty. I agree about that 
phenomenon’s distinctiveness, although it is not clear to me how this should – or whether 
it usefully can – be related to issues of material complexity in non-mental systems. 
 
It may be possible and / or important (so far as understanding underlying causal 
mechanisms goes) to distinguish here between ‘divergent’ and ‘convergent’ processes. The 
outcomes of processes of the former sort are sensitive to the particularity of events, and 
evolution appears to demonstrate this property. If a population is reduced to a single 
potential breeding pair then the fate of the species and the possibility that it will give rise to 
successor species turns on the fates of just two individuals, which may in turn depend on a 
host of contingent environmental factors. Gould has asked what would happen if the ‘tape’ 
of evolution were ‘played’ again (Gould 1989), and if nothing else the question tests our 
intuitions about determinism.77 However, it seems (to me at least) easier to entertain the 
idea that the outcome of each ‘run’ will be significantly different than the possibility that we 
will repeatedly observe the same outcomes, unless conditions are identical in all respects 
for all runs or unless the total system in which evolution takes place is extremely small and 
                                                 
77 An extensive debate has grown up around this question and the issue of whether there are laws in biology 
(see e.g. Fontana and Buss 1994 and Beatty 2006), but as its twists and turns are not central to my present 
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simple. The idea of there being identical conditions between runs might make no sense, if 
for example there were a possibility of random fluctuations at the quantum level ‘leaking 
upwards’ to give rise to macroscopic variations. The second condition – that the system is 
simple – effectively appeals to an entropic argument: if the state space that evolutionary 
processes explore is sufficiently small then the probability that the same configuration will 
be generated within a certain number of runs may be non-negligible. Obviously, the 
chances are increased as the number of runs increases. It is in this sense – of extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions – that the emergence to which evolution gives rise may 
perhaps be considered divergent.78 Convergent processes, on the other hand, are those that 
are robustly indifferent to minor perturbations, and they include many of those that figure 
in the life of the cell and the individual organism. Development of the individuals of a 
species, for example, typically results in the attainment of highly characteristic forms 
despite taking place in sometimes quite markedly different environments. 
 
It is by now I think clear that emergence is a term that is applied to very different 
kinds of phenomena, and it is not at all obvious what it is that unites them. Perhaps further 
work will result in a unified framework that succeeds in encompassing the diversity of 
emergent phenomena while referring solely to properties of systems that are independent 
of the psychological capacities exercised when we contemplate or interact with them. The 
phenomena to be subsumed by such an account include the interactions of numerous, 
individually rather simple, entities at one extreme, and the complex interactions of a small 
number of highly structured, adaptive agents with a structurally and dynamically rich 
environment at the other. The account will have to handle, in biology, the play of historical 
contingency that over time gives rise to the increasingly differentiated and complex 
structures generated by evolutionary processes, the constancies and repetitions of 
metabolism, and the canalised unfolding of form seen in morphogenesis. The project of 
developing an ontologically unified account of emergence capable of addressing all these 
diverse phenomena is not one I shall attempt, however, since I think there is a simpler, 
more satisfactory account to be given. Although this account has a strong epistemological 
component, my starting point is the same as that from which such a more exclusively 
ontological project would probably proceed: consideration of the causal underpinnings of 
emergence. 
  
                                                 
78 The intuitions I have expressed here are presumably susceptible to testing by in silico modelling and 
experiments in artificial life. 
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Causal comprehension and imaginative simulation 
 
It is presumably an uncontroversial claim about emergence to say that it relates in 
some way to our capacity to account for phenomena in terms of antecedent, underlying or 
surrounding conditions. As Mark Bedau has observed, emergent phenomena often exhibit 
a paradoxical duality, being both dependent on and yet apparently autonomous from their 
causal foundations (Bedau 1997). This can make levels talk, for all its difficulties (already 
noted), hard to avoid. The paradox, frequently, is the existence of macro-level phenomena 
that appear to conform to different ordering principles from those obtaining at the micro-
level (one might say the levels are defined by the distinct sets of ordering principles). 
Shifting attention from one level to the other involves making something like a gestalt 
switch, since the connection between the macro-level phenomena and their micro-level 
underpinnings is not apparent.79 
 
Our seeming inability readily to comprehend in an explanation-supporting way the 
causal processes underlying emergent phenomena – in general despite the visibility of the 
entities and processes on which they depend – contrasts rather strikingly with our ability to 
provide quite satisfactory accounts of human behaviour across diverse conditions. We 
suppose that such behaviour is underpinned by the workings of a neuronally instantiated 
mind, but our account-giving capacity works despite the fact that the relevant neurological 
processes are invisible to us. Instead we are frequently able to make some sense of the 
behaviour of others by ascribing certain beliefs, desires, and so on, and by relating these to 
what we know about, for example, an individual’s past experiences. Being able to explain 
someone’s behaviour depends on that behaviour being consistent with what we know 
about the person in question and with what we know about human nature in general. 
Sometimes we will describe someone as having a particular type of personality, or as 
exhibiting a specific behavioural trait. Attributions made on the basis of these kinds of 
inferred dispositional structures – which I take to be a reasonable way of thinking about 
personality types and traits – act as significant modifiers or determinants of the kinds of 
behaviour we see as making sense in relation to a specific individual (or class of individuals) 
in a particular set of circumstances. The whole conceptual framework by which we 
rationalize and account for the behaviour of others in terms of ‘propositional attitudes’ 
such as beliefs and desires is often referred to in philosophical circles as folk psychology. 
 
                                                 
79 I am grateful to Francesco Guala for this observation. 
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Debates of the 1980s and early 1990s concerning the nature of folk psychological 
explanation (see e.g. Davies and Stone 1995) have in recent years evolved into debates 
about what has been referred to as ‘mindreading’ (Nichols and Stich 2003). There are 
substantial elements of continuity to the debates, although the emphasis has shifted. Where 
once there was a preoccupation with whether and in what sense folk psychology could be 
considered a theory (Churchland 1988) there is now much greater interest in the role and 
status of mental simulation, imagination and pretence (Goldman 2006; and see also Nichols 
2006). One of the probable reasons for this shift is that in the intervening time philosophy 
of mind has been reshaped by the development of a new interest in consciousness (Searle 
1992; Chalmers 1996) and in issues of embodiment and emotion in relation to cognition 
(Damasio 1994, 1999; Noë 2004). Additional impetus, especially on the simulation side, has 
come from the discovery of ‘mirror neurons’, first in monkeys and then in humans, that 
fire both when a subject performs a motor activity and when the subject views another 
individual performing the same activity (Gallese and Goldman 1998). 80  
 
Foreshadowing the debates about imagination and mental simulation to which such 
findings have given new impetus are earlier speculative accounts concerning the part played 
by imagination in our ability to interpret other people’s actions within a folk psychological 
framework. Morton (1980) suggests that an important strategy for making sense of 
someone’s behaviour is to situate their actions within a behavioural schema that shows 
how they result from being in a particular psychological state. The schema provides a basis 
for internal simulation, aspects of the schema being adjustable to achieve congruence 
between the simulation and what is perceived. It is not entirely clear how simulation here 
should be understood, but it seems reasonable to assume that an involuntary, non-
deliberative process is intended. Congruence between the simulated behaviour that 
underpins our interpretation of another person’s behaviour and that person’s actual 
behaviour is possible, I take Morton to be proposing, in virtue of the fact that both 
simulated and actual behaviours are causally structured in accordance with the same 
psychological schemas. This sort of interpretative mechanism presumably thus exploits 
similarities between our psychological structures and those of our fellow humans, and no 
doubt also involves tight corroborative loops of language, action, and perception.  
 
                                                 
80 The existence of mirror neurons in humans is still a contested area, however (Lingnau, Gesierich and 
Caramazza 2009; Kilner et al. 2009). So too is the issue of how such ‘resonance systems’ might adjudicate 
between simulation- versus theory-based theories of mind (Gallagher 2007). 
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Cautiously we can speculate that behavioural interpretation, understanding and 
prediction involves a range of mechanisms, often working in parallel and varying in terms 
(for example) of degree of representational abstraction and the extent to which a 
mechanism’s operation is associated with conscious experience. The discovery of mirror 
neurons appears to lend weight to the idea that some of these mechanisms are based on 
capacities to simulate the behaviour of others, or ‘put ourselves in their shoes’ (see e.g. 
Buckner and Carroll 2006). In the present context I want to entertain a related but more 
general idea: that making sense of the world often depends on organized cognitive 
dispositions – schemas – of various kinds that allow us to model its entailment structures 
by mentally simulating them. 
 
Imagination and scientific thought 
 
Let us suppose then that abilities to imagine and simulate play a part in 
comprehending not just the behaviour of our fellow humans – and the behaviour of other 
species too, to the extent that it conforms to schemas that stand in some reasonably direct 
relation to folk psychology – but phenomena more generally. A plausible conjecture then is 
that scientific understanding is sometimes a matter of being able to imagine the behaviour 
of material structures and systems through processes that are underpinned by cognitive 
schemas of various kinds. Scientific communication can be seen as reflecting this. Much 
scientific writing clearly aims at evoking images in the mind of the reader or conveying 
patterns of causality. One way of viewing mathematical expressions in physics is as 
communicable data structures associated with the operation of schemas for encoding and 
manipulating the quantitative relationships that obtain within actual or counterfactual 
scenarios. 
 
Further evidence of a role for imagination in scientific thought comes from a 
number of directions. First there is plain introspection: when I think about how a protein 
might bind to DNA, say, or about the migration of endoplasmic reticulum to the cell 
surface, verbal processes seem very much secondary to visuospatial ones. This 
introspective experience resonates with the first-person accounts reported by Jacques 
Hadamard (1945) that accord a central role to a visuospatial cognitive mode in 
mathematics, and with recent work in the epistemology of mathematics (Giaquinto 2007). 
In the course of his discussion of the role of visuospatial and mechanical thinking in 
engineering Eugene Ferguson presents evidence gathered from a variety of sources across a 
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range of sciences (Ferguson 1992). He specifically mentions Galton, Boltzmann, Einstein, 
Bohr, and Heisenberg in connection with visual thinking, and notes the tendency of 
Faraday, Kelvin, and Maxwell to think in terms of ‘models and mechanical analogies’ 
(pp.44-45). Regarding the latter tendency he discusses Pierre Duhem’s suggestion that 
British and French physicists of the nineteenth century adopted different styles of thought, 
reflecting wider cultural differences of cognitive approach.  
 
Duhem identified in the British mind an ‘extraordinary facility for imagining very 
complicated collections of concrete facts ... and an extreme difficulty in conceiving abstract 
notions and formulating general principles’. In contrast, the French mind he saw as ‘strong 
enough to be unafraid of abstraction and generalization but too narrow to imagine 
anything complex before it is classified in a perfect order’ (Duhem 1954/1991, p.64). These 
distinct styles were reflected in different approaches to, for example, electrostatic physics: 
 
This whole theory of electrostatics constitutes a group of abstract ideas and general 
propositions, formulated in the clear and precise language of geometry and algebra, 
and connected with one another by the rules of strict logic. This whole fully 
satisfies the reason of a French physicist and his taste for clarity, simplicity, and 
order. 
 The same does not hold for an Englishman. These abstract notions of 
material points, force, lines of force, and equipotential surface do not satisfy his 
need to imagine concrete, material, visible, and tangible things. 
(Duhem 1954/1991, p.70)  
 
Duhem goes on to note that in Oliver Lodge’s treatise on the theory of electricity ‘there are 
nothing but strings which move around pulleys, which roll around drums, which go 
through pearl beads, which carry weights...’ Despairingly he says that ‘We thought we were 
entering the tranquil and neatly ordered abode of reason, but we find ourselves in a factory’ 
(p.71). It may be that Duhem’s distinction can itself be thought of as a manifestation of the 
very tendency he articulates so sharply, but at the very least it highlights the possibility that 
scientific activity is compatible with different styles of thought. That the scientists 
Ferguson mentions in connection with a visual-mechanical style of thought are (Galton 
apart) mostly physicists and physical chemists if anything lends additional significance to 
the reports. For if visual thinking plays a part even in physics, where thought is often 
assumed primarily to be mathematical, its role in biology – in which the visualization of 
phenomena is often the principle aim of research – must (it could be argued) be 
considerable. Of Einstein, Ferguson notes that he said how he ‘ rarely thought in words at 
all; his visual and “muscular” images had to be translated “laboriously” into conventional 
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verbal and mathematical terms’ (p. 45). The phrase ‘muscular images’ here echoes MDC’s 
proposal that the intelligibility of a phenomenon is not exclusively a visual matter but may 
incorporate other aspects of bodily experience. 
 
How are first-person reports of a visuospatial component to scientific thought to 
be understood? A variety of findings in cognitive psychology point towards possible 
neuropsychological underpinnings. Roger Shepard famously noted that the time it takes for 
an individual to judge whether the objects shown in two pictures have the same shape is 
proportional to the angular difference in depicted orientation of the objects (Shepard and 
Metzler 1971). The two depicted objects have roughly the same shape, and it is as if the 
subject answers the question by mentally attempting to rotate one of the objects in order to 
bring its major morphological features into the same orientation as those of the other so 
that they can be superimposed and compared. From this kind of work has arisen a major 
strand of research in cognitive science and psychology concerning the part played in 
cognition by imagery and visual thought (e.g. Kosslyn 1994; Cornoldi et al. 1996; de Vega 
et al. 1996; Stenning 2002). Such work can be seen in part as working alongside 
fundamental research in neuropsychology concerning the participation of different brain 
regions in particular mental processes. The evidence that the rear portion of the neocortex 
is involved in visual processing is now overwhelming, for example, and much of the 
neuronal basis of visual perception is well understood (see e.g. Zeki 1993).81 Against this 
neuropsychological background cognitive psychological models of visual thought can be 
regarded as a layer of conjecture capable of – and necessary for – guiding research by 
prompting particular questions which can then be tested by experiment.  
 
Given the conjectural character of the ideas I have outlined to do with simulation 
and imagination it is necessary to preface any tentative philosophical theory of emergence 
based on it with some words of qualification. In the first place there is little doubt that 
individuals differ – irrespective of their nationality! – in terms of the reliance they place on 
different cognitive modes in different situations (Galton 1883; Hadamard 1945; Reisberg et 
al. 2003). Secondly, in performing different tasks we presumably switch between, blend or 
integrate imagistic, mechanistic, linguistic and other cognitive styles as necessary; and 
sometimes we appear to make use of mental models that combine aspects of logical and 
abstracted visuospatial thought (Johnson-Laird 1983). And thirdly it should be noted that I 
do not mean to imply that we can take the findings and ideas from cognitive psychology in 
                                                 
81 To the point where it is increasingly possible to ‘read’ a subject’s perceptual experience from brain fMRI 
scans (Haynes and Rees 2005; Kay et al. 2008). 
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these areas for granted: the imagery debate remains alive and well after several decades of 
argument and counter-argument (see for example Kosslyn et al. 2001; Pylyshyn 2003 and 
references therein). However, proceeding on the basis that a certain view may be roughly 
right at least exposes that view to further testing; and success in clarifying specific problems 
might, on an abductive basis, count in the view’s favour. We should not suspend trying to 
make sense of the issues that interest us until, for example, the nature of the mental 
representations that underlie phenomenal experience has been resolved. The resolution of 
such questions may actually be facilitated by work that incorporates assumptions about the 
likely answers in attempting to make sense of other problems. 
 
Cognition and material systems 
 
It is a truism that our cognitive abilities are not unlimited, but still it is arguable that 
we lack a clear sense of the shape of those abilities and of the directions and degrees of 
limitation. George Miller (1956) famously noted constraints on the number of entities, 
variables or dimensions we can process simultaneously. These constraints are generally 
interpreted in terms of the limited capacity of working memory. Cognitive psychologists 
are exploring further the nature of many of our cognitive tendencies and biases, for 
example in relation to the attribution of functional properties (see e.g. Lombrozo and 
Carey 2006). A significant constraint on our ability to reason about complex systems 
appears to be what Resnick has referred to as a ‘centralized mindset’ (Resnick 1996), or the 
tendency to seek causal foci and concentrated causal sequences of events. It is, I take it, an 
open question to what extent it is within our powers to overcome this tendency. 
Sometimes we reveal other biases when thinking about complex systems, for example the 
tendency to think of causal power as dissipating as it propagates through complex systems 
such as ecosystems (White 1998). Perhaps we do so on the basis of inappropriate analogies 
with phenomena like, say, thermal conduction or sound propagation. Such systems clearly 
have the potential to tax our imaginative and inferential capacities heavily, and often 
exhaust them altogether. In contrast, certain sorts of system are much more amenable to 
comprehension. 
 
Amongst the more epistemically tractable of material systems are the the machine-
type artefacts I discussed at some length in Chapter 2. To recapitulate, these consist on the 
whole of solid-state components in well-defined spatial relationships, capable of moving 
relative to one another in a limited number of ways defined by points, lines and planes of 
articulation established by stable part shapes. The number of degrees of freedom is 
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extremely small relative to the number existing in the equivalent amount of matter in 
gaseous or liquid form. Psychological experiments suggest that we are able to simulate 
mentally the operation of simple mechanisms such as cogs and pulleys in order to trace 
how causal influences propagate through them (Hegarty 2004). It seems reasonable to 
speculate that the simulation process in such cases draws upon the same kinds of mental 
processes as those putatively involved in Shepard’s work on the mental rotation of objects. 
Simple localized transformations of parts – principally rotations and translations – can be 
imagined and we can be confident, because of the properties of the solid state, that these 
do not have non-local consequences. Thus (it can be conjectured) the capacity of working 
memory is not exceeded. 
 
Simulation and causal schemas 
 
Many issues remain to be worked out in the picture I have outlined so far, which is 
obviously sketchy. Quite what is meant by mental simulation could do with clarification, 
for example. In talking about imagination, to what extent do we mean a faculty that is 
associated necessarily with conscious experience? Is it exclusively pictorial or imagistic, or 
can it draw upon or involve different dimensions, relating perhaps to specific perceptual or 
motor skills? (Einstein’s talk of ‘muscular images’ suggests a likely answer to this question.) 
 
These are hardly trivial issues, and it would probably require a book-length 
treatment to do them justice. But I can describe the sort of philosophical and psychological 
framework that would need to be fleshed out if the ideas outlined here were to be 
developed into a comprehensive account. The central notion is that our interactions with 
each other and the world are continuously guided by presumed patterns of entailment or 
schemas of various kinds, and these schema-conformant thoughts represent, or are 
associated with, expectations about how events in the world will unfold. (Research such as 
that reported by Bar (2007), Kveraga et al. (2007) and Schubotz (2007) provides inspiration 
and evidence for the plausibility of this line of thinking.) Schemas may be instantiated 
directly by the perceptual detection of features in phenomena, indirectly by the association 
of such perceived features with memories which then trigger schemas, or may be triggered 
purely by reflective – imaginative – processes. Causal schemas model patterns of 
entailment, and our minds are continually attempting to fit experience to schemas to guess 
the future (Sloman 2005; Frith 2007). Surprise, on this kind of account, is associated with a 
failure to find causal schemas that generate accurate predictions.  
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Morton’s account of behavioural interpretation by imaginative synthesis is about 
the attempt to fit social experience to folk psychological schemas. As he says, this is largely 
a subconscious matter, but overt imaginative and reflective processes can also play a part. 
So it is, I suspect, with the schemas we have for making sense of the material world. As we 
move about in, interact with and observe the world we are guided (I conjecture) by streams 
of expectation generated by the causal schemas triggered by what we experience from 
moment to moment. Expectations are largely invisible, so long as they are gratified by 
experience. The causal schemas are, I assume, acquired through play and learning, although 
some may be innate. As we get older we learn progressively more abstract schemas, come 
to see how these connect with more primitive ones, and automatize associations between 
them.  
 
Being knowledgable, on this kind of account, amounts not so much to having sets 
of justified true beliefs as possessing apt schemas, and perhaps we could say, à la Nozick 
(1981), that apt schemas are ones that track the truth. Expectation takes the form of being 
oriented towards the world in ways that presuppose the development of events in a 
particular manner. An important indication of a certain sort of understanding then consists 
just in not being surprised by events. This is not the passive affair it might sound like, 
however, but a hard-won state based on keeping track of sensed experience and comparing 
it with what we assume or imagine will happen. Mental simulation I think can be regarded 
as a process by which we find a causal schema relevant to an imagined system (e.g. a 
configuration of material elements) and use it as a basis for generating an expected future 
system state. That new state is then the basis for selecting (or just triggers the instantiation 
of) a new schema – if the first one is no longer relevant – in order to generate the next 
state, and so on. These various stages of selection and generation proceed, presumably, 
automatically and subconsciously, but may generate visual outputs (and perhaps can utilize 
the results of visual operations as inputs). A phenomenon is imaginable if we can trace 
through it, and is intelligible if we can keep in step with it, using the schemas at our 
disposal in order to coordinate the states of the system at different times. 
 
I said earlier that I would return to the rabbit at its burrow entrance. What makes 
that case non-banal is that we cannot actually claim to know that the rabbit at the entrance 
was a rabbit when it was in the depths of the burrow. It may have been a dragon, and the 
burrow may not be what we suppose either; these things are matters of belief. But we get 
through life by making hosts of assumptions, on the basis of what seems most likely and 
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most consistent with our perceptions, memories and various interpretative schemas. We 
imagine – as a matter of cognitive parsimony – that before we saw it at the entrance the 
rabbit was in the burrow, being a rabbit. Hence we do not interpret its appearance as an 
instance of any technically interesting sense of emergence.  
 
Emergence, simulation and epistemic prostheses 
 
These rather sketchy ideas about schemas, simulation and expectation provide a 
basis for thinking about emergence. In a nutshell, the concept of emergence can be seen as 
pertaining to phenomena that we have difficulty connecting with initial or underlying 
conditions. The difficulty arises when we are unable to find or construct a causal schema 
that fits the case, and when we describe something as emergent one of the things we are 
doing, in effect, is providing a report on our own cognitive state: we are acknowledging 
that we lack the cognitive resources to trace through, see connections within, or simulate 
the causal structure of some aspect of the world.82 It may be that the requisite 
representations are too complex, for example because they contain more adjustable 
parameters than we are capable of manipulating simultaneously (because working memory 
becomes overloaded, perhaps). Or, as with the simple chaotic oscillator, behaviour evolves 
in ways that we are unable to parallel adequately in folk physical or other imaginable terms 
because we cannot represent or manipulate the physically important quantities in a 
sufficiently precise manner. An analogy is with the generation of an exception by a 
computer program, and we can of course speculate about the nature of the exception-
raising mechanism(s). Perhaps it is simply not possible to derive a viable causal schema on 
the basis of what is known about the phenomena – there is nothing for a putative simulator 
to ‘run’. On the other hand maybe a schema can be found, but when run it ‘crashes’ the 
simulator because of inconsistencies of some kind. The possibilities seem limited mainly by 
our ingenuity at constructing psychological models.  
 
Whatever the psychological facts, we can say that to the extent that we can see how 
they arise, we tend not to think of phenomena as emergent. We can see how phenomena 
arise if we can access causal schemas that are compatible with our cognitive constraints. 
                                                 
82 Perhaps Nagel’s cosmogonic sense of emergence (p.133) can be understood in terms of an inability to 
foresee the consequences of causal structure, often on account of highly contingent and non-linear relations 
amongst events, while many other uses of the term advert to an inability to model the causal connections 
between observed outcomes and prior or underlying conditions. An additional constraint on this kind of 
ascription of a non-cosmogonic sense of emergence to a phenomenon may be commitment to the idea that 
all the relevant causal factors lie within a particular spatiotemporal range. 
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And such schemas can be pretty rough-and-ready yet still be conducive to a sense of 
understanding if by entertaining them we can avoid leaving glaring explanatory gaps. (See 
Keil (2003) for discussion of our ability to ‘paper over the cracks’ in our understanding.) 
This kind of perspective does not provide an objective, observer-independent method of 
classifying phenomena as emergent or not. Instead it suggests that if different individuals 
categorize in the same way then it is because they share the same perceptual and cognitive 
propensities and capacities – and because they share similar sensitivities to linguistic and 
conceptual cultural conventions.  
 
Ontological emergence 
 
An objection to the perspective just presented is that it seems to cast emergence in 
an entirely epistemic light, inasmuch as emergence attributions are seen to be made in 
accordance with a psychological criterion. But this is not to say that emergent phenomena 
have no ontological grounding, if we grant that ontological weight is conferred by the 
possession of irreducible causal capacities (Silberstein and McGeever 1999, p.182). Here we 
should think back to the discussion of molecular dynamics (MD) simulations in Chapter 3. 
Imagine that one could perform a colossal MD simulation in which there were polypeptide 
chains, DNA, water molecules, and so on and so forth. Imagine too that we could run the 
simulation for as long as we liked, with time steps as small as we liked, and employing 
completely accurate interatomic potential functions, realistic control of thermodynamic 
parameters, etc. Given these provisos we would presumably expect that, ceteris paribus, the 
polypeptide chains would fold into native protein structures, and maybe we would actually 
see them binding to the DNA.  
 
This example may be far-fetched, but it is not absurd. The point is that such a 
simulation – which I take it amounts to a virtual re-enactment of what we suppose happens 
in the physical world – would presumably give rise to evidence for equivalents of many of 
the causal capacities we would expect to see manifested by this kind of molecular system. 
An important qualification is that the results would be subject to the limitations imposed 
by the simulation’s boundedness, to acknowledge the possibility of downward/inward 
causation. Sometimes, for some phenomena to be generated, the spatial bounds will have 
to be set so large as to make simulation over anything exceeding extremely small times 
scales impracticable. And an MD simulation would only go so far in mimicking reality, 
since it would not without suitable modification model the occurrence of chemical 
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reactions involving covalent bond breaking and making. To do that would (I take it) require 
the incorporation of quantum mechanical theory into the simulation, and even a very small 
simulated system might exhaust currently available computational resource. (It might even 
be that the only practicable system for modelling a particular physical system would be the 
physical system itself.) If we imagine that we had all the computational resource we needed, 
we generally reckon (I suggest) that scientific theory would enable the simulation of the 
molecular events that occur in biological systems. Thus we have confidence in our 
theoretical understanding, even though we cannot foresee what phenomena the über-
simulation we are envisaging would generate (just as it rapidly becomes hard – and then 
impossible – to foresee future cell configurations in a Game of Life from knowledge of the 
current state and Conway’s rules as the number of cells increases).  
 
Mark Bedau has developed a computationally informed account of weak emergence, 
and it is interesting to compare it with the ideas about emergence sketched here. A 
phenomenon is weakly emergent, according to Bedau, if it can be predicted only by 
simulation.  
 
If P is weakly emergent, it is constituted by, and generated from, the system’s 
underlying microdynamic, whether or not we know anything about this. Our need to 
use a simulation is due neither to the current contingent state of our knowledge nor 
to some specifically human limitation or frailty. Although a Laplacian supercalculator 
would have a decisive advantage over us in simulation speed, she would still need to 
simulate. Underivability without simulation is a purely formal notion concerning the 
existence and nonexistence of certain kinds of derivations of macrostates from a 
system’s underlying dynamic. 
(Bedau 1997, p.379) 
 
In a recent paper Bedau attempts to go further and show that emergent phenomena are 
‘real and objective phenomena’ (Bedau 2008). If they are ‘just in the mind’, as he puts it, 
then emergent phenomena ‘are not real and objective phenomena; they have no 
independent ontological existence; they have no independent causal power, they have no 
objective reality outside the mind’ (Bedau 2008, p.444). He argues that emergence arises 
from when the network of micro-causal interactions on which macro-level phenomena 
depend becomes sufficiently complex that no formal short-cuts exist for deriving the 
macro from the micro: 
 
weak emergence results from incompressible macro-level structure in the network 
of micro-level causal connections. This causal web is embodied and brought to life 
in real ontological substances with real causal powers, and it really generates certain 
macro-level ontological and causal phenomena.  
(Bedau 2008, p.451) 
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Hence ‘weak emergence is not merely in the mind’ (p.457), which for Bedau is equivalent 
to saying that it is not merely epistemological (p.451).  
 
Bedau’s position and mine overlap substantially, although it should be obvious that 
he is much more disinclined than I am to say that emergence reflects our cognitive 
limitations. And the position against which he musters his argument, which is the view that 
emergence might be considered to be ‘merely in the mind’, has something of the character 
of a straw man. Surely no one ever thought that emergent phenomena were just in the 
mind? For if they were merely in the mind then they would amount to little more than 
fantasies or delusions, and we might never agree amongst ourselves about what looks 
emergent. If emergence were just in the mind presumably anything could look emergent, 
which is plainly not the case. We apply the term to particular phenomena, and the problem 
is to understand the basis on which we pick out some phenomena and not others. I have 
already noted the extreme ontological diversity of emergent phenomena, which ranges 
variously across properties, structures, dynamics, behaviours, patterns, and laws. This is 
potentially a problem for Bedau’s account: as he notes, his interpretation of the phrase 
‘weak emergence’ does not apply to some of the phenomena that have been described as 
weakly emergent by others (p.445, n6). He also grants that complexity-related weak 
emergence is a matter of degree (p.447). But in this case one has to ask what determines 
the point along the ontological scale – if indeed there is some unitary scale – at which we 
switch from not seeing emergence to seeing emergence.  
 
My proposal is that the principal basis on which we pick out emergent phenomena 
is a negative one: an inability cognitively to model a pattern of entailment within a system. 
When the complexity of a phenomenon in some respect exceeds a particular level, our 
cognitive schemas become incapable of tracking or paralleling its causal structure (or as 
Bedau might put it, they become insufficient for ‘crawling the micro-causal web’ (Bedau 
2008, p.446)). This is when we see emergence. A virtue of my account is that it provides the 
means to account for the attribution of emergence to radically different kinds of 
phenomena, in respect of which no ontological unity need exist. This will be so if making 
sense of the causal structure of phenomena involves multiple sorts of cognitive resource, 
working either in tandem or independently. Imagine that causal comprehension of a 
phenomenon of ontological kind P1 necessarily draws on cognitive resource C1, while 
comprehension of phenomena of ontological kind P2 draws on resource C2. Then P1 will 
look emergent if the capacity of C1 is exceeded, and P2 will look emergent if C2 is likewise 
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over-stretched. But note that P1 and P2 need have nothing in common, ontologically 
speaking.  Such an account has both epistemic and ontic aspects, in that we classify certain 
phenomena as emergent because of how their objective physical natures interact with our 
psychological capacities. The emergence attributions of others are intelligible to us when 
we make sense of the causal structure of the world using the same or similar cognitive 
schemas. 
 
I also think that Bedau is mistaken (1) to downplay the epistemic status of 
simulation, as he appears to do in his (1997) when he argues that the Laplacian 
supercalculator ‘would still need to simulate’, and (2) to objectify (‘a purely formal notion’) 
the nature of ‘certain kinds of derivations’. I take the latter to be primarily logico-
mathematical derivations, which as he argues are unobtainable in the case of emergent 
phenomena. I suggest, however, that we simply do not know enough about mathematical 
cognition to base an argument on the idea that there is a class of phenomena in the world 
involving relations that are amenable to formal treatment and another class involving 
relations that are not so amenable, and on the idea that the amenability in question is a 
mind-independent matter. Logico-mathematical reasoning is presumably underpinned by 
neural processes that correlate with particular patterns of thought, and as a contingent 
matter these cognitive entailment structures or schemas are capable of (and useful for) 
paralleling particular phenomena in the world or expressing relationships between them. 
But the contingency is key to the present case: it is again whether or not we have schemas 
that are projectible onto phenomena in the world that determines how we individuate and 
classify those phenomena.  
 
A jointly epistemic and ontic account of emergence along the lines proposed here is 
not necessarily incompatible with the possibility of developing a less ‘internalist’ account of 
emergence (i.e. one framed in more exclusively mind-independent terms), based perhaps 
on some agreed causal complexity metric. But it seems unlikely that, programmed with 
such an account, some sort of automated system analyser would diagnose emergence in 
just those circumstances where humans tend to see emergence. For these are situations in 
which a phenomenon arises in a way that we are incapable of simulating or modelling on 
the basis of causal schemas that I suggest are numerous, diverse, and not necessarily 
systematically related to each other. 
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7. Functional attributions and the causal status of  
the genome 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Attention was drawn in the previous chapter to the complexity of the relationships 
that sometimes hold between ontology and epistemology, for in it I argued for an account 
of emergence framed jointly in ontic and epistemic terms. If I am right then the 
phenomenon can be seen as arising from the way in which how things are in the world 
interacts with our psychological constitution. This means that emergence as we experience 
it may be deemed a largely epistemological matter, yet reassuringly it is at the same time not 
without any ontological basis.  
 
In this chapter the accent remains on the metaphysics of biological explanation. 
The principal topic is the nature of functional attribution, which I investigate by 
considering the causal status of the genome. The classic view, which has structured work in 
molecular biology for roughly five decades, is often identified with the ‘Central Dogma’ 
proposed by Francis Crick, which in its original formulation states that 
 
once ‘information’ has passed into protein it cannot get out again. In more detail, the 
transfer of information from nucleic acid to nucleic acid, or from nucleic acid to 
protein may be possible, but transfer from protein to protein, or from protein to 
nucleic acid is impossible. Information means here the precise determination of 
sequence, either of bases in the nucleic acid or of amino acid residues in the 
protein. 
(Crick 1958, p.153; italics in original) 
 
The Dogma, it can be argued, encourages the view that DNA is the dominant causal player 
in the life of the cell and the organism. The idea is that DNA segments called genes store 
information that flows outwards from the genome to direct and structure cellular events in 
order to realise certain phenotypic outcomes. A relatively straightforward correspondence 
between genes and phenotypic features or traits is assumed – or in other words there are 
genes ‘for’ traits. On this kind of basis some have attempted to place the molecular gene at 
the heart of a comprehensive biological worldview (Dawkins 1976). 
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In recent decades, however, genocentric perspectives on biological causation have 
increasingly been called into question (e.g. Strohman 1994; Moss 2003; Van Regenmortel 
2004; Carrier and Finzer 2006; Morange 2006b). Quite what the concept of the gene 
equates to materially has come to look problematic (Stotz, Griffiths and Knight 2004), and 
it is increasingly clear that the relationship between individual genes (when we can decide 
what they are) and particular phenotypic traits is complex. Associated with these 
developments in biological understanding and consequential doubts about genetic 
determinism has been the rise of new perspectives on biological causation such as 
developmental systems theory (DST) (Oyama et al. 2001). DST’s proponents see the 
genome as merely one causal agent amongst many: it is the collective interaction of 
multiple and diverse organismic and environmental structures, processes and agencies that 
generates biological phenomena. Therefore it is argued that accounts of biological 
explanation must be even-handed as regards the assignment of causal responsibility.  
 
A strategy for combating the idea that causal primacy resides in the genome, and 
one that is often employed by those sympathetic to DST-style approaches to biological 
explanation, is to call into question the utility or even the sense of information talk in 
biology. It is argued that to the extent that information concepts can be clearly formulated 
they are as applicable to non-genetic entities and processes as to genetic ones. The project 
of eradicating information talk from biology is part of a broader approach that could be 
termed ‘metaphysical abstinence’. I suggest that the price of such abstinence is, for many 
purposes, explanatory impotence. Biological explanations are typically freighted with 
examples of functional attributions that go beyond what is physically given, and (relatedly) 
frequently they involve perspectivism, or epistemic stance-taking on the basis of what is 
effective for knowledge-building within a particular kind of context. I explore the idea that 
when biologists use information talk in relation to the genome they are engaged in the 
attribution of function in an explanatory but metaphysically laden way. One of my 
conclusions is that information talk does not necessarily commit one to an unacceptably 
strong form of genetic determinism. I argue that it is possible to view genomic involvement 
in cellular processes as representing something akin to information processing, but to do so 
while emphasizing the causal parity of genomic and extra-genomic factors and the tightness 
of the coupling between them. I also outline another perspective on the informational 
genome, according to which it can be viewed as a device for storing – often only very 
approximately – details about an organism’s phenotype. This is not what the genome is 
‘for’ as such, but given certain patterns of material organization and change (within 
organisms and across lineages of organisms) the functional schema of genome-as-storage-
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device is often capable of framing phenomena in molecular and cell biology in an 
explanatory way.  
 
Functions in biology 
 
I suggested in Chapter 1 that a significant difference between biological 
explanations and explanations in the physical sciences is that the former tend to make 
heavier use of functional terminology and concepts than the latter (Hempel 1965, p.297; 
Ruse 2000). Finding effective strategies for decomposing and localizing functions in 
complex systems such as the cell constitutes a major element of biological research, and 
frequently presents the researcher with major practical and conceptual challenges (Bechtel 
and Richardson 1993). Certainly it is not hard to find evidence of biologists’ interest in 
attributing functions to biological structures and processes, sometimes on a somewhat 
metaphorical basis. A recent example is the description of a photosynthetic pigment–
protein complex, the Fenna–Matthews–Olson (FMO) complex, as ‘a rectifier for 
unidirectional energy flow from the peripheral light-harvesting antenna to the reaction 
center complex’ (Ishizaki and Fleming 2009). A rectifier is a component commonly found 
in electrical power supplies that converts alternating current to direct current in virtue of 
the fact that the diodes from which it is made prevent current from flowing in one 
direction but permit it to flow in the other. Another example comes from a paper reporting 
the development of an accurate mathematical model of the aspartate-derived amino-acid 
pathway in plants (Curien et al. 2009). The authors highlight in the abstract of the paper a 
‘crucial result’: ‘the identification of allosteric interactions whose function is not to couple 
demand and supply but to maintain a high independence between fluxes in competing 
pathways’. In other words to identify the functions, qua causal roles, played by processes in 
their systemic context is frequently an important research objective. 
 
Why should function talk be abundant in biology while in physics it is rare if not 
entirely absent? I suggested in Chapter 1 that the answer probably lies in the more 
abstracted character of the latter. I conjectured that in general the ontological elements 
(particles, laws, properties, and so on) discovered or postulated by physicists are not ‘for’ 
anything in particular, are functionless, because they are conceived as being fundamental 
and universal, and hence are viewed in a context-independent way. Biologists on the other 
hand are interested in a subset of the specific material configurations that do occur under 
terrestrial conditions, and when talking about such systems it often proves possible and 
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explanatorily useful to associate particular parts and processes with specific causal roles 
within a system, i.e. with functions in Wouters’ function2 sense (as discussed in Chapter 2).  
This style of usage is underwritten by implicit counterfactual possibilities regarding what 
would happen in the absence of the system component in question. So it is common when 
considering the cell to explicate its contents (structures and processes) in terms of the 
functional roles they perform. Sometimes this is done through metaphor, as illustrated by 
the example above from the recent literature. We speak of mitochondria as the 
‘powerhouses’ of the cell, since they produce ‘fuel’ in the form of ATP molecules; the 
cytoskeletal proteins are said to act as a molecular scaffold; lysosomes perform recycling 
and waste disposal functions; DNA polymerase functions as a chromosome replicator; 
potential examples are legion. More controversially, it has for several decades been 
conventional to think of the nucleus as the control centre of the (eukaryotic) cell, and of 
the genome it contains as an information store that bears the instructions needed to make 
the cell – and indeed the host organism – operate correctly. What is the nature of the link 
between genome-related information talk and biological causation? Does the ascription of 
informational properties to the genome necessarily imply that it has causal priority over 
events and processes? These are the questions I shall address after first reviewing some of 
the relevant historical background. 
 
The determining genome 
 
Much contemporary molecular and cell biology accords to the genome very high 
status as a locus of causal power in the cell, and for the past half century this power has 
been understood to reside primarily in genes construed as discrete molecular entities. The 
concept of the gene was initially understood not materially, however, but more abstractly in 
terms of the transmission of traits from adult organisms to their offspring. Through the 
work of H.J. Muller and others in the early years of the twentieth century it gradually 
became clear that the inheritance of traits was somehow bound up with the chromosomes, 
but for some time it was unclear whether genes were to be identified materially with the 
protein or nucleic acid component of the chromosomes. (Avery published results in 1943 
which indicated that it is the latter that has genetic significance, but even this did not 
completely overcome entrenched beliefs in favour of proteins (Morange 2000, chapter 3).) 
In 1953, famously, Watson and Crick worked out the structure of DNA, and this 
breakthrough gave rise to the research programme with which molecular biology would be 
pre-occupied in the following decade: the elucidation of the molecular basis of gene action. 
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It became clear that the distinctive causal properties of the genome are indeed associated 
largely with the sequence of the DNA base pairs, inasmuch as genetic differences 
correspond to differences of sequence.  
 
Many aspects of molecular biology’s early disciplinary character can be attributed to 
the influx of physicists to biology that took place after the Second World War (Keller 
1990). Schrödinger’s 1944 monograph ‘What is Life?’ was an important influence on some 
of those who would become the new discipline’s leading figures (Watson 1966/2007, 
p.239), for in it he brought the theoretical approach of the physicist, and persuasive 
reasoning about quantum mechanics and thermodynamics, to bear on fundamental 
biological problems such as heredity and biological organization. Especially significant was 
his proposal that the chromosomes contained ‘some kind of code-script’: 
 
It is these chromosomes, or probably only an axial skeleton fibre of what we 
actually see under the microscope as the chromosome, that contain in some kind of 
code-script the entire pattern of the individual’s future development and of its 
functioning in the mature state. ... In calling the structure of the chromosome fibres 
a code-script we mean that the all-penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to 
which every causal connection lay immediately open, could tell from their structure 
whether the egg would develop, under suitable conditions, into a black cock or a 
speckled hen, into a fly or a maize plant, a rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a 
woman. ... But the term code-script is, of course, too narrow. The chromosome 
structures are at the same time instrumental in bringing about the development they 
foreshadow. They are law-code and executive power – or, to use another simile 
[sic], they are architect’s plan and builder’s craft – in one. 
(Schrödinger 1944, p.22-23) 
 
The ‘axial skeleton fibre’ would of course later turn out to be DNA (even if the structural 
organization of the chromosomes owes as much or more to histone proteins). It is hard to 
disagree with those to whom the idea that the genome ‘contains ... the entire pattern of the 
individual’s future development’ appears excessively preformationist, or in other words 
appears to attribute to the genome the power to specify an organism’s form (Moss 2003). 
(Although it might be argued that the term ‘code-script’ is somewhat ambiguous.) Another 
source of difficulty is the idea of the Laplacian ‘all-penetrating mind’ (APM) and how that 
is to be conceived. If such a mind were able to comprehend a snap-shot of all the particles 
in the universe, and were cognisant too of their properties and relevant facts about their 
instantaneous dynamics, then could it not track the future development of the universe, 
‘the individual’s future development’ included? Following that line of thought soon leads to 
difficulties concerning deterministic chaos and the corresponding necessity to store 
infinitely long representations of numerical quantities. Or, given that a particulate view of 
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the universe is physically unrealistic, we are confronted with the issues concerning 
indeterminism that are associated with understanding of the quantum mechanical 
phenomena that occur at what relative to us we regard as the microlevel. It must be 
assumed that the APM is introduced here then merely as a conveniently suggestive device 
for talking about the way in which a series of events unfolds. But even leaving quantum 
mechanical indeterminacy to one side the device as invoked is deeply problematic: we need 
to know much more about the amount of information regarding context the APM takes 
into account, and how it does so, as it attempts to determine from the structure of the 
code-script how the egg would develop. 
 
Ambiguities notwithstanding, the tendency amongst philosophers of biology has 
been to see the quoted passage as representing a strong form of genetic determinism, and 
this interpretation has the virtue of being compatible with the strong impact the essay made 
on a number of future molecular biologists, amongst them Watson. For if genes were such 
powerful determinants of organismic development and function then they were of course a 
highly attractive object of study for ambitious proto-biologists. The conflation of 
developmental and mature-functional roles for the genome that Schrödinger envisaged can 
be related to a more subtle point about the involvement of gene action in cell processes. 
He saw causal direction as being relevant as much to mature function (which can be 
thought of as metabolism) as to development because the mature state is not a fixed 
structure – a configurationally invariant destination towards which dynamic developmental 
processes proceed – but rather must be thought of as a dynamic process in its own right. 
This is what Schrödinger makes clear elsewhere in the essay when he discusses the way in 
which the organism avoids ‘the rapid decay into the inert state of “equilibrium”’ (p.75) by 
feeding on ‘negative entropy’ through metabolism. This rather abstract conception of life in 
terms of the establishment and control of particular kinds of thermodynamic process by 
physical structures was no doubt of immense appeal to the early post-war molecular 
biologists whose backgrounds lay in the physical sciences. It reinforced the conviction 
amongst some of them that biology would be amenable to, and even demanded, a new 
more theoretical way of thinking about biological problems. 
 
Schrödinger’s idea of a hereditary code-script located within the chromosomes 
resonated strongly with ideas that developed in the 1940s and 1950s and which were 
associated with developments in computing that followed the ground-breaking pre-war and 
war work of such figures as Alan Turing and John von Neumann (Hodges 1983/1992; Kay 
2000). New computational possibilities stimulated the development of new fields such as 
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cybernetics (Wiener 1948; Pask 1961) and information theory. In relation to the latter the 
exposition by Shannon and Weaver of the ‘Mathematical Theory of Communication’ 
(MTOC for short) was especially influential (Shannon and Weaver 1949). The concepts of 
cybernetics and information theory shaped research in a number of areas, but in biology 
they can be seen, in certain respects, to have pulled in opposite directions. MTOC 
described the properties of an abstract model communication system consisting essentially 
of a transmitter emitting a signal via a channel to a receiver. This abstract linear schema was 
simple enough to admit of formal mathematical treatment, allowing MTOC to talk in 
quantitative terms about the relationships between information, channel capacity, noise and 
so on. Cybernetics on the other hand dealt with the behavioural characteristics of non-
linear systems featuring looping causal connections. Shannon declared that their intention 
was to develop a very general model: 
 
The word communication will be used here in a very broad sense to include all of 
the procedures by which one mind may affect another. This, of course, involves 
not only written and oral speech, but also music, the pictorial arts, the theatre, the 
ballet, and in fact all human behaviour. In some connections it may be desirable to 
use a still broader definition of communication, namely, one which would include 
the procedures by means of which one mechanism  (say automatic equipment to 
track an airplane and to compute its probably future positions) affects another 
mechanism  (say a guided missile chasing this airplane). 
(Shannon and Weaver 1949/1998, p.3) 
 
But not long afterwards he says: 
 
The word information, in this theory, is used in a special sense that must not be 
confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be confused 
with meaning.  
(p.8) 
 
The special sense referred to relates to the statistical properties of a signal in the context of 
a set of possible signals. Specifically, information is equated with a quantity referred to as 
entropy, by analogy with thermodynamics (Shannon and Weaver 1949/1998, p.12). 
 
Other factors besides the prominence of cybernetics and MTOC are relevant to 
understanding the relationship between biology and information concepts. For example the 
development of X-ray crystallography, the principle technique of structural molecular 
biology, took place in tandem with (and depended on) that of computing, on account of its 
propensity to generate large quantities of numerical data and the requirement to process 
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that data mathematically (de Chadarevian 2002, chapter 4; see also Powell and Dupré 2009, 
p.58). The overall effect was that computational, informational and cryptological concepts 
and terminology were familiar to many scientists of the 1950s, molecular biologists 
included. It seemed possible to view DNA as the molecular realization of something akin 
to Schrödinger’s code-script, and informational language provided molecular biologists like 
Francis Crick and Sydney Brenner with a way of distinguishing their outlook from that of 
biochemists. Brenner later noted how 
 
... in the early days of molecular biology, it was an evangelical movement. Most 
people were against us. Most of the biochemists didn’t understand the nature of the 
problems that we thought were interesting and important. They had a completely 
different set of attitudes. ... I can remember meetings at which it was impossible to 
get across to people the idea that the most important thing in protein synthesis was 
how the order of the amino acids got established. They said, ‘That’s not the 
important problem. The important problem is, where does the energy come from 
to join the amino acids?’ Well, we have written, on many occasions, that the 
sequence is the important thing, and never mind the energy, it’ll look after itself. 
And really, this is what this part of molecular biology brought. It said that the flow 
of information can be studied at the chemical level. I don’t think biochemists 
actually understood the importance of information at that level. It wasn’t 
information theory, it was the flow of messages, and we tried to seek for 
explanation in terms of the molecules. 
(Brenner, in Wolpert and Richards, 1988, pp.101-2) 
 
It was the spirit of the new computing-related fields that informed the molecular 
biologists’ use of informational terminology more than the original technical senses of the 
relevant concepts (Kay 1997). (As Brenner himself notes, the informational language of 
molecular biology ‘wasn’t information theory’.) Despite the ingenious schemes devised by 
figures such as Gamov, cryptological concepts proved to be of only limited relevance to 
genetic biology, although of course simple correspondence relations were found to underlie 
the encoding of the amino acid sequences of proteins by nucleic acid sequences (Kay 
2000). With the elucidation of the basic mechanisms of gene expression – transcription of 
DNA into RNA and translation of RNA into proteins – Crick was able to encapsulate the 
informational perspective succinctly in terms of the Central Dogma and the Sequence 
Hypothesis (Crick 1958). It is of course the latter, discussed in Chapter 3, to which Brenner 
is referring in the above passage.  
 
The Central Dogma and Sequence Hypothesis together constituted the theoretical 
foundation of molecular biology. The Central Dogma asserts that information flows from 
DNA to RNA to protein, and once there it cannot pass back again into the DNA. Exactly 
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what is meant by information in this context is not spelt out, however. The information of 
the Dogma is often conflated with causation or causal power, and indeed it is clear that the 
spirit if not the letter of the Dogma is that the important causal vectors governing cell 
processes run from DNA to the rest of the cell rather than in the reverse direction. 
(Arguably, the concept of a message is basically causal, and the term ‘messenger RNA’ 
trades on this.) Since its original formulation a number of discoveries have shown the 
Dogma to be not entirely exceptionless. Retroviruses possess the means to incorporate 
their RNA into DNA host genomes, and methylation of DNA base pairs can be seen as 
constituting an epigenetic inheritance mechanism, i.e. a mechanism capable of modulating 
genomic contents and stabilizing particular epigenetic cell configurations across 
generations. Nonetheless if the Central Dogma is interpreted narrowly in terms of the 
template-driven specification of protein structure from sequence then it clearly contains an 
important kernel of truth (Šustar 2007). 
 
Ambiguities to do with the meaning of informational terminology, and the 
conflation of information with causation, have been important aspects of genetic 
determinism. By this last term I mean the thesis that there are things called genes and that 
these direct the development, behaviour and other phenotypic characteristics of an 
organism. Concomitant with this is the belief that for any particular trait there is likely to be 
a straightforward genetic explanation.83 Preformationism, the doctrine that an organism’s 
form is encoded in its genome, represents an extreme manifestation of genetic 
determinism. A point to note is that genetic determinism is inevitably in part about scale 
and the direction of causation, since the genome is localized within the cell to the nucleus 
(in eukaryotic cells) and in any case, to a first approximation, to the DNA. Causal influence, 
so the story goes, radiates outwards from genetic structures located on the chromosomes 
to the cell cytoplasm and (in metazoans) thence – for what amount to mereological reasons 
– to the macroscopic organism as it interacts with the world. This (to recapitulate some 
ideas discussed in Chapter 1) is reductionist in two senses: in terms of the dependence of 
the macro on the micro, and also as regards the emphasis the account places on the role of 
a single kind of factor (i.e. the genetic) in explaining the phenotypic characteristics of 
organisms. It is also worth noting that while normally defined in terms of the action of 
genes, the status and even existence of genes could be disputed while not denying genetic 
determinism, if it were re-defined in terms of the causal primacy of a cell’s DNA 
                                                 
83 Sometimes the traits in question are capacities of various kinds, e.g. for evolvability, or – as often posited 
by evolutionary psychologists – psychological dispositions to act in particular ways.  
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component. This point becomes potentially important as the concept of the gene becomes 
more complex and problematic (Griffiths and Neumann-Held 1999; Morange 2001). 
Information talk 
 
Because of its associations with genetic determinism and preformationism the 
‘information talk’ introduced into biology by molecular biologists by way of the Central 
Dogma has become a particular focus for anti-reductionist criticism. The idea that DNA is 
informational remains pervasive, however, despite the qualifications to the Dogma that 
have been necessitated by findings in the very field it helped to define (Maynard Smith 
2000; Nurse 2008). How can we make sense of the ubiquity of information talk in biology, 
and what is its explanatory import? Is it possible to maintain that genes and genomes play 
informational roles whilst acknowledging that many biological processes in which they 
participate, such as organismic development, depend on the interplay of a variety of causes, 
many of them non-genetic / non-genomic? The question probably appears to most 
biologists to be largely rhetorical, but nevertheless it seems important to be able to 
demonstrate the coherence of the position of one who wishes to answer it in the 
affirmative.  
 
A route into debates about information talk in biology is provided by looking at 
what sometimes, in the guise of DST (developmental systems theory), is advanced as a 
contrasting perspective. DST has been described as an attempt to do biology without the 
dichotomies of nature or nurture, genes or environment, biology or culture, and as not so 
much a theory as ‘a general theoretical perspective on development, heredity and evolution, 
a framework both for conducting scientific research and for understanding the broader 
significance of research findings’ (Oyama, Griffiths and Gray 2001, pp.1-2). A core 
principle of DST is that causes should be seen within their systemic contexts. Causal 
responsibility for biological phenomena is typically seen as being distributed across multiple 
entities and processes, and rarely (DST proponents tend to argue) can causal primacy be 
attached to a single class of entity or process. Griffiths and Gray (2005) note how ‘DST 
stresses the delicate dependence (‘contingency’) of development on a rich matrix of factors 
‘outside’ the genome’ (p.419). There are hints here of a rather holistic perspective on 
biological causation (Godfrey-Smith 2001, p.289). The status of information talk in biology 
plays an important part in DST-related debates, since the idea of the informational gene, as 
well as being associated with preformationism (Moss 2003), is regarded by some as 
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representing the privileging of genetic causes in biological processes such as development. 
The editors of the canonical articulation of DST perspectives state that 
 
We believe that the heuristic value of the idea of developmental information in 
certain contexts is more than outweighed by its misleading connotations. Locating 
information in a single type of developmental resource obscures the context-
dependency of causation by localizing control. 
(Oyama, Griffiths and Gray 2001, p.5) 
 
In his (2001) Griffiths develops the attack on information talk in order further to 
undermine the idea that genetic causation should be privileged over the other kinds of 
causal factors that impact on biological processes such as development. This is an 
exemplification of what he terms the ‘parity thesis’, which is a general thesis about 
biological causation to the effect that genetic and non-genetic factors play equally 
important parts in developmental processes (Griffiths and Knight 1998). It does not, its 
advocates argue, ‘imply that there is no difference between the particulars of the causal 
roles of genes and factors such as endosymbionts or imprinting events. It does assert that 
such differences do not justify building theories of development and evolution around a 
distinction between what genes do and what every other causal factor does’ (Oyama et al. 
2001, p.3). The purpose of the thesis is ‘to prevent these empirical differences [e.g. between 
nucleic acids and natural languages] turning into a kind of scientific metaphysics, as 
happens when genes are identified with information (or even “form”) and everything else 
in development as mere matter. This distracts attention from the many ways in which non-
genetic resources sometimes play biological roles more usually associated with genes. It also 
leads to the inappropriate lumping together of very different non-genetic resources (the 
“environment”)’ (Griffiths 2001, p.406).  
 
I shall argue that these concerns about information are misplaced, and that the 
‘particulars of the causal role of genes’ are in fact capable of supporting informational 
interpretations that are neutral on the issue of causal priority. If I succeed then the onus is 
on Griffiths to explain why information talk is so ubiquitous and why it is associated in 
particular with genetic and genomic processes. I begin by outlining, and then questioning, 
Griffiths’ position on information, before outlining an alternative position that accounts 
for the appeal of information talk.  
 
Griffiths begins his argument with the claim that ‘[g]enetic causation is interpreted 
deterministically because genes are thought to be a special kind of cause. Genes are 
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instructions – they provide information – whilst other causal factors are merely material’ 
(2001, p.395). Thinking in this way is mistaken, however, he argues. Contra Maynard Smith 
(2000), information talk in biology has a substantive basis, Griffiths contends, only when it 
adverts to the idea that there is a genetic code ‘by which the sequence of DNA bases in the 
coding regions of a gene corresponds to the sequence of amino acids in the primary 
structure of one or more proteins’. The rest of information talk in biology 
 
is on a par with the claim that the planets compute their orbits around the sun or 
that the economy computes an efficient distribution of goods and resources. It is a 
way to talk about correlation that, in some cases, allows a useful application of the 
mathematical theory of communication and in others plays no theoretical role but 
merely reflects the current cultural prominence of information technology. 
(Griffiths 2001, p.395) 
 
Thus important aspects of Griffiths’ position are the strong distinction he draws 
between metaphor and theory, and the disparaging view he holds of the former. If genes 
and genomes are informational in only a metaphorical sense then they are not really 
informational, it is implied.84 Yet this kind of claim is at odds with the intuition one might 
have that a metaphor, or indeed any sort of analogy (I take it that it makes sense to think of 
metaphors as especially abstract analogies or similarity-stressing comparisons), will have 
explanatory value just in case it establishes a correlation of some kind between features of 
the object to which it is applied and features of the object that is the metaphor’s basis. If 
what we are interested in is scientific explanation then analogical relationships may be 
rather important, and it is not obvious a priori that our explanatory practices do not 
depend heavily on the possibility of pointing out such relationships. Merely to reflect ‘the 
current cultural prominence of information technology’ may be of considerable epistemic 
value. A second but related worry is that the distinction between metaphor and theory is in 
any case overdone. Theories are idealizations, and so the resemblance between a particular 
empirical phenomenon and the theory that is regarded as its best scientific characterization 
may be somewhat tenuous.  
 
If biological information talk is to be given a theoretical footing then the choice, 
Griffiths argues, is between two major alternative conceptions of information: causal 
interpretations (with MTOC usually being regarded as the prime exemplar) and semantic 
(or intentional) construals. Concerning the latter, there is widespread agreement that the 
only viable options are so-called teleosemantic accounts, in which biological meaning is 
                                                 
84 Levy (2007) argues that information can be understood in biological contexts as an explanatory metaphor. 
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cashed out in terms of evolutionarily selected function (Millikan 1984). A signal S carries a 
certain meaning M for an S-detecting system, for example, if it is in virtue of S having been 
interpreted to mean M that the S-detecting system has survived to the present day. 
(Systems that treat S as meaning something other than M are winnowed out by natural 
selection. If S indicates ‘big and stripy with pointed teeth’ and this is taken – or not – to 
mean M ‘a tiger that might eat me’ then it is easy to see in principle how this might work.) 
As this sort of example hints at, information in this teleosemantic sense can be associated 
with many things besides genes and genomes. But I am in any case sceptical that when 
biologists talk about genetic information they are appealing to a sense that is freighted with 
semantic burdens of an intentional kind. Rather, such meaning as might be implied I take 
to relate to causality rather than intentionality. A number of significant pitfalls attend the 
explication of this causal sense of aboutness, however.  
 
One rather simplistic proposal for what it is to say that a gene G is ‘about’ (or 
‘means’) a particular phenotypic feature P is that statistically, in a particular cellular or 
organismic context85,  
 
(A) the occurrence of G correlates with the occurrence of P and the non-
occurrence of G correlates with the non-occurrence of P (i.e. [if G then P] & [if 
~G then ~P]), 
 
or  
 
(B) the occurrence of G correlates with the non-occurrence of P and the non-
occurrence of G correlates with the occurrence of P (i.e. [if G then ~P] & [if ~G 
then P]). 
 
The idea here is that for any given G and P, only (A) or (B) can hold if we are to say that G 
and P are meaningfully related. The need to cater for both patterns of correlation, direct 
and inverse, arises from the different molecular causal possibilities that can potentially arise. 
Some phenotypic traits depend on the presence of particular molecule-dependent 
functions, and these functions will be disrupted if the relevant kinds of molecules are 
absent or are dysfunctionally abnormal. An example would be the requirement for a 
particular kind of enzyme to be present to catalyse a specific reaction. This would conform 
                                                 
85 One could add environmental context here, but the environment generally affects gene action through its 
effects at the molecular and cellular levels so it is redundant. 
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to (A) above. Other traits may require the absence of certain kinds of molecule. The 
presence of a gene coding for an inhibitor of the enzyme just mentioned, for example, 
would abolish the P in question (as per (B) above). (There is a parallel here with the 
negative account of emergence given in the previous chapter, in that sometimes interest 
centres on phenomena that arise as a result of what is missing rather than what is present – 
the relevant causal schemas in the case of emergence, an absence of the relevant molecules 
in the case of some phenotypic outcomes.)  
 
Complicating this simple picture are possibilities for multiple realizability (Fodor 
1974): different genes can give rise to the same phenotypic outcome, and similar outcomes 
can arise in very different ways. If a certain cellular function depends on the formation of a 
complex of six proteins, say, then the absence or abnormality of any of the six might 
abolish the function associated with the complex. On the other hand several different 
variants of one of the proteins may exist, each encoded by a different gene and each 
capable of forming a functional complex with the other five proteins.  
 
However, even this more qualified picture cannot be the complete story concerning 
a causal sense in which a gene could be said to be ‘about’ a phenotypic feature, or even the 
major part of it, since it is agnostic about the direction of causality between G and P (i.e. P 
because G, but also – mistakenly on a causal basis, even in the absence of possibilities for 
multiple realizability – G because P). The account must be supplemented by a belief 
component, to the effect that such correlations as may be apparent are taken to be 
underpinned by a molecular narrative spanning G and P. This asserts that in principle there 
is a causal-mechanical account to be given of how, in a particular set of circumstances, G 
gives rise to P by participating in processes which potentially involve numerous causal 
factors besides G. But note that it may be untrue to say that P could not occur in the 
absence of G (again, even in the absence of possibilities for multiple realizability of the 
kind described above), for the cell might sense the effects of the lack of G and compensate 
by expressing another gene such that P does in fact result. This conclusion is at odds with 
(A) above.  
 
Moss (2003, 2006) explicates these complications in terms of his distinction 
between two senses of gene, one pertaining to phenotypic predictability (Gene-P) and the 
other to developmental processes (Gene-D). These distinct concepts can be related to the 
inverse and direct relations between DNA segments and phenotypic features discussed 
above: ‘Gene-P phenomena are based on the absence of an otherwise normal protein or 
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other resource and what bodies will predictably do, for better or for worse, in the absence 
of that normal resource’ (2006, p.529). It is the Gene-P sense that is associated with 
scenarios of type (B) above. A Gene-D (‘the sense of a gene when it is defined by a nucleic 
acid sequence that provides the template resource (or information) for some set of 
potential downstream polypeptide and/or RNA products’) on the other hand is 
indeterminate with respect to phenotypic outcome – ‘just because between variable  
splicing, co- and post-translational modification, targeting, and many other contextual 
factors, the same Gene-D could be a contributing factor to entirely different, even 
antithetical, phenotypic outcomes’ (2006, p.529). Scenarios of type (A) above involve the 
Gene-D sense.86 
 
The upshot of all this is that although sometimes P does allow us to infer G, and G 
may correlate with P, G/P relations can be more obscure than this. Whether or not 
empirically G and P do show up as being correlated may be highly context-dependent, and 
associations between G and P may not be readily apparent (Rosenberg 1985). Sometimes it 
is only when large-scale studies are conducted, and the data subjected to sophisticated 
statistical analysis, that the relevant correlations are detected (see e.g., in relation to 
Alzheimer’s disease, Harold et al. 2009 and Lambert et al. 2009). 
 
Notwithstanding the complexity of genotype—phenotype relations, the possibilities 
these reflections indicate of relating the semantic to the causal have the effect of 
undercutting Griffiths’ strong dichotomy between two basic types of information account. 
(‘If there is a relationship between intentional information and causal information it is a 
complex and distant one’ (2001, p.397).) However, it should be recalled that the basis for 
Griffiths’ antipathy towards the possibility of construing genes as informational in a way 
that is inapplicable to non-genetic factors is that it is believed to lend support to the 
privileging of genetic causation. This position makes sense if information is interpreted in 
semantic terms, for it is semantic construals that are most vulnerable to charges of varying 
degrees of context-disregarding genetic determinism right up to full-blown 
preformationism. It is this that bothers Griffiths:  
 
                                                 
86A Gene-D is not necessarily indeterminate with respect to phenotypic outcome, however, despite what 
Moss asserts – just as it is not necessarily the case that ‘any gene that is a “gene for” ... would count as a 
Gene-P’, i.e. would involve the absence of a protein (Moss 2006, p.529). In other words a DNA sequence 
may be transcribed and translated to create a protein that instantiates a positive capacity, e.g. to metabolize 
compound X, and it makes sense to say that the gene is the gene for that capacity with which it positively 
correlates. Indeed Moss’ general claims about the indeterminacy of genotype—phenotype relations that he 
attempts to capture through the concepts of Gene-P and Gene-D must be seen as contingent and 
subordinate to empirical findings, rather than  as being necessary in any strong sense. 
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The intuitive notion of information is a semantic notion, carrying the implication 
that genes, unlike other causal factors, are about, or directed at, the outcomes they 
help to produce. Little wonder, then, that the gene-trait relationship seems 
intuitively more context-independent than the relationship between traits and other 
causes. 
(2001, p.396) 
 
Seen non-semantically, on the other hand, it is not clear why information cannot just be 
viewed as pertaining to a variety of causation which, whilst it might make genetic action 
distinctive in some respect or other, is not obviously inimical to the interests of the anti-
reductionist. Turning then to causal construals of information, MTOC is standardly 
appealed to as the best candidate for a full-blown theory of information, and this is a line 
from which Griffiths appears not to depart. We might thus expect MTOC to contrast 
sharply and obviously with mere metaphors, and yet the theory articulates in simple formal 
terms some highly abstract ideas. In fact it is an account so simplified and so abstract that 
there is a good case for saying that it can only ever bear an analogical relation to its 
exemplifications in actual phenomena. Moreover there is (as I shall discuss shortly) a sense, 
concerning entropy and order, in which MTOC gets things exactly the wrong way around 
when applied to genetic information. However, while these kinds of detail are important 
for an appreciation of the place of information concepts in biology they are to some extent 
incidental to understanding Griffiths’ position, the central feature of which is that 
whichever sense of information is chosen, genetic factors have the same informational 
status as a variety of non-genetic causal factors involved in development. The implication is 
that information talk is otiose and therefore dispensable. The mystery then, however, is 
why information talk is so widespread, yet is associated mostly with the genome, when 
currently elaborated information accounts are either inapplicable to biological phenomena 
or are applicable beyond the genome. I conjecture that this is a mystery that can be solved 
only by reconceptualizing information.  
 
My aim then in the remainder of the chapter is to identify and articulate a view of 
information talk that makes sense of its ubiquity in relation to genomic and genetic 
processes whilst recognising the causal parity of those and other processes and events. In 
seeking to do this I am taking seriously the possibility that information talk performs a 
useful and substantive explanatory function in molecular and cell biology, and seeing such 
putative utility as the factor that accounts for its persistence. The fact that in order to make 
themselves understood to diverse audiences it is apparently unnecessary for users of 
information talk to spell out exactly what they mean by information in the context of 
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genetic processes implies the existence of tacit inter-subjective agreement about the 
concept’s projectibility. If this common understanding is more widespread or entrenched 
than that of genetic concepts and mechanisms then information is potentially a valuable 
basis for explaining those concepts and mechanisms. The approach I shall take is to treat 
the property of being informational as a kind of functional attribution, much like many 
others that biologists routinely make (invoking such notions as control, signalling, sensing 
and so on). This promises to shift the emphasis, as with emergence in the previous chapter, 
from ontology to epistemology. Whether some new conception of information entails the 
idea that genes have causal priority will depend on its details, but prima facie, given what I 
have already said about cellular complexity (Chapters 4 and 5) and downward causation 
(Chapter 6), it seems unlikely that such an entailment will be found.  
 
Informational structures and informational roles 
 
To get started it is helpful to note how difficult it is, on reflection, to identify some 
object or class of objects that could be said to be informational in some ‘true’ or definitive 
sense. There is in fact, I suggest, no list of criteria which when fulfilled make something 
definitively the bearer of information, and there is no class of paradigmatically 
informational objects in relation to which other objects stand in some merely metaphorical 
relation as regards the bearing of information. We can probably agree, however, that music 
CDs contain information, as do novels, cookbooks, train timetables, radio broadcasts, and 
much else besides. We might say that clocks impart information, but do not contain it. The 
state of the clock watcher’s mind seems as important here as that of the information-
imparting artefact. If a clock indicates a time that is in rough agreement with our 
expectations then we presume that the time indicated by the clock is approximately the 
right time, but if there is a large discrepancy then we tend to infer that the clock is wrong 
or (depending on what grounds we have for believing the clock to be indicating the right 
time) we introspect in order to figure out why we were so mistaken about the time. We 
might think of a computer program as constituting a kind of information capable of 
directing the operations of mechanisms that act on another kind of information we refer to 
as data, and we might also note that the program can be regarded as data in the context of 
the operations specified by the computer’s operating system. This suggests a relational 
aspect to informationhood.  
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Thinking about the processes in which the information objects we commonly 
recognise as such participate leads to the thought that they usually involve the interaction 
of an interpretative or reading mechanism with the information object. As a result of the 
interaction the state of the interpretative or reading mechanism, or some other system to 
which it is coupled, changes in ways that are keyed to the nature of what is read. The state 
of what is read, on the other hand, is generally unchanged by the reading process. These 
kinds of idea in turn lead to the thought that associated with – and perhaps partially 
constitutive of – the concept of information are a variety of informational roles, including 
(besides reading / interpreting) production, storage, transmission, and transformation / 
translation. My task now is to investigate whether it makes sense to see the genome as a 
structure that fulfils informational roles such as storage and transmission.  
 
If it were to prove possible to attribute informational roles to the genome then this 
would distinguish it in functional terms from cell components that play structural (i.e. 
force-resisting) or catalytic roles, say, or those that act as containers, or sources of energy. 
My immediate working hypothesis is that the genome represents a storage device that is in 
some ways analogous to magnetic tape or some form of computer memory. This 
interpretation of the genome’s function is, some biologists may think, a rather obvious one. 
But it is philosophically interesting to see how it might work and how it squares with the 
views of those like Griffiths for whom information talk is, if not anathema, to be regarded 
with deep misgivings. I approach the concept of genome as storage device from several 
directions. The first approach is to focus on the nature of the DNA molecule, and involves 
recognising a point that has been made by a number of molecular biologists at different 
times concerning its structure. The view to which this gives rise connects with another 
informational perspective, according to which the genome participates in processes that 
stand comparison with computer algorithms. A rather different approach is to think about 
the patterns of material stability and change with which genomes are involved across 
organismic lineages. These different approaches yield subtly different, but related, pictures 
of the genome as a storage device, and separately as well as jointly these are compatible 
with, and go a long way towards making sense of, information talk in biology. In addition, 
and significantly, I believe that they should not arouse the antipathy of anti-reductionists. 
 
To consider first the structure of the DNA molecule, Watson and Crick wrote: 
 
The phosphate-sugar backbone of our model is completely regular, but any 
sequence of the pairs of bases can fit into the structure. It follows that in a long 
molecule many different permutations are possible, and it therefore seems likely 
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that the precise sequence of the bases is the code which carries the genetical 
information. 
(Watson and Crick 1953, p.965) 
 
Wilkins, reflecting later on the impact of Watson and Crick’s structure, noted that 
 
... the really impressive feature of the structure was the extraordinary way in which 
the two kinds of base pairs had exactly the same overall dimensions and shape. ... I 
was rather stunned by it all – the exactness and the replication idea, and the 
resolving of the paradox that DNA was so regular (even crystalline) and yet 
contained the complex and irregular genetic message in the sequence of base pairs. 
(Wilkins 2003, p.212) 
 
The eminent crystallographer David Blow, discussing the contrasting structures and roles 
of DNA and proteins, said in an early overview of the then new field of molecular biology: 
 
There are two main types of polymer to be considered. One type is used for the 
storage and transfer of information, and for this purpose a polymer is required 
whose properties are virtually independent of the information written on it, just as 
one page of a book is very much like another. Enough effect is required to enable 
the information to be ‘read’, and no more. ... A quite different type of polymer is 
needed for the fabric and working material of the cell. Here we require the largest 
possible diversity of properties consistent with the continuity of a single type of 
chain. 
(Blow 1962, p.179) 
 
Common to all three passages is a sense of the significance of the fact that DNA has an 
overall structure that is substantially independent of base sequence. This is a highly unusual 
property for a hetero-polymer (one made up of different monomers) to have. In general 
different monomers have different sizes and chemical properties, and these impose 
different steric and other constraints on the polymer chain, such that distinct monomer 
sequences are associated with different polymer conformations. Indeed, proteins exemplify 
this to a high degree: it is the idea that the amino acid sequence essentially determines a 
protein’s conformation that the Sequence Hypothesis enshrines.  
 
The linear arrangement of an arbitrary number of symbolic tokens selected from a 
limited number of types (nucleotide bases A, C, T, G) that is a constitutive feature of DNA 
is strongly analogous – in non-semantic respects – to the way in which a text is built up by 
selecting letters from an alphabet. The co-linear relationship between ‘one-dimensional’ 
nucleic acid sequences and the polypeptide sequences they encode has been described in 
terms of ‘template correlative determination’, where that phrase relates to a concept 
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explicated in terms of the different causal characteristics of nucleic acids and proteins 
(Šustar 2007). Protein folding processes mean that one-dimensional nucleic acids are 
capable, in the context of the machinery of gene expression, of giving rise to three-
dimensional protein molecules that are structurally and hence functionally uniform (within 
a given context) on a type-specific basis. If it becomes possible, through use of (say) the 
computational techniques discussed in Chapter 3, routinely to predict the structure of a 
protein from its amino acid sequence then in theory it also becomes possible to trace 
determinate connections running from DNA base sequence to protein structure. In 
practice the production of many proteins involves RNA processing steps that complicate 
the picture somewhat, but perhaps not insuperably (see David and Manley 2008).  
 
These distinctive structural properties make for strong analogies between DNA and 
a variety of data storage media. Indeed, novel uses for DNA have been proposed that 
capitalize on its data storage capability.87 The regular bulk structure of a substrate 
supporting arbitrary sequences of readably different monomers enables generic ‘read’, 
‘write’ and ‘error-correction’ mechanisms to act on DNA, rather in the way that a magnetic 
tape can be scanned by a tape-head because of the uniformity of the tape’s form and the 
independence of that form from the specifics of the recorded content. The image of a 
DNA molecule being ‘read’ by other molecular devices, such as RNA polymerase, is a 
diagrammatic commonplace of textbooks on molecular and cell biology. Such images are 
presumably explanatory, but how do they work? This is a matter for psychological 
conjecture, but I suspect that one of the things they do – provided that we understand how 
to interpret the diagrams in question – is help us build cognitive models that provide a 
basis for imagining particular phenomena. A diagram showing DNA being translated may 
contain arrows which show the direction of travel of the polymerase molecule, and their 
purpose is to indicate how to turn the static image into an internal animation. The arrow 
says: imagine this feature in the diagram (i.e. the polymerase molecule) travelling along this 
feature (the DNA molecule). The understanding that the diagram confers is thus connected 
with the capacity to simulate and imagine a pattern of events involving a variety of 
molecular structures. Being able to imagine a pattern of events in this way is to have a form 
of causal knowledge. 
 
On the basis of these reflections we might say that DNA is informational in this 
respect: it is capable of supporting the localized storage of tokenized encodings of entities 
with causal properties that are specific given particular environmental conditions. This 
                                                 
87 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/science/26DNA.html (last accessed 22 September 2009). 
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sense clearly does not imply any kind of preformationism, but it is informational to the 
extent that there are structural and functional similarities with a range of objects we 
unproblematically regard as non-semantically informational. If I am right that the structural 
properties just discussed do underpin a tendency to ascribe informational properties to 
DNA then perhaps it is also a tendency that is encouraged by other factors. Among them is 
the apparently critical importance of sequence. A variety of mechanisms serve to ensure 
that sequences are copied accurately during DNA replication, errors are corrected, breaks 
and mismatches in DNA strands are repaired, and sequence variation is introduced at 
controlled levels during particular key genomic processes (see e.g. Lodish et al. 1999, 
pp.472-492). These processes include the recombination events that occur during meiosis 
(involved in gamete production) and following the fertilization of an egg by a sperm. It is 
hard not to conclude from the existence of these diverse and tightly regulated sequence-
focused processes and properties that sequence has profound biological significance.  
 
Not only is the genome stable, on account of the native structural stability of DNA 
molecules in tandem, in cellular contexts, with the active maintenance of sequence and 
structure just described, but it is highly ordered. By this I mean that while many base 
sequences of a given length are possible in theory88 (and all sequence possibilities are, 
apparently, physically compatible with DNA’s double helical structure), very few are 
maintained and perpetuated in (are causally compatible with) a particular cellular or 
organismic configuration. This points to a potential confusion concerning MTOC that I 
have already alluded to. The Shannon/Weaver construal equates information with entropy, 
such that a high degree of information is formally equivalent to a high degree of entropy, 
whereas an important sense in which DNA can be considered informational relates not to 
a high degree of disorder, but of order in a sense closer to that invoked by Schrödinger.89 
This is order qua improbability, i.e. low entropy, and it is largely a structural matter to do 
with the factors just discussed: the surprising independence of the bulk form of DNA from 
base sequence, the stability of the molecule, and the way in which sequence is maintained 
and transmitted by specialized mechanisms.  
 
                                                 
88 For a DNA molecule of length N base pairs the number of possible sequences is 4N. (So 16 sequences of 
two base pairs are possible.) 
89 Stonier (1990) discusses the relationship between information and entropy in MTOC and in other accounts 
in more detail. He argues that Shannon’s theory, taken to its logical conclusion, ‘would mean that pure noise, 
which contains the greatest amount of entropy, would contain the greatest amount of information’ (p.56).  
Perhaps to resolve the issue requires distinguishing in some explicit way between on the one hand the sense 
of entropy involved in the spatial constraint of nucleotides as they exist in a DNA molecule as against their 
free state and on the other issues to do with the arbitrariness of base sequences and the fact that any given 
sequence of a certain length is a member of a much larger set of sequences of that length. It is on the latter 
issue, to do with probability of selection from a set, that the Shannon/Weaver account focuses. 
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At the same time the genome appears to have few other functions besides storing a 
particular sequence of base pairs: it is not itself the catalyst of a particular class of reactions, 
it does not itself pump protons, it does not itself repair cell walls, and so on. This 
combination of, positively, the genome’s apparent indispensability related to sequence 
storage, and, negatively, a lack of other obvious functions, make the genome what could be 
termed an attractor for functional attributions. It seems to be doing something of 
functional significance, i.e. playing some sort of causal role, and epistemically we feel the 
need to identify that role and find ways to speak about it. The ideas of information storage 
and transmission I take to be attempts to capture that role.90 
  
I suggest – and perhaps it is because informational habits of thought are so 
ingrained that this sounds somewhat banal – that DNA can be regarded as a storage 
structure in the proximate and structural sense just discussed, and that what are stored are 
representations of causal entities. How does this set of ideas relate to DST? One of the 
dangers as I see it of banishing information talk as advocated by many of DST’s 
proponents is that we loose access to a valuable explanatory resource: the idea of causal 
potential. Current philosophical accounts of causation are incapable of dealing with the 
storage of specific causal possibilities. If we want, for well-motivated explanatory purposes, 
to refer to potential causation and to related notions of causal memory and buffering then 
we need a different or supplementary – and more metaphysically laden – concept. This is 
part of what the concept of information gives us. When we see or conceive of a DNA 
molecule in a cell, with that molecule bearing particular promoter and other sequences – 
and when in addition we see (or feel warranted in assuming) the presence of specific 
molecules associated with gene expression – then it is surely inevitable that we recognise 
the latent causal possibilities associated with the DNA. Granted, those causal possibilities 
are stored within the total system of DNA plus expression apparatus, all within a cellular 
context, but the way in which DNA participates in the processes that realise those 
possibilities makes it natural, I contend, to talk in terms of information storage – and to 
identify that function with the DNA rather than with the other cellular apparatus.  
 
Some cautionary remarks are in order. One is that the causal properties of the 
proteins that issue from the genome in response to the dialogue between it and the rest of 
the cell are contextually contingent. When we think we understand a context well we regard 
the causal properties of entities within it as determinate because we believe we can 
accurately imagine how they will behave in that context – although empirical testing has the 
                                                 
90 A transmission sense of information has recently been explicated by Bergstrom and Rosvall (2009). 
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potential to disconfirm the assessments we make of our understanding. Also, the 
structural—functional analogy between DNA and other informational objects is part of the 
basis on which we attribute informational roles to DNA, but it holds in the main only 
schematically and proximately to the structure of DNA in relation to specific operations in 
which it participates such as transcription and error correction. When the larger system is 
considered we see significant differences with respect to the properties and behaviour of 
other information objects as well as similarities, and in the next section I describe some of 
the relevant systemic issues. The case of DNA and information storage shows, however, 
how promiscuous our function-attributing tendencies can be. Even a rather schematic 
structural—functional analogy can serve as basis for an attribution that has explanatory 
utility, especially when supported by additional factors (which in the present case include 
the apparent biological significance of sequence).  
Networks 
 
So far I have emphasized simply the fact that a DNA molecule stores a particular 
base sequence, and that in a cellular context this sequence is actively maintained and 
modified by a variety of mechanisms and processes. I have discussed one of the major ends 
to which this sequence is put: the storage of what I referred to as tokenized encodings of 
entities with specific, albeit context-dependent, causal properties – i.e. protein molecules. 
Now I want briefly to consider another way in which DNA sequences participate causally 
in cell processes. It involves thinking not just about the reading or maintenance of 
particular portions of sequence in isolation but rather about how such sequence-focused 
operations can form elements within larger processes. These processes involve what are 
commonly referred to as gene expression networks, which can be succinctly defined as ‘co-
expressed functional groups of genes’ (Lelandais et al. 2006). Particular cellular phenotypes 
are associated with specific molecular populations and the particular cell structures and 
behaviours to which these give rise, and these in turn are associated with particular patterns 
of gene expression. Comprehending these patterns involves appreciating the roles of both 
genomic and non-genomic factors and the mutuality of their interactions. The expression 
of certain DNA segments produces proteins with specific DNA binding properties, i.e. 
specificity for certain DNA sequences. These so-called transcription factors, which 
effectively represent a modular mechanism for altering the specificity of generic DNA 
transcription devices, result in the expression of particular sets of genes. This yields 
proteins having the particular properties that collectively, and in conjunction with other 
cellular structures, establish or maintain particular forms of cellular life.  
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Regulation of gene expression, for example through feedback mechanisms that 
depend on the ability to sense the levels of particular expressed proteins or the levels of 
particular metabolites, couples genomic activity to cellular processes. The overall picture 
that results is one in which the genome and the rest of the cell form an integrated causal 
complex, with the genome storing a set of encoded representations of structures that 
includes a subset that acts back on the genome to determine which of the total set are 
physically instantiated as a function of current cellular activity. Events within the cell that 
arise as a result of the molecular activities of its contents, and the effects that sensed 
external events have on those activities, are capable of modulating the action of the 
molecules that act on the genome to regulate gene expression. Hence cellular life as it is 
shaped by specific environments might be said to determine its own future by selecting the 
operative patterns of gene expression. This, clearly, is not a picture in which genes and the 
genome could be said to have causal priority over non-genomic structures and processes. 
But is it one in which the genome could be said to be playing an informational role? Yes, I 
contend, in the storage sense I have discussed in terms of the structural and entropic 
factors that underwrite its attribution. However, thinking about the regulation of gene 
expression and gene expression networks reminds us that the genome does more than 
simply store the encoded representations of protein molecules. Its regulatory sequences (i.e. 
sequences that are the targets of regulatory molecules such as promoters and repressors of 
gene expression) serve to bind it tightly to cellular processes in a highly context-dependent 
way. Sometimes it is suggested that the resulting process architecture makes the cell akin to 
a computer program, for example because particular functions are implemented, through 
the expression or repression of particular genes, when specific conditions hold. The parallel 
here is with the role of conditional statements in software, which have the form if 
[conditions] then do [actions]. If a particular transcription factor, a promoter say, is activated 
when a particular cellular condition is sensed (for example when the cell cycle reaches a 
certain stage), then the genes regulated by that factor will be expressed and a particular 
molecular function, qua role-fulfilling activity, will be instantiated.  
 
To push the analogy further, when a computer program runs the values of its 
variables are updated in accordance with the scheme of logical operations, or algorithm, its 
statements define, and at any given moment the state of any particular ‘run’ of the program 
is reflected in a particular set of variable values. A cell state is defined in terms of the 
distribution of a population of molecules representing a snapshot of a similarly dynamic 
process, which can be seen as having a logical architecture defined in part by the placement 
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of regulatory sequences in relation to coding sequences. Thus it seems possible to draw a 
parallel between the state of a cell and the state of a program run, and to see both cells and 
programs as reflecting the workings of a logical mechanism qua a system of entailments (in 
both cases reflecting the occurrence of sequences of symbols in a particular kind of 
context). But there are striking differences too. For example, the hardware/software 
distinction that is readily made where man-made computers are concerned appears to have 
little place in the cellular case. The algorithmic logic of the cell, to the extent that such 
language is defensible, is distributed across the ‘hardware’ of both genomic and extra-
genomic cell structures. Moreover, the ‘logic’ of cellular events and processes is not 
determined solely by issues of sequence occurrence and placement: it is also dependent in 
part on spatiotemporal aspects of genomic and non-genomic processes (e.g. molecular 
diffusion rates), which have no obvious software equivalent.  
 
The algorithmic analogy points to an additional sense in which the genome and 
genetic processes can be thought of as broadly informational, building on the structural 
sense outlined earlier which relates to proximate DNA-reading and sequence-correcting 
mechanisms. Those mechanisms suggest an analogy with other information storage 
structures such as CDs and magnetic tapes, but when viewed systemically the context-
dependence of the causal capacities of the entities DNA encodes becomes clear. The 
overall effects those entities have depend as much on the composition and character of the 
extra-genomic cell as they do on their own individual properties, and the timing and order 
of transcription events matters. The position of a coding sequence within the genome, not 
just linearly in sequence terms but also in terms of three-dimensional genome structure, 
may be an important factor influencing its transcription. (Whether a transcription complex 
is bound at one sequence may for steric reasons influence whether transcription is possible 
at a spatially adjacent – though perhaps sequence-distant – site, for example.) 
 
These reflections on the systemic role of the genome and genetic processes show 
how DNA is informational in a robust structural—functional sense that depends on 
schematic overlap with other informational objects involved in data storage, and which is 
reinforced by entropic and metaphysical factors. Thinking about the participation of DNA 
sequences in the larger context of cellular processes shows, however, that genome and cell 
are tightly coupled and that causal priority attaches to neither. Equally, a computer’s hard 
disk drive could not be said to be causally prior to the rest of the hardware in the context 
of the running of a software application. Rather it is a place that may be used to store 
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specific sequences of byte values that play particular functional roles in the context of the 
dynamic process economy of a particular application.  
Genomes across generations 
 
The construal of DNA as informational on the several bases just outlined is, I 
suggest, compelling in its own right, but it gains additional force from its compatibility with 
another idea. This is the second major sense in which the genome can be seen as a 
repository of information. Appreciating this sense depends on shifting one’s view from the 
proximate causal processes that take place within an individual cell to processes spanning 
lineages of organisms. Focusing on the replication and transmission of genomes across 
generations of organisms reinforces the sense engendered by thinking about how genomic 
processes couple with extra-genomic ones via regulatory networks that the genome has a 
causally ambivalent character. Sometimes – within the context of an individual organism, 
when we focus narrowly on the expression of an individual gene – it appears to be situated 
at the start of a chain of events (and thus looks like the locus of significant causal 
responsibility for subsequent events in the cell as implied by the Central Dogma). 
However, at other times – over evolutionary timescales and in the context of lineage 
descent – it looks as much like the passive outcome or instrument of processes as it does 
their active driver. The claim I now want to defend is that these issues are bound up with 
the idea that genomes represent, in various ways, encoded partial descriptions of their 
organismic hosts.  
 
To appreciate this it is useful to imagine several alternative replication scenarios. 
The first case to consider is that in which an organism gives rise to offspring that are exact 
copies of itself. All individuals in the lineage have the same phenotype P. Whether a 
member M of such a lineage survives beyond a certain generation N depends on the fitness 
of P relative to M’s environment at generation N. The species will survive only so long as 
there are individuals living in environments to which P is well suited. Evolutionary 
adaptation is clearly not possible and environmental change continually threatens to 
extinguish the species altogether. Suppose that P is entirely determined by a genome G, and 
that P is invariant from parent to offspring on account of the perfect copying and 
transmission of G. In these circumstances I contend that it makes sense to think of G as a 
description of P. 
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The second scenario to consider is one in which an organism gives rise to offspring 
having phenotypes that vary from its own in seemingly random and extreme ways, 
irrespective of the genome they inherit. Let us suppose that as before the genome is copied 
and transmitted with complete fidelity, only now assume that the organism’s phenotype is 
causally independent of genotype. (Perhaps it is keyed, exclusively and in a fine-grained 
way, to the details of its developmental environment.) Now environmental change appears 
to pose less of a threat to the lineage, inasmuch as there is always a chance of variation 
yielding a context-fit phenotype. However, a fit phenotype is no more heritable in this case 
than an unfit one, and a priori it seems unlikely that the generation of random, extreme, but 
non-heritable variations can be beneficial for lineage survival. (The effects of rare but 
highly beneficial variations are likely to be undone quickly. The relative dynamics and 
qualitative character of phenotypic variation and environmental change are presumably key 
to determining the chances of long term lineage survival.) The genome in this case, 
assuming that it is invariant from generation to generation, serves as a useful marker or 
label for the lineage – being perhaps the only common feature by which to identify 
organisms as lineage members. But it is not in any richer sense a description of members of 
the lineage. If, however, the genome were to vary slightly from parent to offspring then it 
could still function as a lineage label, but it would become even more useful since it would 
now potentially provide a guide to an individual’s path of descent. This is the sense in 
which the genome represents an information store to which Zuckerkandl and Pauling 
(1965) drew attention (and see also Sommer 2008). 
 
The third case is, I take it, what we in fact find in nature: organisms bearing 
genomes that at least in part determine phenotype and that vary slightly from parents to 
offspring. Now evolutionary adaptation is possible, because there is a mechanism for 
generating variation that stands a good chance of persisting in a population for multiple 
generations to provide the raw material on which selection can act, generating increasingly 
well-adapted organisms against a backdrop of modest environmental change. As in the 
previous case the genome can potentially provide evidence regarding the historical path of 
descent of an individual organism. In addition, however, the causal coupling of genotype 
and phenotype – which is a major factor in making phenotypic variation heritable – means 
that there is an additional sense in which we can think of the genome as an information 
store.  
 
As well as revealing the historical sense in which genomes can be informational – 
i.e. as a record of the path of descent – thinking about generational transitions as I have 
 176
just done provides a fresh perspective on the causal relationship between genotype and 
phenotype. For it becomes possible to view the genome as a package of resources 
assembled to equip the next generation with much of the wherewithal to survive and 
prosper (reproduce) in environments like those encountered by the current generation. 
This teleological stance has the effect of turning the direction of causality on its head, 
making the genome appear if anything to be the instrument of the organism. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have defended the idea that one can think of genes and genomes 
in informational terms without thereby being committed to the view that they have causal 
priority over other cellular (or indeed extracellular) structures and processes. I have done so 
by adopting a functional approach. Rather than seeing information as being the basic 
ontological category at issue, I have framed my account in terms of the informational roles 
that structures and processes can play within larger systemic contexts. These roles include 
storage, reading, writing, and transmission. To identify these different roles with the parts 
of a system requires us to make a functional decomposition of the system, and I have 
suggested that this is a matter of recognising how genomic / genetic structures and 
processes can be accommodated by a variety of functional schemas. The structural 
distinctiveness of DNA, and the profound biological importance of sequence to which the 
existence of a variety of sequence-focused cellular mechanisms attests, are key. These 
features, I suggest, fit some of the functional decompositions we make of systems we think 
of as storing and processing information – even though, as I argued, it is hard to articulate 
any clear folk sense of information.  
 
This approach to biological information has one especially important consequence: 
a particular entity or process can potentially occupy an informational role in multiple 
system decompositions, and these can be decompositions of very different systems. For 
example, a particular segment of DNA may occur in two different systems and be read by 
reading units that are connected to different coupling structures or processes in the two 
systems. These coupling units might in turn connect with functionally quite distinct 
processes, so that very different ends are realized by the two systems. In both cases, 
however, we are justified in saying that the DNA segment is fulfilling an information 
storage role. Some may wish to argue that the segment ‘means’ different things in the two 
systems, but semantics is not really the issue. We are misled into thinking that a book, say, 
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has a meaning that inheres solely in the text itself just because our minds are structured so 
similarly (whether by nature or nurture is incidental) that the text gives rise to similar 
effects in the minds of different readers. What matters for the ability to associate an 
informational storage role with the book is the reasonableness of the assumption of readers 
and writers, i.e. of an overall functional system architecture that includes within its 
functional decomposition the role of information storage.  
 
These reflections on informational roles within systems lead back to the nature of 
functions and functional attributions. They suggest a somewhat holistic picture: an 
individual function is a component within a larger structure, namely an overall functional 
decomposition into which an entire system fits. If this is so then maybe sometimes whether 
a particular part of a system can be assigned a function depends on the possibility of fitting 
other parts of the system into the overall decomposition of which that function is a 
component. (But if a good fit exists within one region of the decomposition then a looser 
fit might be tolerated elsewhere.) The fact that explanation in chemistry and physics seems 
to have no need for functional ascriptions could then be related to the fact that they 
abstract phenomena from specific systemic contexts in their quest for generality. Those are 
circumstances in which functions can play no part. 
 
My approach to biological information represents an attempt to answer the 
question that anti-informationists leave hanging in the air: why it is that information talk 
remains pervasive in biology, and why it is associated in particular with genetic and 
genomic phenomena. At the same time it shows that their concerns about causal priority 
are unfounded. 
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8. Mind in biology 
 
In this thesis I have investigated how a number of related philosophical topics 
intersect with several connected areas of research in molecular and cell biology, in order to 
gain a better sense of what explanation and understanding amount to in those areas and 
more generally, as well as obtain insight into what factors constrain them. In this final 
chapter I recapitulate the main flow of the argument to highlight and reflect further on 
some of the issues it raises, before closing with some more general speculations and 
indications of possible directions for research. 
 
To begin with it is worth restating the main areas of claim-making that the preceding 
chapters have encompassed. As was advertised in Chapter 1 these fall under five distinct 
but related headings:  
 
1) mechanism in molecular and cell biology;  
2) protein folding and the epistemology of molecular dynamics simulation;  
3) cellular complexity;  
4) emergence;  
5) functional attribution and information talk in biology. 
 
The overall perspective that emerges from what I say about these topics is one that 
emphasizes the potential significance of epistemic – in the sense of psychological – factors 
for our understanding of them and the philosophical concepts with which they connect. As 
extensive discussion of a variety of biological phenomena has made plain, however, it has 
not been my intention to downplay the importance of objective and external 
considerations. This ontic/epistemic even-handedness argues for the possibility of 
integrating internalist and externalist thinking in order to create what could be described as 
a systems approach to epistemology.91 By this I mean an approach that regards the total 
                                                 
91 Surprisingly little explicit overlap exists between what I have said in this thesis and the views presented by 
Godfrey-Smith (1994). When he talks about internalism and externalism he seems generally to have in mind 
different perspectives on why organisms come to have the organization and capacities they do. However, his 
argument that the complexity of minds reflects the need for organisms to cope with life in complex 
environments is highly compatible with what I say. A more direct connection with his argument could be 
effected by combining my claim that phenomenal complexity is epistemically relative to our cognitive 
capacities with another idea. This is that the complexity of those capacities is such as to position the 
boundary between what seems complex (i.e. seemingly threatens to overwhelm an organism’s cognitive 
abilities) and what does not at just that point which, minimally and at the population level, is compatible with 
survival.  
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system of mind in the world as potentially relevant to philosophical understanding of topics 
bearing on scientific explanation, since sometimes the relevant concepts operate at (and 
serve to locate) the boundary of mind and world in the sense illustrated by my treatment of 
emergence.  
 
I began by outlining the legacy of logical positivism, in the guise of the logical 
empiricist programme that dominated philosophy of science in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. Philosophers of science around this time devoted much of their energy to the 
construction of formal structures representing the relationships between scientific 
observations and theoretical statements and generalizations. The belief was that these 
structures would collectively provide an objective view of how science works – how it 
explains the world – without making reference to metaphysically problematic notions such 
as causation. The idea was articulated in part via the notion of theoretical subsumption, or 
reduction in the classic sense articulated by Oppenheim and Putnam which I discussed in 
Chapter 1, in terms of which it was hoped that it would be possible to explicate the ‘logic 
of science’.  
 
The problem with explanation as reduction is its requirement that a scientific field’s 
conceptual content be represented (representable) in formal terms, i.e. as a set of nomic 
generalizations or laws to which its phenomena conform.  Such laws are rare in many areas 
of biology, and this is related in large part to the causal complexity of biological 
phenomena. In Chapters 4 and 5 I discussed complexity at the cellular level in part in terms 
of fluidity and the diverse nature of the causal processes that sustain cellular life. Rosenberg 
has argued that the fact that biology is a ‘nomological vacuum’ is a reflection of the fact 
that natural selection filters populations by function rather than structure – so structural 
variation is tolerated if it is not dysfunctional and flourishes if it is adaptive (Rosenberg 
2001). The connection between the cellular complexity I have described and biological 
diversity of the sort Rosenberg presumably has in mind is not obvious – even if there were 
no biological diversity the causal complexity of the cell would still militate against its simple 
formal description. Causal complexity at all scales is the usual state of affairs in biology, 
however, and where mathematical generalizations are possible they tend to be statistical in 
nature, concerning the collective behaviours of molecules, cells or organisms, or are of 
application only to specific systems and circumstances. When laws do apply to phenomena 
they are not usually held to be constitutive of the phenomena; rather they are merely 
contingently descriptive.  
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Even when the goal of mathematicization is abandoned, finding verbal 
generalizations that subsume and potentially explicate large classes of biological 
phenomena is often far from straightforward: for every putative rule there is (as a rule) a 
large set of exceptions (see e.g. in relation to genomics Dupré 2004, p.324). This biological 
lawlessness is problematic for accounts of explanation of the kind developed within the 
logical empiricist tradition, such as Hempel’s D-N model, which construe explanations as 
arguments resting on nomological generalizations. In Chapter 1 I outlined some of the 
problems associated with these accounts, which relate in the main to the eschewal of causal 
notions. Intense philosophical activity focusing on causation, building on centuries-old 
debates, has revealed it to be a far from tractable concept, especially if it is approached 
from an exclusively externalist point of view. Hume famously argued that there is nothing 
given to us in phenomena as a basis on which to pick out causal relations beyond ‘constant 
conjunction’ and other regularities in the succession of events. Yet objective phenomena 
such as spatiotemporal event correlations are often ambiguous or misleading about the 
causal properties and powers of objects. Despite this, we very often are able to predict and 
explain phenomena in causal terms. How are our successes to be accounted for if they are 
not down to luck? In Chapter 1 I discussed a variety of accounts of causation that have 
been proposed, most of which break down when applied to particular kinds of case. This 
thesis has been shaped by the under-explored idea that causal understanding is grounded in 
cognitive models and schemas with which we are able to parallel phenomena in the world.92 
My suspicion was that this perspective on causation would be found to connect in an 
interesting way with the concepts of mechanism currently attracting the interest of 
philosophers of science.  
 
Mechanism, complexity and emergence 
 
This then was the background against which I discussed, in Chapter 2, those 
concepts of mechanism. I started by distinguishing between material and causal senses. 
Machines exemplify the former sense, and I argued that the alignment of structural and 
functional decompositions is one of their key features. But the two senses are related 
inasmuch as machines can be thought of as the material instantiation of particular causal 
structures or entailment patterns. The discussion of function in Chapter 2 revealed the 
concept to be philosophically problematic, since functions are not given to us in any direct 
                                                 
92 Causal models could originate in a variety of ways. Some may be innate and others may be learnt (perhaps 
on the basis of innate capacities to acquire such models given particular forms of experience and interaction 
with the world), while still others may be discovered or constructed.  
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way by the phenomena we study scientifically. Where a man-made machine is concerned 
we see the functions of its parts in relation to the overall function that is attributed to the 
machine. The function of a machine is what it was designed to do, or the purpose to which 
its inventor imagined it being put. The overall function or goal of an organism we generally 
see as the maintenance of its own life and the generation of offspring, for it is apparently 
towards these ends that the organism’s resources are directed.  
 
After discussing the machine and causal senses of mechanism I looked in some 
detail at the MDC account that has been so influential in recent years in philosophy of 
biology and philosophy of science. This account as I see it stems from several motivations. 
Chief amongst these are to make sense of mechanism talk in biology, i.e. to understand the 
heuristic explanatory value of the conceptual content of such talk, and to articulate a more 
normative conception of mechanism capable of playing a major part within a philosophical 
account of explanation. I argued that the account is rather ambiguous, especially as regards 
the ontic twins of entities and activities and how these stand in relation to structure and 
function. On the other hand MDC make the interesting epistemological proposal that 
intelligibility is a matter of connecting a phenomenon with sensory experience, and suggest 
that mechanistic descriptions explain by ‘showing how’ phenomena are brought about. The 
understanding that mechanistic descriptions confer is not just a visual affair, however: it 
may involve other aspects of bodily experience such as proprioception. This epistemic 
aspect of the MDC account is I think also its most potentially fruitful, and it connects with 
much of what I have said in Chapters 4-6 in relation to complexity and emergence. 
 
Before I got on to those topics, however, I explored what at the outset I had 
suspected would be an interesting intermediate case situated between mechanism and non-
mechanism: the phenomenon of protein folding and what it means when scientists talk 
about the mechanism of protein folding. I argued that protein folding is mechanistic in 
only a schematic sense related to the causal sense I outlined in Chapter 2. As if to lend 
weight to the epistemic ideas of MDC concerning intelligibility I found that the science of 
protein folding makes extensive use of visual metaphors, generally of a topographical 
nature. Protein scientists talk frequently about potential energy landscapes, funnels, 
barriers, wells, troughs and peaks. This figurative language provides a means of visualizing 
some of the causally relevant characteristics of complex stochastic processes from which 
hard and fast structure—function relationships (of the sort found in true machines) are 
generally lacking. In addition protein scientists have long depended on techniques for 
visualizing the molecules that interest them. Simplified representations of various kinds – 
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ribbon models, for example – serve to emphasize particular features such as secondary 
structure. Interactive 3-D computer graphics techniques are especially important, and I 
think that it is helpful to think of them, like simulation methods, as a kind of cognitive 
prosthesis. Chiefly what they compensate for are constraints that exist in relation to our 
ability to view a 2-D image and infer from it – and retain in our minds – a 3-D structure. 
They do this by allowing the researcher to manipulate structures and view them from 
different orientations: the mere act of rotating a molecular model on screen in real time is 
sufficient to form an impression of the molecule’s shape. The perceptual basis for this is 
the changes that occur under rotation in the relative positions of the molecule’s atoms, in 
conjunction with depth cues that serve to distinguish between front and back and hence 
disambiguate the direction of rotation. The possibility of adding ‘haptic feedback’ 
underscores the idea that intelligibility can be more than a merely visual matter.  
 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I turned from complex molecular structures to the nature of 
cell complexity, thinking initially that in the cell I would find clear-cut examples of non-
mechanistic phenomena and indeed perhaps an instance of a thoroughly non-mechanistic 
system. To some extent this expectation was gratified, if (as I argued we might) we think of 
non-mechanistic phenomena as ones in which structure—function relationships are 
complex, opaque or possibly even non-existent. (Given the epistemic, subjective nature of 
functional attribution the last must be considered at least in principle a live possibility.) 
Metabolism was found to provide examples of phenomena in which properties and 
behaviours cannot be identified with parts (structures or processes) in isolation but rather 
arise as a result of the combined actions and interactions of multiple parts. Yet the 
fundamental properties of cells, such as genome replication and cell division, and the 
capability for adaptive behaviour and environmental compensation, seem to allow for the 
existence of an underlying overall functional architecture or causal logic. I discussed the 
idea that many cell processes depend on hyperstructures, and used this notion of a category 
of non-equilibrium and equilibrium structures that implement particular functions as the 
basis for a new perspective on mechanism. My aim was to build on the MDC account by 
recognizing the value of that account’s neutrality about the relative causal status of 
structures (entities) and processes (activities, roughly speaking). At the same time I wanted 
to find a way to rehabilitate function, and provide the means to distinguish between 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium phenomena. Achieving the latter was important because it 
bears on a key difference between a machine’s organization and that of a living system. I 
found that the best way to accomplish these goals was to jettison the entity/activity 
ontology and structure my account instead around a class of epistemic objects I refer to as 
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P-structures. These are the psychologically grounded structures and processes we 
individuate and use in our explanations of phenomena, and to which we attribute a variety 
of functions and properties.  
 
Thinking of mechanisms epistemically in terms of P-structures provides the 
flexibility needed to subsume much of the diversity of mechanism talk in science, whilst 
avoiding the reification of functions or causal properties. (It will be recalled that Torres has 
argued that reification of the latter is one of the drawbacks of the MDC account, especially 
in relation to negative causation.) The result is to loosen the bindings of mechanistic 
ascriptions and descriptions to underlying physical processes, and in effect engineer a 
conflation of the machine and causal senses of mechanism discussed in Chapter 2. The 
concept of mechanism that results is I think best thought of as a cognitive ‘resonance 
structure’, by analogy with the representation of certain molecules as resonance structures 
that combine the properties of several distinct electronic configurations. This conceptual 
structure involves two components: a set of a functionally related P-structures and a 
pattern of entailment in phenomena, each of which provides a partial basis for ascribing 
mechanism: 
 
[M0]  set of P-structures ↔ pattern of entailment 
 
The point of representing the concept in this way is that it is more cognitively realistic than 
the simple conjunctive definition of a mechanism as a set of P-structures that instantiate a 
pattern of entailment. Sometimes the set of P-structures involved in a mechanism will be 
understood only incompletely or schematically, although the pattern of entailment they give 
rise to is well defined. In other cases the structures may be understood in detail, but their 
causal consequences are less thoroughly appreciated. But when both the identity of the P-
structures and an associated pattern of entailment are stable and well-defined then the 
ascription of mechanism is made confidently and readily. This resonance conception of 
mechanism can also be thought of as the combination of separate definitions emphasizing 
the two aspects: 
 
[M1] a set of P-structures [instantiating a pattern of entailment] 
 
[M2] a pattern of entailment [instantiated by a set of P-structures]. 
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It can be seen that M1 is akin to the machine sense in that it stresses a mechanism’s 
materiality, while M2 leads with the causal story (and if we bracket off ‘instantiated by a set 
of P-structures’ then indeed it reduces to the causal process conception). Because P-
structures can incorporate the properties we associate with structures and processes, 
including collective properties such as cytoplasmic fluidity, these definitions embrace 
mechanism descriptions that incorporate such properties as explanatory factors. A 
mechanism in the sense of M0, M1 or M2 can thus be a good deal more schematic than 
the traditional machine conception, as I think is necessary if scientific language use is to be 
assimilated adequately. 
 
One can have too much of a good thing, however, and it can rightly be objected 
that in relation to biological systems this perspective is so flexible as to subsume rather 
more than we might always wish. In concluding Chapter 5 I remarked that additional 
constraints would be needed in order to distinguish living from non-living systems, and 
these would probably relate to metabolic circularity, autopoietic capacity, or intrinsic 
teleology, or some combination of these. I suggested that interesting inter-relationships 
exist between all these concepts, although to work them out satisfactorily would require 
more time and space than has been available to me. Perhaps, however, it is feasible to give 
fuller and more explicit expression to thoughts concerning structure—function relations 
than I have given so far. I have alluded several times to the idea that if a system is 
mechanistic then it is possible to associate functions with system parts in a fairly 
straightforward way. And conversely I have said that non-mechanistic systems are generally 
ones in which structure—function relations are complex, problematic, opaque or non-
existent. But to construe the degree of mechanisticity in this way seems if not at odds with 
the definitions given above and the perspective from which they arose then at least to stand 
in uncertain or orthogonal relation to them.  
 
Perhaps these problems to do with structure—function relations can be solved by 
recognising different classes of mechanism according to the nature of such relations. The 
most straightforward cases are entailment systems in which specific functions can be 
identified for each and every P-structure in the system. Then we can imagine systems in 
which a pattern of entailment can be identified with a particular configuration of P-
structures, only a subset of which can be associated with a particular function. (Perhaps. 
Would we not tend to assign coupling or connective functions to otherwise ‘functionless’ 
P-structures?) Different again will be entailment systems in which one or more functions 
are distributed over multiple system components, or in which in some other way a 
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functional decomposition fails to map straightforwardly to material structures and 
processes. My inclination is to see mechanism as being basically a causal matter, to do with 
the ability to see or imagine (and therefore specify) what (in terms of P-structures) brings 
something about and how they do it. When we can do that we can in principle (in a 
Woodwardian counterfactual or ideal sense) intervene in or manipulate the phenomenon. 
Perhaps sometimes – my intuitions here are rather weak – we can do this without 
attributing functions to parts of a system, and if this is so then it argues for providing a 
space for functional attributions in one’s mechanism account (as I do), but not for making 
them mandatory.93 But then a lack of mechanisticity has to be cashed out in terms other 
than structure—function correspondence, such as haziness of the association between 
entailment and P-structure identity. 
 
This raises another, perhaps related, problem: how we should view the relationship 
between mechanism, emergence and cognition. I argued in Chapter 6 for a negative 
account of emergence, whereby a phenomenon is emergent if we lack the cognitive 
schemas needed to trace through or model the entailment structures giving rise to it. When 
such schemas are to hand (or, rather, mind) phenomena strike us as intelligible, explicable 
and only to be expected. If functions are highly distributed across numerous P-structures 
rather than highly localized then prima facie this seems likely to make entailment modelling 
cognitively taxing, in line for example with what Resnick has said about our bias towards a 
‘centralized mindset’ (Resnick 1996). We need to be clear about what we mean by 
distribution, however.  
 
As a thought experiment, suppose one were somehow to reify an ‘exploded view’ 
of the clock discussed in Chapter 2, say, and draw apart the parts that this reveals so that 
they are highly separated in space. (We must imagine the parts suspended in space, in 
defiance of gravity.) Imagine then surrounding each part with a set of sensors and actuators 
that communicate (by radio frequency waves, perhaps) with the sensors and actuators 
surrounding just those other parts with which the part is normally in mechanical contact. 
We can imagine the system of sensors and actuators being configured so as to establish the 
same pattern of causal inter-relationships amongst the exploded set of clock parts as 
normally exist amongst the parts of the unexploded clock. In this case there would be a 
sense in which the exploded clock and the normal clock exhibit a similar functional 
architecture, although the parts are more distributed in the sense of being more spatially 
                                                 
93 However, I suspect that the processes of functional attribution and P-structure individuation are often 
closely and synergistically coupled. 
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dispersed. (Note that even the relative dispositions of parts could be altered without 
changing the functional architecture, provided that the sensor/actuator system 
implemented the same pattern of inter-relationships as exists in the unexploded clock.) For 
each part in the normal clock there is a functionally equivalent part in the exploded clock, 
albeit now associated with a system of sensors and actuators.  
 
Davies (2008) argues that the concept of causal distribution versus localization 
serves to capture important characteristics of certain biological problems and approaches, 
and helps to account for our bias towards simple causal analyses. Thinking about the 
exploded clock helps us to interpret him correctly, however. Such examples show that 
distribution qua dispersal in space does not necessarily make for epistemic impenetrability: 
exploded views of complex artefacts are intended, after all, to facilitate comprehension by 
showing the parts that make them up and how they relate spatially. What matters more for 
the purposes of Davies’ argument is that sometimes causal responsibility for a function is 
distributed in the sense of being divided across multiple structures or sub-systems. It is the 
combined activities of these – their partial contributions – that implement the whole 
function, and sometimes this functional distribution confers redundancy in that not all of 
the structures are required for functional implementation. Exactly how distinct the issues 
of spatial distribution and functional division are, and how they relate to functional 
architecture, is not entirely obvious, however. Perhaps the distribution of a function over 
multiple entities implies an increased burden on working memory, relative to the load 
presented by phenomena in which functions are concentrated within fewer entities. But 
this is more a matter of having to keep track of multiple entities in order to monitor system 
state than it is of spatial distribution.  
 
The implication of all this is that from the point of view of epistemic tractability as 
much interest potentially attaches to the comparison of different functional architectures 
that fulfil the same overall goals or which exhibit the same overall causal properties as it 
does to different patterns of functional distribution. A system in which each part 
contributes towards each and every function of the system’s functional decomposition 
would presumably be deemed more complex than one in which the same functions were 
associated with parts in a more modular fashion. But an overall system function might be 
implemented in accordance with quite different functional decompositions (think about the 
different ways in which electricity can be generated, for example), some of which may be 
more intelligible than others.  
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Irrespective of issues of this sort to do with functional architecture, on a Cummins-
style (causal role in a system) account of function there is a close relationship between 
causal schemas and functional schemas. I noted in Chapter 2 that functions can be 
associated with sets of counterfactual structures, any member of which would fulfil the 
function to enable normal system operation. We can therefore think of a functional schema 
as a meta-causal schema – a causal schema at an additional degree of schematic abstraction. 
For this reason something like the account of emergence I outlined in Chapter 6 subsumes 
cases in which what we lack is not a causal schema as such but a functional schema, i.e. a 
set of counterfactual causal schemas, for a phenomenon. To be functionally emergent goes 
beyond being non-mechanistic in the sense of lacking a functional analysis that maps neatly 
onto P-structures. It means instead fulfilling the more stringent condition of having no 
obvious functional decomposition at all.  
 
In some ways the account of emergence outlined in Chapter 6 represents the 
complement of what I have said about mechanism. The latter concept pertains, I have 
argued, to the association of a pattern of entailment with a more or less determinate 
structural or processual basis, which I explicated in terms of P-structures. An emergence 
attribution on the other hand points to a failure to correlate a pattern of entailment with 
any such material basis, through lack of a cognitive schema with which to model the 
entailment structure. The difference is thus one of cognitive connectability, and perhaps 
there is a link here with reduction and reducibility. If so then the conceptual relationships 
are not straightforward, however. I argued that emergence is associated with a lack of 
connectability in the sense, typically, of imaginability or simulability – although I was 
equivocal about the extent to which the latter should be thought to involve conscious 
experience or deliberate cognitive activity. Sometimes we do visualize how a process occurs 
– for example, knowledge of a little chemistry enables us to generate internal images in 
response to the invitation to imagine an ethane molecule and then imagine rotating the two 
ethyl groups around the bond that joins them. That is feasible enough, but imagining the 
effects of rotating around several of the rotatable main-chain bonds of a polypeptide 
structure is not, I assume. (Does this make protein folding an emergent process? The 
answer is perhaps not clear-cut: to the extent that the process is unimaginable, yes; but to 
the extent that we know what the relevant physical factors are and how they operate 
schematically to yield a folded polypeptide, arguably no.) On the other hand I think many 
emergence attributions are to be understood as arising from a sub-conscious inability to 
trace or follow the causal connections underlying a phenomenon. The involvement of 
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mirror neurons and similar neurological mechanisms in behavioural comprehension might 
count as evidence in favour of – or at least compatible with – this kind of view. 
 
The topic of genetic determinism discussed in Chapter 7 is an interesting case to 
consider in relation to the topics of reduction and cognitive and conceptual connectability. 
Up until the 1970s (when the part genes play in development became better understood) 
molecular biologists propounded the idea that an organism’s genotype specifies its 
phenotype, and seemed to imply that it does so in a linear way, gene by gene. The Central 
Dogma, with its simple readily visualized schema, helped to consolidate genocentric 
patterns of thinking by deflecting attention from the contextual factors that influence gene 
action and focusing just on DNA-proximate processes. These processes can certainly be 
thought of as mechanisms in my sense as far as the production of mRNA goes, for we can 
readily identify the relevant entailments and P-structures. In conjunction with knowledge of 
the RNA splicing ‘machinery’ our mechanistic picture of gene expression can be extended a 
little further out into the cell, where it comes into contact with other pockets of 
mechanistic understanding focusing on regulation, metabolism, signalling and so on. But 
whatever the prospects are for integrating all these functionally specialized sub-mechanisms 
into an overall mechanistic picture of the cell, the vision that straightforward connections 
in general exist between genotype and phenotype must be discarded.  
 
As I argued in Chapter 7, however, this is not to say that the concept of 
information, which has often been associated with genetic determinism, has no part to play 
in how we conceptualize the cell. The reified view of information encouraged by the 
Central Dogma, which construes it as something that flows outwards from the genome, 
was surely misleading. But the alternative perspective I have presented, emphasizing 
concepts of information storage and transmission, makes sense of the stability of 
chromosomal DNA sequences. Moreover it is consonant with the structural and functional 
schemas in terms of which we interpret the working of a variety of objects and products we 
regard as unambiguously informational, such as books, CDs and magnetic tapes.  
 
Explanation and understanding in biology 
 
To return almost to where I began, in Chapter 1 I reflected on some of the ways in 
which biological fields are liable to be distinctive as regards their explanatory character. I 
speculated that particular areas of biology are notable in three respects: their comparative 
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lack of law and theory, their heavy emphasis on the visualization of phenomena as a 
primary research objective, and the important part played by functional concepts. On the 
basis of the preceding chapters it is reasonable to conclude that the second two 
characteristics are ones that molecular and cell biology share. More doubt attaches to the 
status of laws and theories, in that contemporary systems and synthetic biologists argue 
that they are discovering general abstract principles about the workings of cells – expressed 
for example in terms of network motifs (Alon 2007a) – and indeed laws (Boogerd et al. 
2007, p.332). But even if this is so, it is I think reasonable to say that laws and theories of 
the kind we know from physics have not played a major part in organizing or codifying 
(and still less constituting) the knowledge acquired in mainstream molecular and cell 
biology.  
 
Given these findings we can ask how de Regt’s account of understanding, also 
discussed in Chapter 1, fares in relation to mainstream work in molecular and cell biology. 
It will be recalled that his view is based on a semantic conception of theories, in which 
models occupy a mediating position between phenomena and theory (Morgan and 
Morrison 1999). Skill and judgement must be exercised in order to develop perspicuous 
explanatory models, and a premium is placed on the intelligibility of theories. As a basis for 
explicating understanding in molecular and cell biology this sort of account seems on the 
face of it to be altogether too complex and theory-oriented. (And it is disconcerting that de 
Regt endorses a broadly Hempelian view of explanation.94) The putative laws and general 
principles of systems and synthetic biology apart, most work in biology that focuses on the 
cell has traditionally involved identifying and correlating macromolecular structures, 
processes and functions. This is frequently a visual business, as the case of protein science 
well illustrates, and I now want to examine the implications of the larger claim that 
understanding in these areas of biology has traditionally been largely a matter of 
visualizability and perhaps other forms of ‘sensibility’. In service of this goal research has 
emphasized the characterization of macromolecular structures and elucidation of their 
origins, interactions and fates. Commonly the structural and interactional knowledge 
furnished by these activities allows functions to be correlated with particular structures and 
processes, and when this is done a mechanistic ‘picture’ emerges of how a particular 
cellular phenomenon occurs. The picture here is not a simple static image, however. Rather 
I propose that it can be thought of as a set of sensory ‘frames’ (whose contents are 
visualizable or otherwise sensible structures or schematic representations of processes, i.e. 
                                                 
94 ‘I agree with the basic Hempelian idea that explanations are arguments which attempt to fit a phenomenon 
into a broader theoretical framework’ (de Regt 2009, p.25). 
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derivatives of the P-structures described earlier) associated with dispositions to connect 
frames together in ways that model the patterns of causality seen in molecular and cell 
biological phenomena, often on the basis of properties we attribute to frame contents. 
These visuo-sensory frames plus associated connective dispositions or schemas constitute 
the cognitive mechanisms by which we are able to imagine phenomena by paralleling them 
in our minds, and on the basis of which we can generate verbal descriptions when asked to 
explain them such that our interlocutors can ‘see’ what we are saying.95 These cognitive 
mechanisms are explanatory because they tell us what structures and processes participate 
in a phenomenon (frame contents) and how the phenomenon comes about (via the 
dispositions to connect frames in causality-modelling ways). (These ideas are closely related 
to the conjectures I made in Chapter 6, in that we can say that sometimes visuo-sensory 
frames are generated at ‘run time’, so to speak, by simulation schemas.) 
 
This preliminary, and somewhat dispositional, visuo-sensory account of 
understanding is consistent with – and unpacks a little further – MDC’s proposal 
concerning intelligibility, according to which it is a matter of making connections between a 
phenomenon and sensory experience. This is not necessarily incompatible with the 
perspective de Regt outlines, although it is unclear where theories fit in the account, which 
involves just phenomena and cognitive mechanisms for paralleling them. Should we say 
that these mechanisms are theory and model in one, or that the cognitive mechanisms in 
my sketch are to be equated straightforwardly just with the models of the semantic view 
(with theories being factored out of the picture)? Then again to what extent are the models 
of semantic accounts to be thought of as logico-linguistic structures, and what is their 
relationship to the visuospatial models that feature in molecular modelling?96 Perhaps one 
of the lessons of Chapter 3, concerning protein folding and MD simulation, is that there is 
a theoretical foundation to the molecular phenomena of the cell, but it is a micro-scale 
physico-chemical one (to do with inter-atomic interactions and so on) that is cognitively 
disconnected from the biological understanding obtained from visualization on account of 
the causal complexity of the relevant processes. (Note that this is compatible with my 
rendering of downward causation as inward causation, in which causes can converge on a 
region from distant and widely distributed points to act in highly non-linear ways. It is thus 
not a microreductionist view.) 
 
                                                 
95 They can also perhaps be thought of as examples of the 4-D representations for which Griesemer argues 
(2004, p.434). 
96
 Giere (1988) for one emphasizes the non-linguistic nature of models. 
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To answer such questions requires us to be clearer about what models are, and the 
difficulty is that the concept has been interpreted in a variety of ways (Morgan and 
Morrison 1999, Chapters 1 and 2; Morrison 2007, esp. Section 2). The received or syntactic 
view of models as abstract deductive structures is I take it of very little relevance to the 
sensory perspective on understanding I am outlining. Van Fraassen’s semantic account on 
the other hand incorporates the idea of a state space, which Morrison and Morgan 
explicate in these terms: 
 
If we think of a system consisting of physical entities developing in time, each of 
which has a space of possible states, then we can define a model as representing 
one of these possibilities. The models of the system will be united by a common 
state space with each model having a domain of objects plus a history function that 
assigns to each object a trajectory in that space. A physical theory will have a 
number of state spaces each of which contains a cluster of models. For example, 
the laws of motion in classical particle mechanics are laws of succession. These laws 
select the physically possible trajectories in the state space; in other words only the 
trajectories in the state space that satisfy the equations describing the laws of 
motion will be physically possible. Each of these physical possibilities is represented 
by a model. 
(Morrison and Morgan 1999, p.4) 
 
There are potential points of contact here with both the account I gave of protein folding 
science in Chapter 3 and the particle tracking ideas I discussed at the start of Chapter 4. A 
polypeptide’s conformational space is the state space within which folding takes place, and 
the laws of interatomic interaction are what in Morrison and Morgan’s terminology ‘select’ 
the physically possible trajectory of a polypeptide through that space. Each physically 
possible trajectory in Van Fraassen’s account is represented by a model which, as Morrison 
and Morgan put it, incorporates ‘a history function that assigns to each object [in the 
model] a trajectory in that space’. Thus a phenomenon such as the folding of a particular 
polypeptide is represented by a family of models rather than by a single model. It is this 
family of models that seems closest to my conception of a cognitive mechanism, although 
there are difficulties with this idea in that the models incorporate more physics than we are 
capable of cognizing. Van Fraassen’s models must for this reason be considered more as 
ontological constructs than as epistemic structures we put to practical use in the ways I 
have in mind for cognitive mechanisms. 
 
A more straightforward idea is to think of both models and cognitive mechanisms 
as representations of phenomena (Morgan and Morrison 1999, Section 2.3; Giere 2004; 
Morrison 2007, pp.210-217). Skill and judgement enter into de Regt’s account of 
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understanding chiefly in relation to the development of perspicuous models from theories. 
In the perspective I outlined above understanding and explanation are two sides of the 
same coin. The sensory frames and connective schemas that together instantiate the visuo-
sensory type of understanding that I suggest is central to the epistemology of molecular 
and cell biology are explanatory because they represent phenomena so that we can model 
them cognitively. This enables us to make predictions, construct hypotheses, design 
interventions that test our knowledge, and generate verbal and pictorial descriptions that 
communicate our knowledge to others. When we have an adequate cognitive mechanism 
we can display our understanding of a phenomenon by inspecting and interrogating frame 
contents or by imagining an entailment pattern according to our dispositions to connect 
frames in causality-modelling ways. Differences in understanding on this view could come 
about through differences in the facility with which structures or processes can be 
visualized (or other sensory associations activated) and in the capacity to coordinate frames 
with connective dispositions. 
 
Mind in biology 
 
The principal aim of this thesis has been to illustrate how epistemic and ontic 
factors interact to shape our understanding of biological systems and the explanations we 
give of them. This is perhaps seen most clearly in relation to emergence: I have argued that 
phenomena are described as emergent when and because they fail to fit our causal 
cognitive schemas. But in relation to mechanism and complexity my position is similar, in 
that what strikes us as a mechanism and what seems complex are also epistemically relative 
matters. The concept of function has played a central part in my discussion of these 
concepts, yet it remains elusive and difficult to work with. One possibility – which Ratcliffe 
(2000) points towards – is that this is because functional talk is as epistemic an affair, is as 
symptomatic of internal cognitive states, as are (say) emergence attributions. Perhaps, 
however, we can say that one of the functions of functional attribution is to act as an 
orienting device. When we know the function of something we are primed with a 
schematic set of causal expectations about how it will behave in particular circumstances, 
and about the likely systemic or contextual effects of its removal or disruption.97 This I 
suggest is what underlies the importance biologists attach to determining the functions of 
                                                 
97 Lombrozo and Carey (2006), in their account of ‘Explanation for Export’, propose the broadly compatible 
idea that the function of explanation is ‘to provide the kind of information likely to subserve future 
intervention and prediction’. They argue that functional explanations point to general causal patterns of 
potential predictive utility (pp.195-197).  
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the structures and processes that make up living systems, as was evident in the several 
recent examples from the literature mentioned in Chapter 7. There I also noted how 
reflecting on the role of the genome in transmitting phenotypic characteristics from one 
generation to the next encourages a teleological mode of explanation. That topic is too 
complex for a detailed exposition to be attempted here, but further work would I think 
show it to connect with my overall perspective in potentially fruitful ways. 
 
The teleological mode of explanation works, it will be recalled, by treating 
phenomena as though they come about on account of events and processes that are 
directed at bringing them about or that intend them to come about.98 This seeming end-
directedness I propose is a matter of phenomena fitting cognitive or behavioural schemas 
of some sort, and again (as with emergence) perhaps these schemas can be highly diverse. 
Some forms of adaptive or purposive behaviour, such as those of the hunting protozoans 
(and Grey Walter’s robotic turtles) described by Bray (2009, Chapters 1 and 2), presumably 
conform to the kinds of folk psychological schema I discussed in Chapter 6. The 
connotation of psychological characteristics in respect of non-psychological systems that 
results from this has led to teleological explanation acquiring a slight air of philosophical 
disreputability. Another class of teleological explanations involves the adoption of a ‘design 
stance’ or ‘artefact model’, in which a system is described as if it were the creation of a 
rational designer (Lewens 2005). (It has been suggested that this kind of explanation is 
especially common in elementary-level presentations such as ‘popular science’ publications 
(Lewens 2000, pp.100-102). In this regard it is interesting to note research suggesting that 
this is a basic explanatory mode to which young children default, before education instils 
increasing capacities to explain phenomena in causal-mechanical terms (Keleman 1999).) 
The idea here is that the system engages the cognitive and action schemas that would be 
invoked were we to be tasked with constructing a system to fulfil the function we attribute 
to it. Sometimes, however, perhaps a system is teleologically explicable when its behaviour 
is the result of a seemingly coordinated set of processes. Here it may that we project 
ourselves into the driving seat, so to speak, and find consonance between on the one hand 
the inter-relations between system processes and the overall system state that results and 
on the other the pattern of processual coordination that we would seek to establish were 
that system state a goal we were responsible for achieving.  
 
                                                 
98 Psychological work suggests that it is a mode of explanation to which we are strongly disposed, in relation 
not only to human behaviour (Rosset 2008) but also to natural phenomena (Keleman and Rosset 2009). 
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The picture that results from these reflections and the more detailed discussions of 
the preceding chapters is a naturalistic one that associates the content of philosophical 
debates with our embodied cognitive situation in the world. The above conjectures about 
teleological explanation show the diverse nature of our explanatory capacities, and 
reinforce the point illustrated by my treatment of emergence that they can often be 
understood in terms of cognitive schemas of various kinds. I have argued that explanation 
and understanding in molecular and cell biology make heavy use of the visual and other 
sense-proximate forms of cognition that have been relatively neglected by philosophers of 
science, but it is clear that other forms of cognition are also important. James Clerk 
Maxwell noted the relevant distinction: 
 
There are ... some minds which can go on contemplating with satisfaction pure 
quantities presented to the eye by symbols, and to the mind in a form which none 
but mathematicians can conceive. There are others who feel more enjoyment in 
following geometrical forms, which they draw on paper, or build in the empty 
space before them. 
(Maxwell 1890, quoted in Cat 2001, p.407) 
 
Maybe the new more abstract perspectives of systems and synthetic biology represent a 
major shift in the nature of biological knowledge in the direction of a framing in terms of 
‘pure quantities presented to the eye by symbols’. It is probably still too early to assess the 
prospects for developing an all-embracing ‘theory of the cell’, but if any such thing proves 
attainable it seems likely that it will be something akin to a schematic functional algorithm 
rather than a theory of the kind we know well from physics, expressed in terms of succinct 
formulae in which time and/or space appear as independent variables. It would be 
extremely interesting for this reason to investigate the relationships between sense-
proximate thought, language, and more abstract and logically based forms of reasoning.99 A 
fundamental issue in this regard is likely to concern the plasticity of different cognitive 
capacities, in terms of the extent to which they are ‘hard-wired’ into the brain.  
 
It seems plausible to suppose that sense-proximate thought, including the capacity 
to simulate phenomena visually, is more developmentally entrenched and less plastic than 
capacities for more abstract patterns of thought. Neuroanatomical differences between 
different brain regions tend to support this view. Logical reasoning and abstract thought 
                                                 
99 The tension between visual and abstract thought surfaces even in relation to quantum mechanics. 
Schrödinger wrote that he ‘felt discouraged, not to say repelled’ by Heisenberg’s transcendental algebraic 
approach, ‘which appeared very difficult to me, and by the lack of visualizability’. Heisenberg meanwhile said 
that ‘the more I reflect on the physical portion of Schrödinger’s theory the more disgusting I find it. ... What 
Schrödinger writes on the visualizability of his theory ... I consider trash’ (quoted in Yourgrau 2007, p.83). 
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are associated with the more recently evolved areas of the neocortex, whereas sensory areas 
correspond to some of the evolutionarily oldest regions of the brain. The neurons in these 
older regions are more heavily myelinated than those of the neocortex, and myelin sheath 
formation occurs earlier, suggesting a relative lack of developmental plasticity (Fields 2008). 
What are the implications of this? Does understanding necessarily require the participation 
of sense-proximate mental processes? What are the constraints on abstract thought, and 
how constrained is it, if it depends on more plastic neurological structures? Can any sort of 
philosophical connection usefully be made between the sense-proximate versus 
abstract/logical distinction and the ideas of, say, Sellars (1963/1991) or McDowell (1996)?  
 
Another set of directions for research flows from the fact that I have discussed my 
chosen themes from an obviously individualistic point of view, focusing on aspects of the 
cognitive psychology of humans as isolated epistemic agents. One natural course would be 
to broaden scope to consider the role of sociological factors, whilst another would be to 
attend much more to the practices and technologies surrounding scientific problem 
solving. These approaches and themes are already well represented, of course, in thriving 
programmes in philosophy and sociology of science. The relevance to such programmes of 
the ideas discussed in this thesis stems from the fact that explanation comes to ground in 
individual understanding, and often explanations function, in a surprisingly literal way, by 
making sense of things. 
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